On Wed, Sep 30, 2020 at 05:53:46PM +0200, Jann Horn via Containers wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 30, 2020 at 1:07 PM Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
> <mtk.manpages@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > I knew it would be a big ask, but below is kind of the manual page
> > I was hoping you might write [1] for the seccomp user-space notification
> > mechanism. Since you didn't (and because 5.9 adds various new pieces
> > such as SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SETFD and SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD
> > that also will need documenting [2]), I did :-). But of course I may
> > have made mistakes...
> [...]
> > NAME
> > seccomp_user_notif - Seccomp user-space notification mechanism
> >
> > SYNOPSIS
> > #include <linux/seccomp.h>
> > #include <linux/filter.h>
> > #include <linux/audit.h>
> >
> > int seccomp(unsigned int operation, unsigned int flags, void *args);
>
> Should the ioctl() calls be listed here, similar to e.g. the SYNOPSIS
> of the ioctl_* manpages?
>
> > DESCRIPTION
> > This page describes the user-space notification mechanism pro‐
> > vided by the Secure Computing (seccomp) facility. As well as the
> > use of the SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER flag, the SEC‐
> > COMP_RET_USER_NOTIF action value, and the SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES
> > operation described in seccomp(2), this mechanism involves the
> > use of a number of related ioctl(2) operations (described below).
> >
> > Overview
> > In conventional usage of a seccomp filter, the decision about how
> > to treat a particular system call is made by the filter itself.
> > The user-space notification mechanism allows the handling of the
> > system call to instead be handed off to a user-space process.
> > The advantages of doing this are that, by contrast with the sec‐
> > comp filter, which is running on a virtual machine inside the
> > kernel, the user-space process has access to information that is
> > unavailable to the seccomp filter and it can perform actions that
> > can't be performed from the seccomp filter.
> >
> > In the discussion that follows, the process that has installed
> > the seccomp filter is referred to as the target, and the process
>
> Technically, this definition of "target" is a bit inaccurate because:
>
> - seccomp filters are inherited
> - seccomp filters apply to threads, not processes
> - seccomp filters can be semi-remotely installed via TSYNC
>
> (I assume that in manpages, we should try to go for the "a task is a
> thread and a thread group is a process" definition, right?)
>
> Perhaps "the threads on which the seccomp filter is installed are
> referred to as the target", or something like that would be better?
>
> > that is notified by the user-space notification mechanism is
> > referred to as the supervisor. An overview of the steps per‐
> > formed by these two processes is as follows:
> >
> > 1. The target process establishes a seccomp filter in the usual
> > manner, but with two differences:
> >
> > · The seccomp(2) flags argument includes the flag SECCOMP_FIL‐
> > TER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER. Consequently, the return value of
> > the (successful) seccomp(2) call is a new "listening" file
> > descriptor that can be used to receive notifications.
> >
> > · In cases where it is appropriate, the seccomp filter returns
> > the action value SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF. This return value
> > will trigger a notification event.
> >
> > 2. In order that the supervisor process can obtain notifications
> > using the listening file descriptor, (a duplicate of) that
> > file descriptor must be passed from the target process to the
> > supervisor process. One way in which this could be done is by
> > passing the file descriptor over a UNIX domain socket connec‐
> > tion between the two processes (using the SCM_RIGHTS ancillary
> > message type described in unix(7)). Another possibility is
> > that the supervisor might inherit the file descriptor via
> > fork(2).
>
> With the caveat that if the supervisor inherits the file descriptor
> via fork(), that (more or less) implies that the supervisor is subject
> to the same filter (although it could bypass the filter using a helper
> thread that responds SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE, but I don't
> expect any clean software to do that).
>
> > 3. The supervisor process will receive notification events on the
> > listening file descriptor. These events are returned as
> > structures of type seccomp_notif. Because this structure and
> > its size may evolve over kernel versions, the supervisor must
> > first determine the size of this structure using the sec‐
> > comp(2) SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES operation, which returns a
> > structure of type seccomp_notif_sizes. The supervisor allo‐
> > cates a buffer of size seccomp_notif_sizes.seccomp_notif bytes
> > to receive notification events. In addition,the supervisor
> > allocates another buffer of size seccomp_notif_sizes.sec‐
> > comp_notif_resp bytes for the response (a struct sec‐
> > comp_notif_resp structure) that it will provide to the kernel
> > (and thus the target process).
> >
> > 4. The target process then performs its workload, which includes
> > system calls that will be controlled by the seccomp filter.
