> On Wed, Jan 25, 2017 at 1:43 PM, Ben Hutchings <ben@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > wrote: > > On Wed, 2017-01-25 at 13:06 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > >> If an unprivileged program opens a setgid file for write and passes > >> the fd to a privileged program and the privileged program writes to > >> it, we currently fail to clear the setgid bit. Fix it by checking > >> f_cred instead of current's creds whenever a struct file is involved. > > [...] > > > > What if, instead, a privileged program passes the fd to an un > > unprivileged program? It sounds like a bad idea to start with, but at > > least currently the unprivileged program is going to clear the setgid > > bit when it writes. This change would make that behaviour more > > dangerous. > > Hmm. Although, if a privileged program does something like: > > (sudo -u nobody echo blah) >setuid_program > > presumably it wanted to make the change. I'm not following all the intricacies here, though I need to... What about a privileged program that drops privilege for certain operations? Specifically the Ganesha user space NFS server runs as root, but sets fsuid/fsgid for specific threads performing I/O operations on behalf of NFS clients. I want to make sure setgid bit handling is proper for these cases. Ganesha does some permission checking, but this is one area I want to defer to the underlying filesystem because it's not easy for Ganesha to get it right. > > Perhaps there should be a capability check on both the current > > credentials and file credentials? (I realise that we've considered > > file credential checks to be sufficient elsewhere, but those cases > > involved virtual files with special semantics, where it's clearer that > > a privileged process should not pass them to an unprivileged process.) > > > > I could go either way. > > What I really want to do is to write a third patch that isn't for -stable that just > removes the capable() check entirely. I'm reasonably confident it won't > break things for a silly reason: because it's capable() and not ns_capable(), > anything it would break would also be broken in an unprivileged container, > and I haven't seen any reports of package managers or similar breaking for > this reason. Frank --- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. https://www.avast.com/antivirus -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@xxxxxxxxx. For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Don't email: <a href
