On Fri, Jun 16, 2017 at 01:53:26PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> Boot data (such as EFI related data) is not encrypted when the system is
> booted because UEFI/BIOS does not run with SME active. In order to access
> this data properly it needs to be mapped decrypted.
>
> Update early_memremap() to provide an arch specific routine to modify the
> pagetable protection attributes before they are applied to the new
> mapping. This is used to remove the encryption mask for boot related data.
>
> Update memremap() to provide an arch specific routine to determine if RAM
> remapping is allowed. RAM remapping will cause an encrypted mapping to be
> generated. By preventing RAM remapping, ioremap_cache() will be used
> instead, which will provide a decrypted mapping of the boot related data.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/io.h | 5 +
> arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 179 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/linux/io.h | 2 +
> kernel/memremap.c | 20 ++++-
> mm/early_ioremap.c | 18 ++++-
> 5 files changed, 217 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
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