On 07/09/2016 01:37 AM, Ingo Molnar wrote: > - There are 16 pkey indices on x86 currently. We already use index 15 for the > true PROT_EXEC implementation. Let's set aside another pkey index for the > kernel's potential future use (index 14), and clear it explicitly in the > FPU context on every context switch if CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU is enabled to make > sure it remains unallocated. After mulling over this for a week: I really don't think we want to pre-reserve any keys. The one bit of consistent feedback I've heard from the folks that are going to use this is that they want more keys. The current code does not reserve any keys (except 0 of course). Virtually every feature that we've talked about adding on top of this _requires_ having this allocation mechanism and kernel knowledge of which keys are in use. Even having kernel-reserved keys requires telling userspace about allocation, whether we use pkey_mprotect() for it or not. I'd like to resubmit this set with pkey_get/set() removed, but with pkey_alloc/free() still in place. Why are folks so sensitive to the number of keys? There are a few modes this will get used in when folks want more pkeys that hardware provides. Both of them are harmed in a meaningful way if we take some of their keys away. Here's how they will use pkeys: 1. As an accelerator for existing mprotect()-provided guarantees. Let's say you want 100 pieces of data, but you only get 15 pkeys in hardware. The app picks the 15 most-frequently accessed pieces, and uses pkeys to control access to them, and uses mprotect() for the other 85. Each pkey you remove means a smaller "working set" covered by pkeys, more mprotect()s and lower performance. 2. To provide stronger access guarantees. Let's say you have 100 pieces of data. To access a given piece of data, you hash its key in to a pkey: hash(92)%NR_PKEYS. Accessing a random bit of data, you have a 1/NR_PKEYS chance of a hash collision and access to data you should not have access to. Fewer keys means more data corruption. Losing 2/16 keys means a 15% greater chance of a collision on a given access. -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@xxxxxxxxx. For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@xxxxxxxxx";> email@xxxxxxxxx </a>