> > Whenever one of these system calls causes the filter to return
> > the SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF action value, the kernel does not
> > execute the system call; instead, execution of the target
> > process is temporarily blocked inside the kernel and a notifi‐
>
> where "blocked" refers to the interruptible, restartable kind - if the
> child receives a signal with an SA_RESTART signal handler in the
> meantime, it'll leave the syscall, go through the signal handler, then
> restart the syscall again and send the same request to the supervisor
> again. so the supervisor may see duplicate syscalls.
>
> What's really gross here is that signal(7) promises that some syscalls
> like epoll_wait(2) never restart, but seccomp doesn't know about that;
> if userspace installs a filter that uses SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF for a
> non-restartable syscall, the result is that UAPI gets broken a little
> bit. Luckily normal users of seccomp probably won't use
> SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF for restartable syscalls, but if someone does
> want to do that, we might have to add some "suppress syscall
> restarting" flag into the seccomp action value, or something like
> that... yuck.
>
> > cation event is generated on the listening file descriptor.
> >
> > 5. The supervisor process can now repeatedly monitor the listen‐
> > ing file descriptor for SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF-triggered
> > events. To do this, the supervisor uses the SEC‐
> > COMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV ioctl(2) operation to read information
> > about a notification event; this operation blocks until an
>
> (interruptably - but I guess that maybe doesn't have to be said
> explicitly here?)
>
> > event is available.
>
> Maybe we should note here that you can use the multi-fd-polling APIs
> (select/poll/epoll) instead, and that if the notification goes away
> before you call SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, the ioctl will return
> -ENOENT instead of blocking, and therefore as long as nobody else
> reads from the same fd, you can assume that after the fd reports as
> readable, you can call SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV once without blocking.
>
> Exceeeeept that this part looks broken:
>
> if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&filter->notify_lock) < 0)
> return EPOLLERR;
>
> which I think means that we can have a race where a signal arrives
> while poll() is trying to add itself to the waitqueue of the seccomp
> fd, and then we'll get a spurious error condition reported on the fd.
> That's a kernel bug, I'd say.
>
> > The operation returns a seccomp_notif
> > structure containing information about the system call that is
> > being attempted by the target process.
> >
> > 6. The seccomp_notif structure returned by the SEC‐
> > COMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV operation includes the same information
> > (a seccomp_data structure) that was passed to the seccomp fil‐
> > ter. This information allows the supervisor to discover the
> > system call number and the arguments for the target process's
> > system call. In addition, the notification event contains the
> > PID of the target process.
>
> That's a PIDTYPE_PID, which the manpages call a "thread ID".
>
> > The information in the notification can be used to discover
> > the values of pointer arguments for the target process's sys‐
> > tem call. (This is something that can't be done from within a
> > seccomp filter.) To do this (and assuming it has suitable
> > permissions), the supervisor opens the corresponding
> > /proc/[pid]/mem file,
>
> ... which means that here we might have to get into the weeds of how
> actually /proc has invisible directories for every TID, even though
> only the ones for PIDs are visible, and therefore you can just open
> /proc/[tid]/mem and it'll work fine?
>
> > seeks to the memory location that corre‐
> > sponds to one of the pointer arguments whose value is supplied
> > in the notification event, and reads bytes from that location.
> > (The supervisor must be careful to avoid a race condition that
> > can occur when doing this; see the description of the SEC‐
> > COMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID ioctl(2) operation below.) In addi‐
> > tion, the supervisor can access other system information that
> > is visible in user space but which is not accessible from a
> > seccomp filter.
> >
> > ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
> > │FIXME │
> > ├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
> > │Suppose we are reading a pathname from /proc/PID/mem │
> > │for a system call such as mkdir(). The pathname can │
> > │be an arbitrary length. How do we know how much (how │
> > │many pages) to read from /proc/PID/mem? │
> > └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
>
> It can't be an arbitrary length. While pathnames *returned* from the
> kernel in some places can have different limits, strings supplied as
> path arguments *to* the kernel AFAIK always have an upper limit of
> PATH_MAX, else you get -ENAMETOOLONG. See getname_flags().
>
> > 7. Having obtained information as per the previous step, the
> > supervisor may then choose to perform an action in response to
> > the target process's system call (which, as noted above, is
> > not executed when the seccomp filter returns the SEC‐
> > COMP_RET_USER_NOTIF action value).
>
> (unless SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE is used)
>
> > One example use case here relates to containers. The target
> > process may be located inside a container where it does not
> > have sufficient capabilities to mount a filesystem in the con‐
> > tainer's mount namespace. However, the supervisor may be a
> > more privileged process that that does have sufficient capa‐
>
> nit: s/that that/that/
>
> > bilities to perform the mount operation.
