Hi kernel developers,
I found one interesting follow-up for these two crash reports. In the
syzbot dashboard, they are fixed with different patches. Each patch
fixes at the failure point - mceusb_handle_command and
mceusb_dev_printdata. For patch details, please have a look at the
crash reports [1] and [2].
Recall the vulnerability below, and kernel crashes both at the case
SUBCMD with incorrect value in ir_buf_in[i+2]. I still think they
share the same root cause and fixing this bug needs two patches at the
same time.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
for (; i < buf_len; i++) {
switch (ir->parser_state) {
case SUBCMD:
ir->rem = mceusb_cmd_datasize(ir->cmd, ir->buf_in[i]);
mceusb_dev_printdata(ir, ir->buf_in, buf_len, i - 1,
ir->rem + 2, false);
if (i + ir->rem < buf_len)
mceusb_handle_command(ir, &ir->buf_in[i - 1]);
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I wonder if developers can see two crash reports in the very
beginning, they may craft different patches which fix this bug in the
root cause. Meanwhile, if developers can see those crash reports in
advance, this may save some time for developers since only one takes
time to analyze this bug. If you have any issues about this statement,
please let me know.
[1] UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in mceusb_dev_printdata
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=df1efbbf75149f5853ecff1938ffd3134f269119
[2] UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in mceusb_dev_recv
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=50d4123e6132c9563297ecad0479eaad7480c172
On Wed, Jan 13, 2021 at 7:20 PM 慕冬亮 <mudongliangabcd@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Jan 13, 2021 at 3:51 PM Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, Jan 13, 2021 at 01:04:44PM +0800, 慕冬亮 wrote:
> > > Hi developers,
> > >
> > > I found that "UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in mceusb_dev_recv" and
> > > "UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in mceusb_dev_printdata" should share the
> > > same root cause.
> > > The reason is that the PoCs after minimization has a high similarity
> > > with the other. And their stack trace only diverges at the last
> > > function call. The following is some analysis for this bug.
> > >
> > > The following code in the mceusb_process_ir_data is the vulnerable
> > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > for (; i < buf_len; i++) {
> > > switch (ir->parser_state) {
> > > case SUBCMD:
> > > ir->rem = mceusb_cmd_datasize(ir->cmd, ir->buf_in[i]);
> > > mceusb_dev_printdata(ir, ir->buf_in, buf_len, i - 1,
> > > ir->rem + 2, false);
> > > if (i + ir->rem < buf_len)
> > > mceusb_handle_command(ir, &ir->buf_in[i - 1]);
> > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > >
> > > The first report crashes at a shift operation(1<<*hi) in mceusb_handle_command.
> > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > static void mceusb_handle_command(struct mceusb_dev *ir, u8 *buf_in)
> > > {
> > > u8 *hi = &buf_in[2]; /* read only when required */
> > > if (cmd == MCE_CMD_PORT_SYS) {
> > > switch (subcmd) {
> > > case MCE_RSP_GETPORTSTATUS:
> > > if (buf_in[5] == 0)
> > > ir->txports_cabled |= 1 << *hi;
> > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > >
> > > The second report crashes at another shift operation (1U << data[0])
> > > in mceusb_dev_printdata.
> > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > static void mceusb_dev_printdata(struct mceusb_dev *ir, u8 *buf, int buf_len,
> > > int offset, int len, bool out)
> > > {
> > > data = &buf[offset] + 2;
> > >
> > > period = DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST((1U << data[0] * 2) *
> > > (data[1] + 1), 10);
> > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > >
> > > >From the analysis, we can know the data[0] and *hi access the same
> > > memory cell - ``ir->buf_in[i+1]``. So the root cause should be that it
> > > misses the check of ir->buf_in[i+1].
> > >
> > > For the patch of this bug, there is one from anant.thazhemadam@xxxxxxxxx:
> > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > diff --git a/drivers/media/rc/mceusb.c b/drivers/media/rc/mceusb.c
> > > index f1dbd059ed08..79de721b1c4a 100644
> > > --- a/drivers/media/rc/mceusb.c
> > > +++ b/drivers/media/rc/mceusb.c
> > > @@ -1169,7 +1169,7 @@ static void mceusb_handle_command(struct
> > > mceusb_dev *ir, u8 *buf_in)
> > > switch (subcmd) {
> > > /* the one and only 5-byte return value command */
> > > case MCE_RSP_GETPORTSTATUS:
> > > - if (buf_in[5] == 0)
> > > + if ((buf_in[5] == 0) && (*hi <= 32))
> > > ir->txports_cabled |= 1 << *hi;
> > > break;
> > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > I tried this patch in the second crash report and found it does not
> > > work. I think we should add another filter for the value in
> > > ``ir->buf_in[i+1]``.
> > >
> > > With this grouping, I think developers can take into consideration the
> > > issue in mceusb_dev_printdata and generate a complete patch for this
> > > bug.
> >
> > Why not create a patch yourself and submit it? That way you get the
> > correct credit for solving the problem.
> >
>
> I have sent a simple but working patch to the corresponding
> developers. We can take it as a base to discuss.
>
> And this email is to provide some information about bug duplication
> for developers as I am doing some research on crash deduplication. I
> want to get some credits if our grouping information is useful for
> some kernel developers.
>
> > thanks,
> >
> > greg k-h
