On 02/03/2017 16:18, Brijesh Singh wrote: > The SEV memory encryption engine uses a tweak such that two identical > plaintexts at different location will have a different ciphertexts. > So swapping or moving ciphertexts of two pages will not result in > plaintexts being swapped. Relocating (or migrating) a physical backing pages > for SEV guest will require some additional steps. The current SEV key > management spec [1] does not provide commands to swap or migrate (move) > ciphertexts. For now we pin the memory allocated for the SEV guest. In > future when SEV key management spec provides the commands to support the > page migration we can update the KVM code to remove the pinning logical > without making any changes into userspace (qemu). > > The patch pins userspace memory when a new slot is created and unpin the > memory when slot is removed. > > [1] http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM%20API_Spec.pdf This is not enough, because memory can be hidden temporarily from the guest and remapped later. Think of a PCI BAR that is backed by RAM, or also SMRAM. The pinning must be kept even in that case. You need to add a pair of KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OPs (one that doesn't map to a PSP operation), such as KVM_REGISTER/UNREGISTER_ENCRYPTED_RAM. In QEMU you can use a RAMBlockNotifier to invoke the ioctls. Paolo > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx> > --- > arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 6 +++ > arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 93 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 3 + > 3 files changed, 102 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h > index fcc4710..9dc59f0 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h > @@ -723,6 +723,7 @@ struct kvm_sev_info { > unsigned int handle; /* firmware handle */ > unsigned int asid; /* asid for this guest */ > int sev_fd; /* SEV device fd */ > + struct list_head pinned_memory_slot; > }; > > struct kvm_arch { > @@ -1043,6 +1044,11 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops { > void (*setup_mce)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); > > int (*memory_encryption_op)(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp); > + > + void (*prepare_memory_region)(struct kvm *kvm, > + struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot, > + const struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem, > + enum kvm_mr_change change); > }; > > struct kvm_arch_async_pf { > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > index 13996d6..ab973f9 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > @@ -498,12 +498,21 @@ static inline bool gif_set(struct vcpu_svm *svm) > } > > /* Secure Encrypted Virtualization */ > +struct kvm_sev_pinned_memory_slot { > + struct list_head list; > + unsigned long npages; > + struct page **pages; > + unsigned long userspace_addr; > + short id; > +}; > + > static unsigned int max_sev_asid; > static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap; > static void sev_deactivate_handle(struct kvm *kvm); > static void sev_decommission_handle(struct kvm *kvm); > static int sev_asid_new(void); > static void sev_asid_free(int asid); > +static void sev_unpin_memory(struct page **pages, unsigned long npages); > #define __sev_page_pa(x) ((page_to_pfn(x) << PAGE_SHIFT) | sme_me_mask) > > static bool kvm_sev_enabled(void) > @@ -1544,9 +1553,25 @@ static inline int avic_free_vm_id(int id) > > static void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) > { > + struct list_head *pos, *q; > + struct kvm_sev_pinned_memory_slot *pinned_slot; > + struct list_head *head = &kvm->arch.sev_info.pinned_memory_slot; > + > if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > return; > > + /* if guest memory is pinned then unpin it now */ > + if (!list_empty(head)) { > + list_for_each_safe(pos, q, head) { > + pinned_slot = list_entry(pos, > + struct kvm_sev_pinned_memory_slot, list); > + sev_unpin_memory(pinned_slot->pages, > + pinned_slot->npages); > + list_del(pos); > + kfree(pinned_slot); > + } > + } > + > /* release the firmware resources */ > sev_deactivate_handle(kvm); > sev_decommission_handle(kvm); > @@ -5663,6 +5688,8 @@ static int sev_pre_start(struct kvm *kvm, int *asid) > } > *asid = ret; > ret = 0; > + > + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.sev_info.pinned_memory_slot); > } > > return ret; > @@ -6189,6 +6216,71 @@ static int sev_launch_measure(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > return ret; > } > > +static struct kvm_sev_pinned_memory_slot *sev_find_pinned_memory_slot( > + struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot) > +{ > + struct kvm_sev_pinned_memory_slot *i; > + struct list_head *head = &kvm->arch.sev_info.pinned_memory_slot; > + > + list_for_each_entry(i, head, list) { > + if (i->userspace_addr == slot->userspace_addr && > + i->id == slot->id) > + return i; > + } > + > + return NULL; > +} > + > +static void amd_prepare_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, > + struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot, > + const struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem, > + enum kvm_mr_change change) > +{ > + struct kvm_sev_pinned_memory_slot *pinned_slot; > + struct list_head *head = &kvm->arch.sev_info.pinned_memory_slot; > + > + mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); > + > + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > + goto unlock; > + > + if (change == KVM_MR_CREATE) { > + > + if (!mem->memory_size) > + goto unlock; > + > + pinned_slot = kmalloc(sizeof(*pinned_slot), GFP_KERNEL); > + if (pinned_slot == NULL) > + goto unlock; > + > + pinned_slot->pages = sev_pin_memory(mem->userspace_addr, > + mem->memory_size, &pinned_slot->npages); > + if (pinned_slot->pages == NULL) { > + kfree(pinned_slot); > + goto unlock; > + } > + > + sev_clflush_pages(pinned_slot->pages, pinned_slot->npages); > + > + pinned_slot->id = memslot->id; > + pinned_slot->userspace_addr = mem->userspace_addr; > + list_add_tail(&pinned_slot->list, head); > + > + } else if (change == KVM_MR_DELETE) { > + > + pinned_slot = sev_find_pinned_memory_slot(kvm, memslot); > + if (!pinned_slot) > + goto unlock; > + > + sev_unpin_memory(pinned_slot->pages, pinned_slot->npages); > + list_del(&pinned_slot->list); > + kfree(pinned_slot); > + } > + > +unlock: > + mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); > +} > + > static int amd_memory_encryption_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > { > int r = -ENOTTY; > @@ -6355,6 +6447,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __ro_after_init = { > .update_pi_irte = svm_update_pi_irte, > > .memory_encryption_op = amd_memory_encryption_cmd, > + .prepare_memory_region = amd_prepare_memory_region, > }; > > static int __init svm_init(void) > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c > index 6a737e9..e05069d 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c > @@ -8195,6 +8195,9 @@ int kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, > const struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem, > enum kvm_mr_change change) > { > + if (kvm_x86_ops->prepare_memory_region) > + kvm_x86_ops->prepare_memory_region(kvm, memslot, mem, change); > + > return 0; > } > > -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@xxxxxxxxx. 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