> >
> > 8. The supervisor then sends a response to the notification. The
> > information in this response is used by the kernel to con‐
> > struct a return value for the target process's system call and
> > provide a value that will be assigned to the errno variable of
> > the target process.
> >
> > The response is sent using the SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV
> > ioctl(2) operation, which is used to transmit a sec‐
> > comp_notif_resp structure to the kernel. This structure
> > includes a cookie value that the supervisor obtained in the
> > seccomp_notif structure returned by the SEC‐
> > COMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV operation. This cookie value allows the
> > kernel to associate the response with the target process.
>
> (unless if the target thread entered a signal handler or was killed in
> the meantime)
>
> > 9. Once the notification has been sent, the system call in the
> > target process unblocks, returning the information that was
> > provided by the supervisor in the notification response.
> >
> > As a variation on the last two steps, the supervisor can send a
> > response that tells the kernel that it should execute the target
> > process's system call; see the discussion of SEC‐
> > COMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE, below.
> >
> > ioctl(2) operations
> > The following ioctl(2) operations are provided to support seccomp
> > user-space notification. For each of these operations, the first
> > (file descriptor) argument of ioctl(2) is the listening file
> > descriptor returned by a call to seccomp(2) with the SECCOMP_FIL‐
> > TER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER flag.
> >
> > SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV
> > This operation is used to obtain a user-space notification
> > event. If no such event is currently pending, the opera‐
> > tion blocks until an event occurs.
>
> Not necessarily; for every time a process entered a signal handler or
> was killed while a notification was pending, a call to
> SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV will return -ENOENT.
>
> > The third ioctl(2)
> > argument is a pointer to a structure of the following form
> > which contains information about the event. This struc‐
> > ture must be zeroed out before the call.
> >
> > struct seccomp_notif {
> > __u64 id; /* Cookie */
> > __u32 pid; /* PID of target process */
>
> (TID, not PID)
>
> > __u32 flags; /* Currently unused (0) */
> > struct seccomp_data data; /* See seccomp(2) */
> > };
> >
> > The fields in this structure are as follows:
> >
> > id This is a cookie for the notification. Each such
> > cookie is guaranteed to be unique for the corre‐
> > sponding seccomp filter. In other words, this
> > cookie is unique for each notification event from
> > the target process.
>
> That sentence about "target process" looks wrong to me. The cookies
> are unique across notifications from the filter, but there can be
> multiple filters per thread, and multiple threads per filter.
>
> > The cookie value has the fol‐
> > lowing uses:
> >
> > · It can be used with the SEC‐
> > COMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID ioctl(2) operation to
> > verify that the target process is still alive.
> >
> > · When returning a notification response to the
> > kernel, the supervisor must include the cookie
> > value in the seccomp_notif_resp structure that is
> > specified as the argument of the SEC‐
> > COMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND operation.
> >
> > pid This is the PID of the target process that trig‐
> > gered the notification event.
> >
> > ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
> > │FIXME │
> > ├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
> > │This is a thread ID, rather than a PID, right? │
> > └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
>
> Yeah.
>
> >
> > flags This is a bit mask of flags providing further
> > information on the event. In the current implemen‐
> > tation, this field is always zero.
> >
> > data This is a seccomp_data structure containing infor‐
> > mation about the system call that triggered the
> > notification. This is the same structure that is
> > passed to the seccomp filter. See seccomp(2) for
> > details of this structure.
> >
> > On success, this operation returns 0; on failure, -1 is
> > returned, and errno is set to indicate the cause of the
> > error. This operation can fail with the following errors:
> >
> > EINVAL (since Linux 5.5)
> > The seccomp_notif structure that was passed to the
> > call contained nonzero fields.
> >
> > ENOENT The target process was killed by a signal as the
> > notification information was being generated.
>
> Not just killed, interruption with a signal handler has the same effect.
>
> > ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
> > │FIXME │
> > ├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
> > │From my experiments, it appears that if a SEC‐ │
> > │COMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV is done after the target │
> > │process terminates, then the ioctl() simply blocks │
> > │(rather than returning an error to indicate that the │
> > │target process no longer exists). │
> > │ │
> > │I found that surprising, and it required some con‐ │
> > │tortions in the example program. It was not possi‐ │
> > │ble to code my SIGCHLD handler (which reaps the zom‐ │
> > │bie when the worker/target process terminates) to │
> > │simply set a flag checked in the main handleNotifi‐ │
> > │cations() loop, since this created an unavoidable │
> > │race where the child might terminate just after I │
> > │had checked the flag, but before I blocked (for‐ │
> > │ever!) in the SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV operation. │
> > │Instead, I had to code the signal handler to simply │
> > │call _exit(2) in order to terminate the parent │
> > │process (the supervisor). │
> > │ │
> > │Is this expected behavior? It seems to me rather │
> > │desirable that SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV should give │
> > │an error if the target process has terminated. │
> > └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
>
> You could poll() the fd first. But yeah, it'd probably be a good idea
> to change that.
