In gl861_i2c_master_xfer, msg is controlled by user. When msg[i].buf
is null and msg[i].len is zero, former checks on msg[i].buf would be
passed. Malicious data finally reach gl861_i2c_master_xfer. If accessing
msg[i].buf[0] without sanity check, null ptr deref would happen.
We add check on msg[i].len to prevent crash.
Similar commit:
commit 0ed554fd769a
("media: dvb-usb: az6027: fix null-ptr-deref in az6027_i2c_xfer()")
Signed-off-by: Zhang Shurong <zhang_shurong@xxxxxxxxxxx>
---
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/gl861.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/gl861.c b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/gl861.c
index 0c434259c36f..a552b646d407 100644
--- a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/gl861.c
+++ b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/gl861.c
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static int gl861_i2c_master_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
/* XXX: I2C adapter maximum data lengths are not tested */
if (num == 1 && !(msg[0].flags & I2C_M_RD)) {
/* I2C write */
- if (msg[0].len < 2 || msg[0].len > sizeof(ctx->buf)) {
+ if (msg[0].len == 0 || msg[0].len > sizeof(ctx->buf)) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto err;
}
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ static int gl861_i2c_master_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
} else if (num == 2 && !(msg[0].flags & I2C_M_RD) &&
(msg[1].flags & I2C_M_RD)) {
/* I2C write + read */
- if (msg[0].len > 1 || msg[1].len > sizeof(ctx->buf)) {
+ if (msg[0].len != 1 || msg[1].len > sizeof(ctx->buf)) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto err;
}
--
2.30.2
