On Thu, Apr 19, 2018 at 9:02 AM, Dave Hansen
<dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 04/18/2018 05:11 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Fri, Apr 6, 2018 at 1:55 PM, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> +/*
>>> + * For some configurations, map all of kernel text into the user page
>>> + * tables. This reduces TLB misses, especially on non-PCID systems.
>>> + */
>>> +void pti_clone_kernel_text(void)
>>> +{
>>> + unsigned long start = PFN_ALIGN(_text);
>>> + unsigned long end = ALIGN((unsigned long)_end, PMD_PAGE_SIZE);
>> I think this is too much set global: _end is after data, bss, and brk,
>> and all kinds of other stuff that could hold secrets. I think this
>> should match what mark_rodata_ro() is doing and use
>> __end_rodata_hpage_align. (And on i386, this should be maybe _etext.)
>
> Sounds reasonable to me. This does assume that there are no secrets
> built into the kernel image, right?
It's hard to say, but I was trying to consider the basic threat model
of having your kernel image available to an attacker (i.e. a distro
kernel can be examined from packages, etc). In that case, the text and
rodata are readable through much more direct mechanisms. Everything
after rodata is run-time state, and should be excluded in the general
case.
I would expect more paranoid system builders to boot with "pti=on",
but perhaps we should disable Global under other specific CONFIGs, or
make a specific CONFIG for it that other options can select, probably.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
