On Fri, Jan 15, 2016 at 9:18 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 14, 2016 at 9:55 PM, Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> On Fri, Jan 15, 2016 at 12:22 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> Normally, when a user can modify a file that has setuid or setgid bits,
>>> those bits are cleared when they are not the file owner or a member
>>> of the group. This is enforced when using write and truncate but not
>>> when writing to a shared mmap on the file. This could allow the file
>>> writer to gain privileges by changing a binary without losing the
>>> setuid/setgid/caps bits.
>>>
>>> Changing the bits requires holding inode->i_mutex, so it cannot be done
>>> during the page fault (due to mmap_sem being held during the fault).
>>> Instead, clear the bits if PROT_WRITE is being used at mmap open time,
>>> or added at mprotect tLooks good to me.ime.
>>>
>>> Since we can't do the check in the right place inside mmap (due to
>>> holding mmap_sem), we have to do it before holding mmap_sem, which
>>> means duplicating some checks, which have to be available to the non-MMU
>>> builds too.
>>>
>>> When walking VMAs during mprotect, we need to drop mmap_sem (while
>>> holding a file reference) and restart the walk after clearing privileges.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>
>> Looks good. Ack.
>
> While we're at it:
>
> int should_remove_suid(struct dentry *dentry)
> {
> umode_t mode = d_inode(dentry)->i_mode;
> int kill = 0;
>
> /* suid always must be killed */
> if (unlikely(mode & S_ISUID))
> kill = ATTR_KILL_SUID;
>
> /*
> * sgid without any exec bits is just a mandatory locking mark; leave
> * it alone. If some exec bits are set, it's a real sgid; kill it.
> */
> if (unlikely((mode & S_ISGID) && (mode & S_IXGRP)))
> kill |= ATTR_KILL_SGID;
>
> if (unlikely(kill && !capable(CAP_FSETID) && S_ISREG(mode)))
> return kill;
>
> return 0;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(should_remove_suid);
>
> Oh wait, is that an implicit use of current_cred in vfs_write? No, it
> couldn't be. Kernel developers *never* make that mistake.
>
> This is, of course, totally fucked because this function doesn't have
> access to a struct file and therefore can't see f_cred. I'm not going
> to look in to this right now, but I swear I saw an exploit that took
> advantage of this bug recently. Anyone want to try to fix it?
Good point. it's here since 2.3.43.
As I see file->f_cred is reachable in all places.
>
> FWIW, posix says (man 3p write):
>
> Upon successful completion, where nbyte is greater than 0, write()
> shall mark for update the last data modification and last file status
> change timestamps of the file, and if the file is a regular file, the
> S_ISUID and S_ISGID bits of the file mode may be cleared.
>
> so maybe the thing to do is just drop the capable check entirely and
> cross our fingers that nothing was relying on it.
>
> --Andy
>
>>
>>> ---
>>> v9:
>>> - use file_needs_remove_privs, jack & koct9i
>>> v8:
>>> - use mmap/mprotect method, with mprotect walk restart, thanks to koct9i
>>> v7:
>>> - document and avoid arch-specific O_* values, viro
>>> v6:
>>> - clarify ETXTBSY situation in comments, luto
>>> v5:
>>> - add to f_flags instead, viro
>>> - add i_mutex during __fput, jack
>>> v4:
>>> - delay removal instead of still needing mmap_sem for mprotect, yalin
>>> v3:
>>> - move outside of mmap_sem for real now, fengguang
>>> - check return code of file_remove_privs, akpm
>>> v2:
>>> - move to mmap from fault handler, jack
>>> ---
>>> include/linux/mm.h | 1 +
>>> mm/mmap.c | 20 ++++----------------
>>> mm/mprotect.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>> mm/util.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>> 4 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
>>> index 00bad7793788..b264c8be7114 100644
>>> --- a/include/linux/mm.h
>>> +++ b/include/linux/mm.h
>>> @@ -1912,6 +1912,7 @@ extern unsigned long get_unmapped_area(struct file *, unsigned long, unsigned lo
>>>
>>> extern unsigned long mmap_region(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
>>> unsigned long len, vm_flags_t vm_flags, unsigned long pgoff);
>>> +extern int do_mmap_shared_checks(struct file *file, unsigned long prot);
>>> extern unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
>>> unsigned long len, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
>>> vm_flags_t vm_flags, unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long *populate);
>>> diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
>>> index 2ce04a649f6b..b3424db0a29e 100644
>>> --- a/mm/mmap.c
>>> +++ b/mm/mmap.c
>>> @@ -1320,25 +1320,13 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
>>> return -EAGAIN;
>>>
>>> if (file) {
>>> - struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
>>> + int err;
>>>
>>> switch (flags & MAP_TYPE) {
>>> case MAP_SHARED:
>>> - if ((prot&PROT_WRITE) && !(file->f_mode&FMODE_WRITE))
>>> - return -EACCES;
>>> -
>>> - /*
>>> - * Make sure we don't allow writing to an append-only
>>> - * file..
