Hi Jarkko, Thanks for the page. Adding to Michael's comment, here are a few things to fix (see below). Michael, there's also a question for you (grep mtk). Thanks, Alex On 12/2/20 8:15 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx> > --- > man7/sgx.7 | 198 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 1 file changed, 198 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 man7/sgx.7 > > diff --git a/man7/sgx.7 b/man7/sgx.7 > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000..429c9b64d > --- /dev/null > +++ b/man7/sgx.7 > @@ -0,0 +1,198 @@ > +.\" Copyright (C) 2020 Intel Corporation > +.\" > +.\" %%%LICENSE_START(VERBATIM) > +.\" Permission is granted to make and distribute verbatim copies of this > +.\" manual provided the copyright notice and this permission notice are > +.\" preserved on all copies. > +.\" > +.\" Permission is granted to copy and distribute modified versions of this > +.\" manual under the conditions for verbatim copying, provided that the > +.\" entire resulting derived work is distributed under the terms of a > +.\" permission notice identical to this one. > +.\" > +.\" Since the Linux kernel and libraries are constantly changing, this > +.\" manual page may be incorrect or out-of-date. The author(s) assume no > +.\" responsibility for errors or omissions, or for damages resulting from > +.\" the use of the information contained herein. The author(s) may not > +.\" have taken the same level of care in the production of this manual, > +.\" which is licensed free of charge, as they might when working > +.\" professionally. > +.\" > +.\" Formatted or processed versions of this manual, if unaccompanied by > +.\" the source, must acknowledge the copyright and authors of this work. > +.\" %%%LICENSE_END > +.\" > +.TH SGX 7 2020-12-02 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual" > +.PP > +sgx - overview of Software Guard eXtensions > +.SH DESCRIPTION > +.PP > +Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) allow user space applications to > +set aside private memory regions of code and data. > +These memory regions are called as enclaves. wfix: These memory regions are called enclaves. > +.PP > +SGX must be enabled by the BIOS. > +If SGX appears to be unsupported on a system having the hardware 1) s/having the hardware/having hardware/ 2) Please, use semantic newlines. To understand 'semantic newlines', please have a look at man-pages(7)::STYLE GUIDE::Use semantic newlines Basically, split lines at the most natural separation point, instead of just when the line gets over the margin. > +support, ensure that SGX is enabled in the BIOS. > +If a BIOS presents a choice between \[lq]Enabled\[rq] and \[lq]Software s/\\[lq]/\\(dq/g s/\\[rq]/\\(dq/g Basically, we use \(dq for any double quotes, and we don't care about left or right. Michael (mtk): I was searching to see if it was documented in man-pages(7), but I didn't find it. Should we add something under man-pages(7)::STYLE GUIDE::Generating optimal glyphs? > +Enabled\[rq] modes for SGX, choose \[lq]Enabled\[rq]. > +.PP > +An enclave can be only entered at a fixed set of entry points. > +Each of them can hold a single hardware thread at a time. > +While the enclave is loaded from a regular binary file, only the threads > +inside the enclave can access its memory. > +.PP > +Although carved out of normal DRAM, enclave memory is marked in the > +system memory map as reserved and is not managed by the Linux memory > +manager. > +There may be several regions spread across the system. > +Each contiguous region is called an Enclave Page Cache (EPC) section. > +EPC sections are enumerated via CPUID. > +These regions are encrypted when they leave the LLC. > +.PP > +SGX is available only if the kernel was configured and built with the > +\f[B]CONFIG_X86_SGX\f[R] option. Replace by: [ .B CONFIG_X86_SGX option. ] > +The hardware support for SGX can be observed from > +\f[I]/proc/cpuinfo\f[R] with the \[lq]flags\[rq] field containing > +\[lq]sgx\[rq]. [ .I /proc/cpuinfo with the \(dqflags\(dq field containing \(dqsgx\(dq. ] > +.SS Enclave management > +.PP > +Enclave\[cq]s life-cycle starts by opening \f[I]/dev/sgx_enclave\f[R], For single quotes (or apostrophe), please use '\(aq': [ Enclave\(aqs life ... ] See man-pages(7)::STYLE GUIDE::Generating optimal glyphs > +and ends once all the references to the opened file have been closed. > +After opening the enclave, its contents must be populated with the ioctl > +interface provided by \f[I]<asm/sgx.h>\f[R]. > +ENCLS is a privileged (ring-0) instruction with the functionality for > +managing enclave memory, and the ioctl inteface provides a wrapper for > +it. > +.PP > +Enclave construction starts by calling \f[B]SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE\f[R], > +which takes in the initial version of SGX Enclave Control Structure > +(SECS). > +SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS) contains the description of the > +enclave. > +The ioctl calls ENCLS[ECREATE] function, which will copy SECS to the SGX > +reserved memory. > +SECS is never mapped to the process address space, and thus cannot be > +directly referenced. > +.PP > +Among other things, SECS contains the base address and size of the > +enclave, meaning that the addresss space must be carved out before the > +creation. > +There is also a hardware constrain that the size must be a power of two, > +and the base address must be also naturally aligned relative to the > +size. > +.PP > +Some of the SECS fields must be initialized to zero because their values > +are determined dynamically