From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
This establishes two more system calls for protection key management:
unsigned long pkey_get(int pkey);
int pkey_set(int pkey, unsigned long access_rights);
The return value from pkey_get() and the 'access_rights' passed
to pkey_set() are the same format: a bitmask containing
PKEY_DENY_WRITE and/or PKEY_DENY_ACCESS, or nothing set at all.
These can replace userspace's direct use of the new rdpkru/wrpkru
instructions.
With current hardware, the kernel can not enforce that it has
control over a given key. But, this at least allows the kernel
to indicate to userspace that userspace does not control a given
protection key. This makes it more likely that situations like
using a pkey after sys_pkey_free() can be detected.
The kernel does _not_ enforce that this interface must be used for
changes to PKRU, whether or not a key has been "allocated".
This syscall interface could also theoretically be replaced with a
pair of vsyscalls. The vsyscalls would just call WRPKRU/RDPKRU
directly in situations where they are drop-in equivalents for
what the kernel would be doing.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: linux-api@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: linux-mm@xxxxxxxxx
Cc: x86@xxxxxxxxxx
Cc: torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
---
b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 2 +
b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 2 +
b/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h | 4 +-
b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
b/include/linux/pkeys.h | 8 ++++
b/mm/mprotect.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++
6 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff -puN arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl~pkeys-118-syscalls-set-get arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl~pkeys-118-syscalls-set-get 2016-05-31 08:27:49.962152188 -0700
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl 2016-05-31 08:27:49.978152911 -0700
@@ -389,3 +389,5 @@
380 i386 pkey_mprotect sys_pkey_mprotect
381 i386 pkey_alloc sys_pkey_alloc
382 i386 pkey_free sys_pkey_free
+383 i386 pkey_get sys_pkey_get
+384 i386 pkey_set sys_pkey_set
diff -puN arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl~pkeys-118-syscalls-set-get arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl~pkeys-118-syscalls-set-get 2016-05-31 08:27:49.965152324 -0700
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl 2016-05-31 08:27:49.979152956 -0700
@@ -338,6 +338,8 @@
329 common pkey_mprotect sys_pkey_mprotect
330 common pkey_alloc sys_pkey_alloc
331 common pkey_free sys_pkey_free
+332 common pkey_get sys_pkey_get
+333 common pkey_set sys_pkey_set
#
# x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impact
diff -puN arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h~pkeys-118-syscalls-set-get arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h~pkeys-118-syscalls-set-get 2016-05-31 08:27:49.967152414 -0700
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h 2016-05-31 08:27:49.980153001 -0700
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ static inline bool validate_pkey(int pke
}
static inline
-bool mm_pkey_is_allocated(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long pkey)
+bool mm_pkey_is_allocated(struct mm_struct *mm, int pkey)
{
if (!validate_pkey(pkey))
return true;
@@ -107,4 +107,6 @@ extern int arch_set_user_pkey_access(str
extern int __arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey,
unsigned long init_val);
+extern unsigned long arch_get_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ int pkey);
#endif /*_ASM_X86_PKEYS_H */
diff -puN arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c~pkeys-118-syscalls-set-get arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c~pkeys-118-syscalls-set-get 2016-05-31 08:27:49.969152504 -0700
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c 2016-05-31 08:27:49.981153046 -0700
@@ -690,7 +690,7 @@ void fpu__resume_cpu(void)
*
* Note: does not work for compacted buffers.
*/
-void *__raw_xsave_addr(struct xregs_state *xsave, int xstate_feature_mask)
+static void *__raw_xsave_addr(struct xregs_state *xsave, int xstate_feature_mask)
{
int feature_nr = fls64(xstate_feature_mask) - 1;
@@ -864,6 +864,7 @@ out:
#define NR_VALID_PKRU_BITS (CONFIG_NR_PROTECTION_KEYS * 2)
#define PKRU_VALID_MASK (NR_VALID_PKRU_BITS - 1)
+#define PKRU_INIT_STATE 0
/*
* This will go out and modify the XSAVE buffer so that PKRU is
@@ -882,6 +883,9 @@ int __arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct t
int pkey_shift = (pkey * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY);
u32 new_pkru_bits = 0;
+ /* Only support manipulating current task for now */
+ if (tsk != current)
+ return -EINVAL;
/*
* This check implies XSAVE support. OSPKE only gets
* set if we enable XSAVE and we enable PKU in XCR0.
