On 2/27/18 9:52 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > I'd like more details on the threat model here; if it's just a matter > of .so loading order, I wonder if load order randomization would get a > comparable level of uncertainty without the memory fragmentation, This also seems to assume that leaking the address of one single library isn't enough to mount a ROP attack to either gain enough privileges or generate a primitive that can leak further information. Is this really the case? Do you have some further data around this? - twiz -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@xxxxxxxxx. For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@xxxxxxxxx";> email@xxxxxxxxx </a>