>
> > SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID
> [...]
> > In the above scenario, the risk is that the supervisor may
> > try to access the memory of a process other than the tar‐
> > get. This race can be avoided by following the call to
> > open with a SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID operation to ver‐
> > ify that the process that generated the notification is
> > still alive. (Note that if the target process subse‐
> > quently terminates, its PID won't be reused because there
>
> That's wrong, the PID can be reused, but the /proc/$pid directory is
> internally not associated with the numeric PID, but, conceptually
> speaking, with a specific incarnation of the PID, or something like
> that. (Actually, it is associated with the "struct pid", which is not
> reused, instead of the numeric PID.)
>
> > remains an open reference to the /proc[pid]/mem file; in
> > this case, a subsequent read(2) from the file will return
> > 0, indicating end of file.)
> >
> > On success (i.e., the notification ID is still valid),
> > this operation returns 0 On failure (i.e., the notifica‐
>
> nit: s/returns 0/returns 0./
>
> > tion ID is no longer valid), -1 is returned, and errno is
> > set to ENOENT.
> >
> > SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND
> [...]
> > Two kinds of response are possible:
> >
> > · A response to the kernel telling it to execute the tar‐
> > get process's system call. In this case, the flags
> > field includes SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE and the
> > error and val fields must be zero.
> >
> > This kind of response can be useful in cases where the
> > supervisor needs to do deeper analysis of the target's
> > system call than is possible from a seccomp filter
> > (e.g., examining the values of pointer arguments), and,
> > having verified that the system call is acceptable, the
> > supervisor wants to allow it to proceed.
>
> "allow" sounds as if this is an access control thing, but this
> mechanism should usually not be used for access control (unless the
> "seccomp" syscall is blocked). Maybe reword as "having decided that
> the system call does not require emulation by the supervisor, the
> supervisor wants it to execute normally", or something like that?
>
> [...]
> > On success, this operation returns 0; on failure, -1 is
> > returned, and errno is set to indicate the cause of the
> > error. This operation can fail with the following errors:
> >
> > EINPROGRESS
> > A response to this notification has already been
> > sent.
> >
> > EINVAL An invalid value was specified in the flags field.
> >
> > EINVAL The flags field contained SEC‐
> > COMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE, and the error or val
> > field was not zero.
> >
> > ENOENT The blocked system call in the target process has
> > been interrupted by a signal handler.
>
> (you could also get this if a response has already been sent, instead
> of EINPROGRESS - the only difference is whether the target thread has
> picked up the response yet)
>
> > NOTES
> > The file descriptor returned when seccomp(2) is employed with the
> > SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER flag can be monitored using
> > poll(2), epoll(7), and select(2). When a notification is pend‐
> > ing, these interfaces indicate that the file descriptor is read‐
> > able.
>
> We should probably also point out somewhere that, as
> include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h says:
>
> * Similar precautions should be applied when stacking SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF
> * or SECCOMP_RET_TRACE. For SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF filters acting on the
> * same syscall, the most recently added filter takes precedence. This means
> * that the new SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF filter can override any
> * SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND from earlier filters, essentially allowing all
> * such filtered syscalls to be executed by sending the response
> * SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE. Note that SECCOMP_RET_TRACE can equally
> * be overriden by SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE.
>
> In other words, from a security perspective, you must assume that the
> target process can bypass any SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF (or
> SECCOMP_RET_TRACE) filters unless it is completely prohibited from
> calling seccomp(). This should also be noted over in the main
> seccomp(2) manpage, especially the SECCOMP_RET_TRACE part.
So I was actually wondering about this when I skimmed this and a while
ago but forgot about this again... Afaict, you can only ever load a
single filter with SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER set. If there
already is a filter with the SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER property
in the tasks filter hierarchy then the kernel will refuse to load a new
one?
static struct file *init_listener(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
{
struct file *ret = ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
struct seccomp_filter *cur;
for (cur = current->seccomp.filter; cur; cur = cur->prev) {
if (cur->notif)
goto out;
}
shouldn't that be sufficient to guarantee that USER_NOTIF filters can't
override each other for the same task simply because there can only ever
be a single one?
>
>
> > EXAMPLES
> [...]
