On Wed, 2010-04-28 at 16:12 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote: > On Wed, 28 Apr 2010 18:04:06 -0500 > Matt Mackall <mpm@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > I suspect random32() would suffice here. It avoids depleting the > > > entropy pool altogether. > > > > I wouldn't worry about that. get_random_int() touches the urandom pool, > > which will always leave entropy around. Also, Ted and I decided over a > > year ago that we should drop the whole entropy accounting framework, > > which I'll get around to some rainy weekend. > > hm, so why does random32() exist? Speed? Yep. There are lots of RNG uses that aren't security sensitive and this is one: the kernel won't be DoSed by an attacker that gets all pages preferentially allocated on one node. Performance will suffer, but it's reasonably bounded. One of my goals is to call these sorts of trade-offs out in the API, ie: get_fast_random_u32() get_fast_random_bytes() get_secure_random_u32() get_secure_random_bytes() -- http://selenic.com : development and support for Mercurial and Linux -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxx For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@xxxxxxxxx";> email@xxxxxxxxx </a>