after the enclave has been created. > +Most importantly SECS contains two SHA256 hashes: MRENCLAVE and > +MRSIGNER. > +Each enclave invocation, during the enclave construction, hashes its > +defining parameters MRENCLAVE. > +Arbitrary data can be also hashed into MRENCLAVE via the ENCLS[EEXTEND] > +function. > +MRSIGNER contains the hash of the enclave signer key, which is used to > +sign the SIGSTRUCT structure passed to the ENCLS[EINIT] function. > +A running enclave can use both of these fields as material for keys > +acquired with the ENCLU[EGETKEY]unction. > +.PP > +After the enclave has been created, a series of > +\f[B]SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES\f[R]calls are issued. > +This ioctl copies the provided data to the enclave memory by invoking > +the ENCLS[EADD] function, and optionally hashes it with help of the > +ENCLS[EEXTEND] function. > +Hashing is optional because it is a slow operation and sometimes not > +required. > +For instance, one might only care to measure the code pages. > +.PP > +Finally, when all the data has been copied to the enclave memory, > +\f[B]SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT\f[R] is called, which invokes the ENCLS[EINIT] > +function. > +This function inspects that the accumulated MRENCLAVE matches the > +MRENCLAVE inside the caller provided SIGSTRUCT, andlocks down the > +enclave from further build operations. > +After this, the enclave can be invoked. > +.SS Enclave memory mapping > +.PP > +The processor tracks EPC pages in a hardware metadata structure called > +the \f[I]Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM)\f[R]. > +The EPCM contains an entry for each EPC page which describes the owning > +enclave, access rights and page type among the other things. > +EPCM permissions are separate from the normal page tables. > +This prevents the kernel from, for instance, allowing writes to data > +which an enclave wishes to remain read-only. > +EPCM permissions may only impose additional restrictions on top of > +normal x86 page permissions. > +.PP > +For all intents and purposes, the SGX architecture allows the processor > +to invalidate all EPCM entries at will. > +This requires that software be prepared to handle an EPCM fault at any > +time. > +In practice, this can happen on events like power transitions when the > +ephemeral key that encrypts enclave memory is lost. > +.PP > +Kernel records EPCM permissions when \f[B]SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES\f[R] > +is called. > +When the pages are mapped to memory via mmap() or mprotect(), the EPCM > +permissions are compared against the declared permissions. > +If the declared permissions have bits set that are not part of the EPCM > +permissions, the operation fails with \f[B]-EACCES\f[R]. > +.SS Enclave invocation > +.PP > +Enclaves encounter exceptions for lots of reasons: everything from > +enclave page faults to NULL pointer de-references, to system calls that > +must be called by a delegate from outside the enclave. > +Also, the enclave memory can be invalidated at any point of time when > +system state changes. > +For instance, when system wakes up from a sleep state, all EPC regions > +get invalidated. > +An SGX run-time must be prepared to all of this, and must be ready to > +even rebuild the enclave when the memory is invalidated. > +.PP > +This type of exception handling has been traditionally been handled in > +SIGSEGV handlers, registered by the library. > +But, being process-wide, shared state, signal handling and shared > +libraries do not mix well. > +.PP > +In order to assist the run-time, kernel provides a vDSO, > +\f[B]vsgx_enter_enclave\f[R], which wraps enclave entry functions > +ENCLU[EENTER] and EENTER[ERESUME], and returns exceptions to the caller > +at the point they happen. > +The exception information is filled in RDI, RSI and RDX. > +The kernel-provided user space portion of the vDSO handler will place > +this information in a user-provided buffer, or optionally trigger a > +user-provided callback at the time of the exception. > +.PP > +The vDSO function calling convention uses the standard RDI RSI, RDX, > +RCX, R8 and R9 registers. > +This makes it possible to declare the vDSO as a C prototype, but other > +than that there is no specific support for SystemV ABI. > +Things like storing XSAVE are the responsibility of the enclave and the > +runtime. > +.SS Page reclaimer > +.PP > +Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory > +available and over-committing it is a very valuable tool to reduce > +resource use. > +Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. > +.PP > +In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access > +enclave memory. > +To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to > +help. > +Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from > +normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the > +process. > +.PP > +Kernel provides a page reclaimer by using these functions. > +It picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in > +the system. > +A new kernel thread (ksgxd) reclaims pages in the background based on > +watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. > +.PP > +All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. > +But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata > +page which must be reclaimed last. > +The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) > +is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. > +The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently > +reclaimable. >
