On Wed, 2011-03-16 at 00:24 -0400, George Spelvin wrote: > Thank you very much for your review! > > > I've spent a while thinking about this over the past few weeks, and I > > really don't think it's productive to try to randomize the allocators. > > It provides negligible defense and just makes life harder for kernel > > hackers. > > > > (And you definitely can't randomize SLOB like this.) > > I'm not sure, either. I *do* think it actually prevents an attacker > reliably allocating two consecutive kernel objects, but I expect that > most buffer overrun attacks can just allocate lots of taget objects and > figure out which one got smashed. > > It's mostly for benchmarking and discussion. > > > >> The unlocked function is needed for following work. > >> No API change. > > > As I mentioned last time this code was discussed, we're already one > > crypto-savvy attacker away from this code becoming a security hole. > > We really need to give it a serious rethink before we make it look > > anything like a general-use API. > > If you like, and don't mind a few more bytes of per-cpu data, I'll > happily replace the whole dubious thing with a cryptographically secure > high-speed PRNG. I'm thinking ChaCha/12, as Salsa20 was selected by > eSTREAM and ChaCha is generally agreed to be stronger. (It's had more > review as the basis of the BLAKE hash function, a SHA-3 finalist.) Yes, let's do this. ChaCha looks like a fine candidate. > I've got some working SSE2 code for it, too. Invoking it should be > conditional on the amount requested; there's no point context-switching > the FPU for one iteration. > > I can also add a (configurable) /dev/frandom interface for it. I'd rather not add an frandom until after we get rid of the random/urandom dichotomy. > > And you've got it backwards here: __ should be the unlocked, dangerous > > version. But the locked version already has a __ because it's already > > dangerous. > > I don't understand. The old version did *not* have a __, and I added > __ in front of the dangerous unlocked version. If, on re-reading it, > you still think I did something wrong, can you please explain in more > detail? I probably misread your patch, sorry. > > >> This is a function for generating random numbers modulo small > >> integers, with uniform distribution and parsimonious use of seed > >> material. > > > This actually looks pretty reasonable, ignoring the scary API foundation > > it's built on. But as popular as rand() % m constructs are with > > programmers, it's better to design things so as to avoid the modulus > > entirely. We've done pretty well at that so far, so I'd rather not have > > such a thing in the kernel. > > I was thinking of using it to implement randomize_range(), I just didn't > want to be too intrusive, and I'd need to extend the code to handle 64-bit > address spaces. > > If you'd like, I can do that. (Actually, looking at it, there are > only three callers and the range is always 0x02000000. And the > use of PAGE_ALIGN is wrong; it should round down rather than up.) > On Mon, 2011-03-14 at 21:58 -0400, George Spelvin wrote: > > > >> For sysfs files that map a boolean to a flags bit. > > > This one's actually pretty nice. > > The old code just annoyed me; I couldn't stand to cut & paste one > more time. > > I can probably do better; I can extend the slab_sttribute structure to > include the bit mask, have the slab_attr_show and slab_attr_store dispatch > functions pass the attribute pointer to the ->show and ->store functions, > and do away with all the per-bit functions. > > > You should really try to put all the uncontroversial bits of a series > > first. > > Is that really a more important principle than putting related changes > together? I get the idea, but thought it made more sense to put > all the slub.c changes together. Think of it as a way of making forward progress. You should explicitly call out 'hey, these bits are cleanups you should just merge' so they don't get lost in the debate. Then the next time around, you have that many fewer patches. -- Mathematics is the supreme nostalgia of our time. -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxx For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Fight unfair telecom internet charges in Canada: sign http://stopthemeter.ca/ Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@xxxxxxxxx";> email@xxxxxxxxx </a>