RE: [PATCH] kasan: improve double-free detection

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



Hi Dmitry,

Thanks very much for your response/review.

> I agree that it's something we need to fix (user-space ASAN does
> something along these lines). My only concern is increase of
> kasan_alloc_meta size. It's unnecessary large already and we have a
> plan to reduce both alloc and free into to 16 bytes. However, it can
> make sense to land this and then reduce size of headers in a separate
> patch using a CAS-loop on state.

ok.

>  Alexander, what's the state of your
> patches that reduce header size?
> 
> I think there is another race. If we have racing frees, one thread
> sets state to KASAN_STATE_QUARANTINE but does not fill
> free_info->track yet, at this point another thread does free and
> reports double-free, but the track is wrong so we will print a bogus
> stack. The same is true for all other state transitions (e.g.
> use-after-free racing with the object being pushed out of the
> quarantine).

Yes, I've noticed this too. For the double-free, in my local tests, the error
reports from the bad frees get printed only after the successful "good"
free set the new track info. But then, I was using kasan_report() on the
error path to get sane reports from the multiple concurrent frees so that
may have "slowed" down the error paths enough until the good free was
done. Agreed, the window still exists for a stale (or missing) deallocation
stack in error report.

>  We could introduce 2 helper functions like:
> 
> /* Sets status to KASAN_STATE_LOCKED if the current status is equal to
> old_state, returns current state. Waits while current state equals
> KASAN_STATE_LOCKED. */
> u32 kasan_lock_if_state_equals(struct kasan_alloc_meta *meta, u32 old_state);
> 
> /* Changes state from KASAN_STATE_LOCKED to new_state */
> void kasan_unlock_and_set_status(struct kasan_alloc_meta *meta, u32
> new_state);
> 
> Then free can be expressed as:
> 
> if (kasan_lock_if_state_equals(meta, KASAN_STATE_ALLOC) ==
> KASAN_STATE_ALLOC) {
>                free_info = get_free_info(cache, object);
>                quarantine_put(free_info, cache);
>                set_track(&free_info->track, GFP_NOWAIT);
>                kasan_poison_slab_free(cache, object);
>                kasan_unlock_and_set_status(meta, KASAN_STATE_QUARANTINE);
>                return true;
> }
> 
> And on the reporting path we would need to lock the header, read all
> state, unlock the header.
> 
> Does it make sense?

It does, thanks! I'll try to hack up something, though right now, it's not entirely
clear to me how to achieve this without resorting to a global lock (which would
be unacceptable).

> 
> Please add the test as well. We need to start collecting tests for all
> these tricky corner cases.

Sure, a new test can be added for test_kasan.ko. Unlike the other tests, a
double-free would likely panic the system due to slab corruption. Would it still
be "KASANic" for kasan_slab_free() to return true after reporting double-free
attempt error so thread will not call into __cache_free()? How does ASAN
handle this?

Thanks,

Kuthonuzo
��.n������g����a����&ޖ)���)��h���&������梷�����Ǟ�m������)������^�����������v���O��zf������




[Index of Archives]     [Linux ARM Kernel]     [Linux ARM]     [Linux Omap]     [Fedora ARM]     [IETF Annouce]     [Bugtraq]     [Linux]     [Linux OMAP]     [Linux MIPS]     [ECOS]     [Asterisk Internet PBX]     [Linux API]