On Thu, Apr 19, 2018 at 7:38 AM, David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Pavel Machek <pavel@xxxxxx> wrote: > >> > There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning >> > from hibernate. This might compromise the signed modules trust model, >> > so until we can work with signed hibernate images we disable it when the >> > kernel is locked down. >> >> I'd rather see hibernation fixed than disabled like this. > > The problem is that you have to store the hibernated kernel image encrypted, > but you can't store the decryption key on disk unencrypted or you've just > wasted the effort. > > So the firmware has to unlock the image, asking the user for a password to > unlock the key. Why firmware? Either the boot kernel could figure out how to ask for a password (or unseal using the TPM) or we could defer this to userspace. The latter should already work using kexec-jump, no? -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-man" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