> > This program can used to demonstrate various aspects of the
>
> nit: "can be used to demonstrate", or alternatively just "demonstrates"
>
> > behavior of the seccomp user-space notification mechanism. To
> > help aid such demonstrations, the program logs various messages
> > to show the operation of the target process (lines prefixed "T:")
> > and the supervisor (indented lines prefixed "S:").
> [...]
> > Program source
> [...]
> > #define errExit(msg) do { perror(msg); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); \
> > } while (0)
>
> Don't we have err() for this?
>
> > /* Send the file descriptor 'fd' over the connected UNIX domain socket
> > 'sockfd'. Returns 0 on success, or -1 on error. */
> >
> > static int
> > sendfd(int sockfd, int fd)
> > {
> > struct msghdr msgh;
> > struct iovec iov;
> > int data;
> > struct cmsghdr *cmsgp;
> >
> > /* Allocate a char array of suitable size to hold the ancillary data.
> > However, since this buffer is in reality a 'struct cmsghdr', use a
> > union to ensure that it is suitable aligned. */
>
> nit: suitably
>
> > union {
> > char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
> > /* Space large enough to hold an 'int' */
> > struct cmsghdr align;
> > } controlMsg;
> >
> > /* The 'msg_name' field can be used to specify the address of the
> > destination socket when sending a datagram. However, we do not
> > need to use this field because 'sockfd' is a connected socket. */
> >
> > msgh.msg_name = NULL;
> > msgh.msg_namelen = 0;
> >
> > /* On Linux, we must transmit at least one byte of real data in
> > order to send ancillary data. We transmit an arbitrary integer
> > whose value is ignored by recvfd(). */
> >
> > msgh.msg_iov = &iov;
> > msgh.msg_iovlen = 1;
> > iov.iov_base = &data;
> > iov.iov_len = sizeof(int);
> > data = 12345;
> >
> > /* Set 'msghdr' fields that describe ancillary data */
> >
> > msgh.msg_control = controlMsg.buf;
> > msgh.msg_controllen = sizeof(controlMsg.buf);
> >
> > /* Set up ancillary data describing file descriptor to send */
> >
> > cmsgp = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msgh);
> > cmsgp->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
> > cmsgp->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
> > cmsgp->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
> > memcpy(CMSG_DATA(cmsgp), &fd, sizeof(int));
> >
> > /* Send real plus ancillary data */
> >
> > if (sendmsg(sockfd, &msgh, 0) == -1)
> > return -1;
> >
> > return 0;
> > }
>
> Instead of using unix domain sockets to send the fd to the parent, I
> think you could also use clone3() with flags==CLONE_FILES|SIGCHLD,
> dup2() the seccomp fd to an fd that was reserved in the parent, call
> unshare(CLONE_FILES) in the child after setting up the seccomp fd, and
> wake up the parent with something like pthread_cond_signal()? I'm not
> sure whether that'd look better or worse in the end though, so maybe
> just ignore this comment.
(If the target process exec's (rather fast) then VFORK can be useful.)
>
> [...]
> > /* Access the memory of the target process in order to discover the
> > pathname that was given to mkdir() */
> >
> > static void
> > getTargetPathname(struct seccomp_notif *req, int notifyFd,
> > char *path, size_t len)
> > {
> > char procMemPath[PATH_MAX];
> > snprintf(procMemPath, sizeof(procMemPath), "/proc/%d/mem", req->pid);
> >
> > int procMemFd = open(procMemPath, O_RDONLY);
>
> Should example code like this maybe use O_CLOEXEC unless the fd in
> question actually has to be inheritable? I know it doesn't actually
> matter here, but if this code was used in a multi-threaded context, it
> might.
Agreed, about the O_CLOEXEC part.
>
> > if (procMemFd == -1)
> > errExit("Supervisor: open");
> >
> > /* Check that the process whose info we are accessing is still alive.
> > If the SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID operation (performed
> > in checkNotificationIdIsValid()) succeeds, we know that the
> > /proc/PID/mem file descriptor that we opened corresponds to the
> > process for which we received a notification. If that process
> > subsequently terminates, then read() on that file descriptor
> > will return 0 (EOF). */
> >
> > checkNotificationIdIsValid(notifyFd, req->id);
> >
> > /* Seek to the location containing the pathname argument (i.e., the
> > first argument) of the mkdir(2) call and read that pathname */
> >
> > if (lseek(procMemFd, req->data.args[0], SEEK_SET) == -1)
> > errExit("Supervisor: lseek");
> >
> > ssize_t s = read(procMemFd, path, PATH_MAX);
> > if (s == -1)
> > errExit("read");
>
> Why not pread() instead of lseek()+read()?
With multiple arguments to be read process_vm_readv() should also be
considered.
