Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear

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On 5/15/2017 1:35 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 04:19:21PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
Boot data (such as EFI related data) is not encrypted when the system is
booted because UEFI/BIOS does not run with SME active. In order to access
this data properly it needs to be mapped decrypted.

The early_memremap() support is updated to provide an arch specific

"Update early_memremap() to provide... "

Will do.


routine to modify the pagetable protection attributes before they are
applied to the new mapping. This is used to remove the encryption mask
for boot related data.

The memremap() support is updated to provide an arch specific routine

Ditto. Passive tone always reads harder than an active tone,
"doer"-sentence.

Ditto.


to determine if RAM remapping is allowed.  RAM remapping will cause an
encrypted mapping to be generated. By preventing RAM remapping,
ioremap_cache() will be used instead, which will provide a decrypted
mapping of the boot related data.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/io.h |    4 +
 arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c     |  182 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/io.h        |    2
 kernel/memremap.c         |   20 ++++-
 mm/early_ioremap.c        |   18 ++++
 5 files changed, 219 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
index 7afb0e2..75f2858 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
@@ -381,4 +381,8 @@ extern int __must_check arch_phys_wc_add(unsigned long base,
 #define arch_io_reserve_memtype_wc arch_io_reserve_memtype_wc
 #endif

+extern bool arch_memremap_do_ram_remap(resource_size_t offset, size_t size,
+				       unsigned long flags);
+#define arch_memremap_do_ram_remap arch_memremap_do_ram_remap
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_IO_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index 9bfcb1f..bce0604 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <linux/mmiotrace.h>
+#include <linux/efi.h>

 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/e820/api.h>
@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
 #include <asm/pat.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>

 #include "physaddr.h"

@@ -419,6 +421,186 @@ void unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t phys, void *addr)
 	iounmap((void __iomem *)((unsigned long)addr & PAGE_MASK));
 }

+/*
+ * Examine the physical address to determine if it is an area of memory
+ * that should be mapped decrypted.  If the memory is not part of the
+ * kernel usable area it was accessed and created decrypted, so these
+ * areas should be mapped decrypted.
+ */
+static bool memremap_should_map_decrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+					  unsigned long size)
+{
+	/* Check if the address is outside kernel usable area */
+	switch (e820__get_entry_type(phys_addr, phys_addr + size - 1)) {
+	case E820_TYPE_RESERVED:
+	case E820_TYPE_ACPI:
+	case E820_TYPE_NVS:
+	case E820_TYPE_UNUSABLE:
+		return true;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Examine the physical address to determine if it is EFI data. Check
+ * it against the boot params structure and EFI tables and memory types.
+ */
+static bool memremap_is_efi_data(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+				 unsigned long size)
+{
+	u64 paddr;
+
+	/* Check if the address is part of EFI boot/runtime data */
+	if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {

Save indentation level:

	if (!efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
		return false;


I was worried what the compiler might do when CONFIG_EFI is not set,
but it appears to take care of it. I'll double check though.


+		paddr = boot_params.efi_info.efi_memmap_hi;
+		paddr <<= 32;
+		paddr |= boot_params.efi_info.efi_memmap;
+		if (phys_addr == paddr)
+			return true;
+
+		paddr = boot_params.efi_info.efi_systab_hi;
+		paddr <<= 32;
+		paddr |= boot_params.efi_info.efi_systab;

So those two above look like could be two global vars which are
initialized somewhere in the EFI init path:

efi_memmap_phys and efi_systab_phys or so.

Matt ?

And then you won't need to create that paddr each time on the fly. I
mean, it's not a lot of instructions but still...

