From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
KAISER has two copies of the page tables: one for the kernel and
one for when we are running in userspace. There is also a kernel
portion of each of the page tables: the part that *maps* the
kernel.
The kernel portion is relatively static and uses pre-populated
PGDs. Nobody ever calls set_pgd() on the kernel portion during
normal operation.
The userspace portion of the page tables is updated frequently as
userspace pages are mapped and we demand-allocate page table
pages. These updates of the userspace *portion* of the tables
need to be reflected into both the kernel and user/shadow copies.
The original KAISER patches did this by effectively looking at
the address that we are updating *for*. If it is <PAGE_OFFSET,
we are doing an update for the userspace portion of the page
tables and must make an entry in the shadow. We also make the
kernel copy if this new entry unusable for userspace.
However, this has a wrinkle: we have a few places where we use
low addresses in supervisor (kernel) mode. When we make EFI
calls, we they use traditionaly user addresses in supervisor mode
and trip over these checks. The trampoline code that we use for
booting secondary CPUs has a similar issue.
Remember, we need to do two things for a userspace PGD: populate
the shadow and sabotage the kernel PGD so it can not be used in
userspace. This patch fixes the wrinkle by only doing those two
things when we are dealing with a user address *and* the PGD has
_PAGE_USER set. That way, we do not accidentally sabotage the
in-kernel users of low addresses that are typically used only for
userspace.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Moritz Lipp <moritz.lipp@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Michael Schwarz <michael.schwarz@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: x86@xxxxxxxxxx
---
b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 61 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff -puN arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h~kaiser-set-pgd-careful-plus-NX arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h~kaiser-set-pgd-careful-plus-NX 2017-11-08 10:45:30.776681391 -0800
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h 2017-11-08 10:45:30.779681391 -0800
@@ -177,38 +177,76 @@ static inline p4d_t *native_get_normal_p
/*
* Page table pages are page-aligned. The lower half of the top
* level is used for userspace and the top half for the kernel.
- * This returns true for user pages that need to get copied into
- * both the user and kernel copies of the page tables, and false
- * for kernel pages that should only be in the kernel copy.
+ *
+ * Returns true for parts of the PGD that map userspace and
+ * false for the parts that map the kernel.
*/
-static inline bool is_userspace_pgd(void *__ptr)
+static inline bool pgdp_maps_userspace(void *__ptr)
{
unsigned long ptr = (unsigned long)__ptr;
return ((ptr % PAGE_SIZE) < (PAGE_SIZE / 2));
}
+/*
+ * Does this PGD allow access via userspace?
+ */
+static inline bool pgd_userspace_access(pgd_t pgd)
+{
+ return (pgd.pgd & _PAGE_USER);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the pgd_t that the kernel should use in its page tables.
+ */
+static inline pgd_t kaiser_set_shadow_pgd(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_KAISER
+ if (pgd_userspace_access(pgd)) {
+ if (pgdp_maps_userspace(pgdp)) {
+ /*
+ * The user/shadow page tables get the full
+ * PGD, accessible to userspace:
+ */
+ native_get_shadow_pgd(pgdp)->pgd = pgd.pgd;
+ /*
+ * For the copy of the pgd that the kernel
+ * uses, make it unusable to userspace. This
+ * ensures if we get out to userspace with the
+ * wrong CR3 value, userspace will crash
+ * instead of running.
+ */
+ pgd.pgd |= _PAGE_NX;
+ }
+ } else if (!pgd.pgd) {
+ /*
+ * We are clearing the PGD and can not check _PAGE_USER
+ * in the zero'd PGD. We never do this on the
+ * pre-populated kernel PGDs, except for pgd_bad().
+ */
+ if (pgdp_maps_userspace(pgdp)) {
+ native_get_shadow_pgd(pgdp)->pgd = pgd.pgd;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Uh, we are very confused. We have been
+ * asked to clear a PGD that is in the kernel
+ * part of the address space. We preallocated
+ * all the KAISER PGDs, so this should never
+ * happen.
+ */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ /* return the copy of the PGD we want the kernel to use: */
+ return pgd;
+}
+
+
static inline void native_set_p4d(p4d_t *p4dp, p4d_t p4d)
{
#if defined(CONFIG_KAISER) && !defined(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)
- /*
- * set_pgd() does not get called when we are running
- * CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL=y. So, just hack around it. We
- * know here that we have a p4d but that it is really at
- * the top level of the page tables; it is really just a
- * pgd.
- */
- /* Do we need to also populate the shadow p4d? */
- if (is_userspace_pgd(p4dp))
- native_get_shadow_p4d(p4dp)->pgd = p4d.pgd;
- /*
- * Even if the entry is *mapping* userspace, ensure
- * that userspace can not use it. This way, if we
- * get out to userspace with the wrong CR3 value,
- * userspace will crash instead of running.
- */
- if (!p4d.pgd.pgd)
- p4dp->pgd.pgd = p4d.pgd.pgd | _PAGE_NX;
+ p4dp->pgd = kaiser_set_shadow_pgd(&p4dp->pgd, p4d.pgd);
#else /* CONFIG_KAISER */
*p4dp = p4d;
#endif
@@ -226,17 +264,7 @@ static inline void native_p4d_clear(p4d_
static inline void native_set_pgd(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_KAISER
- /* Do we need to also populate the shadow pgd? */
- if (is_userspace_pgd(pgdp))
- native_get_shadow_pgd(pgdp)->pgd = pgd.pgd;
- /*
- * Even if the entry is mapping userspace, ensure
- * that it is unusable for userspace. This way,
- * if we get out to userspace with the wrong CR3
- * value, userspace will crash instead of running.
- */
- if (!pgd_none(pgd))
- pgdp->pgd = pgd.pgd | _PAGE_NX;
+ *pgdp = kaiser_set_shadow_pgd(pgdp, pgd);
#else /* CONFIG_KAISER */
*pgdp = pgd;
#endif
_
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