On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 12:34 AM Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 3:09 PM, Rick Edgecombe > <rick.p.edgecombe@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > This patch changes the module loading KASLR algorithm to randomize the position > > of each module text section allocation with at least 18 bits of entropy in the > > typical case. It used on x86_64 only for now. > > Very cool! Thanks for sending the series. :) > > > Today the RANDOMIZE_BASE feature randomizes the base address where the module > > allocations begin with 10 bits of entropy. From here, a highly deterministic > > algorithm allocates space for the modules as they are loaded and un-loaded. If > > an attacker can predict the order and identities for modules that will be > > loaded, then a single text address leak can give the attacker access to the > > nit: "text address" -> "module text address" > > > So the defensive strength of this algorithm in typical usage (<800 modules) for > > x86_64 should be at least 18 bits, even if an address from the random area > > leaks. > > And most systems have <200 modules, really. I have 113 on a desktop > right now, 63 on a server. So this looks like a trivial win. But note that the eBPF JIT also uses module_alloc(). Every time a BPF program (this includes seccomp filters!) is JIT-compiled by the kernel, another module_alloc() allocation is made. For example, on my desktop machine, I have a bunch of seccomp-sandboxed processes thanks to Chrome. If I enable the net.core.bpf_jit_enable sysctl and open a few Chrome tabs, BPF JIT allocations start showing up between modules: # grep -C1 bpf_jit_binary_alloc /proc/vmallocinfo | cut -d' ' -f 2- 20480 load_module+0x1326/0x2ab0 pages=4 vmalloc N0=4 12288 bpf_jit_binary_alloc+0x32/0x90 pages=2 vmalloc N0=2 20480 load_module+0x1326/0x2ab0 pages=4 vmalloc N0=4 -- 20480 load_module+0x1326/0x2ab0 pages=4 vmalloc N0=4 12288 bpf_jit_binary_alloc+0x32/0x90 pages=2 vmalloc N0=2 36864 load_module+0x1326/0x2ab0 pages=8 vmalloc N0=8 -- 20480 load_module+0x1326/0x2ab0 pages=4 vmalloc N0=4 12288 bpf_jit_binary_alloc+0x32/0x90 pages=2 vmalloc N0=2 40960 load_module+0x1326/0x2ab0 pages=9 vmalloc N0=9 -- 20480 load_module+0x1326/0x2ab0 pages=4 vmalloc N0=4 12288 bpf_jit_binary_alloc+0x32/0x90 pages=2 vmalloc N0=2 253952 load_module+0x1326/0x2ab0 pages=61 vmalloc N0=61 If you use Chrome with Site Isolation, you have a few dozen open tabs, and the BPF JIT is enabled, reaching a few hundred allocations might not be that hard. Also: What's the impact on memory usage? Is this going to increase the number of pagetables that need to be allocated by the kernel per module_alloc() by 4K or 8K or so? > > As for fragmentation, this algorithm reduces the average number of modules that > > can be loaded without an allocation failure by about 6% (~17000 to ~16000) > > (p<0.05). It can also reduce the largest module executable section that can be > > loaded by half to ~500MB in the worst case. > > Given that we only have 8312 tristate Kconfig items, I think 16000 > will remain just fine. And even large modules (i915) are under 2MB... > > > The new __vmalloc_node_try_addr function uses the existing function > > __vmalloc_node_range, in order to introduce this algorithm with the least > > invasive change. The side effect is that each time there is a collision when > > trying to allocate in the random area a TLB flush will be triggered. There is > > a more complex, more efficient implementation that can be used instead if > > there is interest in improving performance. > > The only time when module loading speed is noticeable, I would think, > would be boot time. Have you done any boot time delta analysis? I > wouldn't expect it to change hardly at all, but it's probably a good > idea to actually test it. :) If you have a forking server that applies seccomp filters on each fork, or something like that, you might care about those TLB flushes. > Also: can this be generalized for use on other KASLRed architectures? > For example, I know the arm64 module randomization is pretty similar > to x86. > > -Kees > > -- > Kees Cook > Pixel Security
