From: Wei Chen <harperchen1110@xxxxxxxxx>
In ce6230_i2c_master_xfer, msg is controlled by user. When msg[i].buf
is null and msg[i].len is zero, former checks on msg[i].buf would be
passed. Malicious data finally reach ce6230_i2c_master_xfer. If accessing
msg[i].buf[0] without sanity check, null ptr deref would happen. We add
check on msg[i].len to prevent crash.
Similar commit:
commit 0ed554fd769a ("media: dvb-usb: az6027: fix null-ptr-deref in az6027_i2c_xfer()")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-media/20230313092751.209496-1-harperchen1110@xxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Wei Chen <harperchen1110@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/ce6230.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/ce6230.c b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/ce6230.c
index 44540de1a206..d3b5cb4a24da 100644
--- a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/ce6230.c
+++ b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/ce6230.c
@@ -101,6 +101,10 @@ static int ce6230_i2c_master_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap,
if (num > i + 1 && (msg[i+1].flags & I2C_M_RD)) {
if (msg[i].addr ==
ce6230_zl10353_config.demod_address) {
+ if (msg[i].len < 1) {
+ i = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ break;
+ }
req.cmd = DEMOD_READ;
req.value = msg[i].addr >> 1;
req.index = msg[i].buf[0];
@@ -117,6 +121,10 @@ static int ce6230_i2c_master_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap,
} else {
if (msg[i].addr ==
ce6230_zl10353_config.demod_address) {
+ if (msg[i].len < 1) {
+ i = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ break;
+ }
req.cmd = DEMOD_WRITE;
req.value = msg[i].addr >> 1;
req.index = msg[i].buf[0];
--
2.40.1