@@ -907,7 +911,7 @@ int __arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct t
* state.
*/
if (!old_pkru_state)
- new_pkru_state.pkru = 0;
+ new_pkru_state.pkru = PKRU_INIT_STATE;
else
new_pkru_state.pkru = old_pkru_state->pkru;
@@ -945,4 +949,51 @@ int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct tas
return -EINVAL;
return __arch_set_user_pkey_access(tsk, pkey, init_val);
}
+
+/*
+ * Figures out what the rights are currently for 'pkey'.
+ * Converts from PKRU's format to the user-visible PKEY_DISABLE_*
+ * format.
+ */
+unsigned long arch_get_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey)
+{
+ struct fpu *fpu = ¤t->thread.fpu;
+ u32 pkru_reg;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /* Only support manipulating current task for now */
+ if (tsk != current)
+ return -1;
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
+ return -1;
+ /*
+ * The contents of PKRU itself are invalid. Consult the
+ * task's XSAVE buffer for PKRU contents. This is much
+ * more expensive than reading PKRU directly, but should
+ * be rare or impossible with eagerfpu mode.
+ */
+ if (!fpu->fpregs_active) {
+ struct xregs_state *xsave = &fpu->state.xsave;
+ struct pkru_state *pkru_state =
+ get_xsave_addr(xsave, XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU);
+ /*
+ * PKRU is in its init state and not present in
+ * the buffer in a saved form.
+ */
+ if (!pkru_state)
+ return PKRU_INIT_STATE;
+
+ return pkru_state->pkru;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Consult the user register directly.
+ */
+ pkru_reg = read_pkru();
+ if (!__pkru_allows_read(pkru_reg, pkey))
+ ret |= PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS;
+ if (!__pkru_allows_write(pkru_reg, pkey))
+ ret |= PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE;
+
+ return ret;
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */
diff -puN include/linux/pkeys.h~pkeys-118-syscalls-set-get include/linux/pkeys.h
--- a/include/linux/pkeys.h~pkeys-118-syscalls-set-get 2016-05-31 08:27:49.971152595 -0700
+++ b/include/linux/pkeys.h 2016-05-31 08:27:49.981153046 -0700
@@ -44,6 +44,14 @@ static inline int mm_pkey_free(struct mm
static inline int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey,
unsigned long init_val)
{
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static inline
+unsigned long arch_get_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey)
+{
+ if (pkey)
+ return -1;
return 0;
}
diff -puN mm/mprotect.c~pkeys-118-syscalls-set-get mm/mprotect.c
--- a/mm/mprotect.c~pkeys-118-syscalls-set-get 2016-05-31 08:27:49.973152685 -0700
+++ b/mm/mprotect.c 2016-05-31 08:27:49.982153091 -0700
@@ -536,3 +536,44 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(pkey_free, int, pkey)
*/
return ret;
}
+
+SYSCALL_DEFINE2(pkey_get, int, pkey, unsigned long, flags)
+{
+ unsigned long ret = 0;
+
+ if (flags)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+ if (!mm_pkey_is_allocated(current->mm, pkey))
+ ret = -EBADF;
+ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = arch_get_user_pkey_access(current, pkey);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(pkey_set, int, pkey, unsigned long, access_rights,
+ unsigned long, flags)
+{
+ unsigned long ret = 0;
+
+ if (flags)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+ if (!mm_pkey_is_allocated(current->mm, pkey))
+ ret = -EBADF;
+ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = arch_set_user_pkey_access(current, pkey, access_rights);
+
+ return ret;
+}
_
--
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