Hello Vincent, On 03/01/2016 05:36 PM, Vincent Bernat wrote: > ❦ 1 mars 2016 11:31 -0500, Craig Gallek <kraigatgoog@xxxxxxxxx> : > >>> But, what about the second paragraph mentioned in my other mail. I >>> think we should just kill it. What do you think? >> Ah, that's an interesting question... I believe the 'typical use >> case' paragraph is correct with removal of the 'privilege' qualifiers >> (and pretty much lifted from the commit message), but I'll defer to >> you as to whether or not it's appropriate for a man page. There don't >> appear to be other such examples in this specific page and anyone who >> is really interested in the motivation behind the implementation of a >> feature is better off looking at the code and commit messages >> anyway... > > The typical use case is still about privileges since a fully privileged > process could just create a similar socket without the filter. It makes > little sense to create a socket, add a filter and lock it if you keep > your privileges. Thanks. That, plus a reread of the commit message was the info I needed. The point here is that we're talking about raw sockets, right? I reworded that paragraph to: The typical use case is for a privileged process to set up a raw socket (an operation that requires the CAP_NET_RAW capability), apply a restrictive filter, set the SO_LOCK_FILTER option, and then either drop its privileges or pass the socket file descriptor to an unprivileged process via a UNIX domain socket. Cheers, Michael -- Michael Kerrisk Linux man-pages maintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/ Linux/UNIX System Programming Training: http://man7.org/training/ -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-man" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html