>>> - */
>>> - if (IS_APPEND(inode) && (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
>>> - return -EACCES;
>>> -
>>> - /*
>>> - * Make sure there are no mandatory locks on the file.
>>> - */
>>> - if (locks_verify_locked(file))
>>> - return -EAGAIN;
>>> + err = do_mmap_shared_checks(file, prot);
>>> + if (err)
>>> + return err;
>>>
>>> vm_flags |= VM_SHARED | VM_MAYSHARE;
>>> if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
>>> diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
>>> index ef5be8eaab00..57cb81c11668 100644
>>> --- a/mm/mprotect.c
>>> +++ b/mm/mprotect.c
>>> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
>>> #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
>>> #include <linux/shm.h>
>>> #include <linux/mman.h>
>>> +#include <linux/file.h>
>>> #include <linux/fs.h>
>>> #include <linux/highmem.h>
>>> #include <linux/security.h>
>>> @@ -375,6 +376,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mprotect, unsigned long, start, size_t, len,
>>>
>>> vm_flags = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot);
>>>
>>> +restart:
>>> down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
>>>
>>> vma = find_vma(current->mm, start);
>>> @@ -416,6 +418,28 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mprotect, unsigned long, start, size_t, len,
>>> goto out;
>>> }
>>>
>>> + /*
>>> + * If we're adding write permissions to a shared file,
>>> + * we must clear privileges (like done at mmap time),
>>> + * but we have to juggle the locks to avoid holding
>>> + * mmap_sem while holding i_mutex.
>>> + */
>>> + if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) && vma->vm_file &&
>>> + (newflags & VM_WRITE) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) &&
>>> + file_needs_remove_privs(vma->vm_file)) {
>>> + struct file *file = get_file(vma->vm_file);
>>> +
>>> + start = vma->vm_start;
>>> + up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
>>> + mutex_lock(&file_inode(file)->i_mutex);
>>> + error = file_remove_privs(file);
>>> + mutex_unlock(&file_inode(file)->i_mutex);
>>> + fput(file);
>>> + if (error)
>>> + return error;
>>> + goto restart;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> error = security_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
>>> if (error)
>>> goto out;
>>> diff --git a/mm/util.c b/mm/util.c
>>> index 9af1c12b310c..1882eaf33a37 100644
>>> --- a/mm/util.c
>>> +++ b/mm/util.c
>>> @@ -283,6 +283,29 @@ int __weak get_user_pages_fast(unsigned long start,
>>> }
>>> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(get_user_pages_fast);
>>>
>>> +int do_mmap_shared_checks(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
>>> +{
>>> + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
>>> +
>>> + if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
>>> + return -EACCES;
>>> +
>>> + /*
>>> + * Make sure we don't allow writing to an append-only
>>> + * file..
>>> + */
>>> + if (IS_APPEND(inode) && (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
>>> + return -EACCES;
>>> +
>>> + /*
>>> + * Make sure there are no mandatory locks on the file.
>>> + */
>>> + if (locks_verify_locked(file))
>>> + return -EAGAIN;
>>> +
>>> + return 0;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> unsigned long vm_mmap_pgoff(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
>>> unsigned long len, unsigned long prot,
>>> unsigned long flag, unsigned long pgoff)
>>> @@ -291,6 +314,33 @@ unsigned long vm_mmap_pgoff(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
>>> struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
>>> unsigned long populate;
>>>
>>> + /*
>>> + * If we must remove privs, we do it here since doing it during
>>> + * page fault may be expensive and cannot hold inode->i_mutex,
>>> + * since mm->mmap_sem is already held.
>>> + */
>>> + if (file && (flag & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED && (prot & PROT_WRITE)) {
>>> + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
>>> + int err;
>>> +
>>> + if (!IS_NOSEC(inode)) {
>>> + /*
>>> + * Make sure we can't strip privs from a file that
>>> + * wouldn't otherwise be allowed to be mmapped.
>>> + */
>>> + err = do_mmap_shared_checks(file, prot);
>>> + if (err)
>>> + return err;
>>> +
>>> + mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
>>> + err = file_remove_privs(file);
>>> + mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
>>> +
>>> + if (err)
>>> + return err;
>>> + }
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> ret = security_mmap_file(file, prot, flag);
>>> if (!ret) {
>>> down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
>>> --
>>> 2.6.3
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> Kees Cook
>>> Chrome OS & Brillo Security
>
>
>
> --
> Andy Lutomirski
> AMA Capital Management, LLC
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