Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
> On Thu, Nov 17, 2016 at 9:08 AM, Eric W. Biederman
> <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>> It is the reasonable expectation that if an executable file is not
>> readable there will be no way for a user without special privileges to
>> read the file. This is enforced in ptrace_attach but if we are
>> already attached there is no enforcement if a readonly executable
>> is exec'd.
>>
>> Therefore do the simple thing and if there is a non-dumpable
>> executable that we are tracing without privilege fail to exec it.
>>
>> Fixes: v1.0
>> Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> ---
>> fs/exec.c | 8 +++++++-
>> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
>> index fdec760bfac3..de107f74e055 100644
>> --- a/fs/exec.c
>> +++ b/fs/exec.c
>> @@ -1230,6 +1230,11 @@ int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
>> {
>> int retval;
>>
>> + /* Fail if the tracer can't read the executable */
>> + if ((bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP) &&
>> + !ptracer_capable(current, bprm->mm->user_ns))
>> + return -EPERM;
>> +
>
> At the very least, I think that BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP needs to
> check capable_wrt_inode_uidgid too. Otherwise we risk breaking:
>
> $ gcc whatever.c
> $ chmod 400 a.out
> $ strace a.out
It is an invariant that if you have caps in mm->user_ns you will
also be capable_write_inode_uidgid of all files that a process exec's.
My third patch winds up changing mm->user_ns to maintain this invariant.
It is also true that Willy convinced me while this check is trivial it
will break historic uses so I have replaced this patch with:
"ptrace: Don't allow accessing an undumpable mm.
Eric
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