+		if (phys_addr == paddr)
+			return true;
+
+		if (efi_table_address_match(phys_addr))
+			return true;
+
+		switch (efi_mem_type(phys_addr)) {
+		case EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA:
+		case EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA:
+			return true;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Examine the physical address to determine if it is boot data by checking
+ * it against the boot params setup_data chain.
+ */
+static bool memremap_is_setup_data(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+				   unsigned long size)
+{
+	struct setup_data *data;
+	u64 paddr, paddr_next;
+
+	paddr = boot_params.hdr.setup_data;
+	while (paddr) {
+		bool is_setup_data = false;

You don't need that bool:

static bool memremap_is_setup_data(resource_size_t phys_addr,
                                   unsigned long size)
{
        struct setup_data *data;
        u64 paddr, paddr_next;

        paddr = boot_params.hdr.setup_data;
        while (paddr) {
                if (phys_addr == paddr)
                        return true;

                data = memremap(paddr, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB | MEMREMAP_DEC);

                paddr_next = data->next;

                if ((phys_addr > paddr) && (phys_addr < (paddr + data->len))) {
                        memunmap(data);
                        return true;
                }

                memunmap(data);

                paddr = paddr_next;
        }
        return false;
}

Flow is a bit clearer.

I may introduce a length variable to capture data->len right after
paddr_next is set and then have just a single memunmap() call before
the if check.


+/*
+ * Examine the physical address to determine if it is boot data by checking
+ * it against the boot params setup_data chain (early boot version).
+ */
+static bool __init early_memremap_is_setup_data(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+						unsigned long size)
+{
+	struct setup_data *data;
+	u64 paddr, paddr_next;
+
+	paddr = boot_params.hdr.setup_data;
+	while (paddr) {
+		bool is_setup_data = false;
+
+		if (phys_addr == paddr)
+			return true;
+
+		data = early_memremap_decrypted(paddr, sizeof(*data));
+
+		paddr_next = data->next;
+
+		if ((phys_addr > paddr) && (phys_addr < (paddr + data->len)))
+			is_setup_data = true;
+
+		early_memunmap(data, sizeof(*data));
+
+		if (is_setup_data)
+			return true;
+
+		paddr = paddr_next;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}

This one is begging to be unified with memremap_is_setup_data() to both
call a __ worker function.

I tried that, but calling an "__init" function (early_memremap()) from
a non "__init" function generated warnings. I suppose I can pass in a
function for the map and unmap but that looks worse to me (also the
unmap functions take different arguments).


+
+/*
+ * Architecture function to determine if RAM remap is allowed. By default, a
+ * RAM remap will map the data as encrypted. Determine if a RAM remap should
+ * not be done so that the data will be mapped decrypted.
+ */
+bool arch_memremap_do_ram_remap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
+				unsigned long flags)

So this function doesn't do anything - it replies to a yes/no question.
So the name should not say "do" but sound like a question. Maybe:

	if (arch_memremap_can_remap( ... ))

or so...

Ok, I'll change that.


+{
+	if (!sme_active())
+		return true;
+
+	if (flags & MEMREMAP_ENC)
+		return true;
+
+	if (flags & MEMREMAP_DEC)
+		return false;

So this looks strange to me: both flags MEMREMAP_ENC and _DEC override
setup and efi data checking. But we want to remap setup and EFI  data
*always* decrypted because that data was not encrypted as, as you say,
firmware doesn't run with SME active.

So my simple logic says that EFI stuff should *always* be mapped DEC,
regardless of flags. Ditto for setup data. So that check below should
actually *override* the flags checks and go before them, no?

This is like the chicken and the egg scenario. In order to determine if
an address is setup data I have to explicitly map the setup data chain
as decrypted. In order to do that I have to supply a flag to explicitly
map the data decrypted otherwise I wind up back in the
memremap_is_setup_data() function again and again and again...


+
+	if (memremap_is_setup_data(phys_addr, size) ||
+	    memremap_is_efi_data(phys_addr, size) ||
+	    memremap_should_map_decrypted(phys_addr, size))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Architecture override of __weak function to adjust the protection attributes
+ * used when remapping memory. By default, early_memremp() will map the data

early_memremAp() - a is missing.

Got it.

Thanks,
Tom



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