On 18 Oct 2015 22:13, Tobias Markus wrote: > On 17.10.2015 22:17, Richard Weinberger wrote: > > On Sat, Oct 17, 2015 at 5:58 PM, Tobias Markus <tobias@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >> One question remains though: Does this break userspace executables that > >> expect being able to create user namespaces without priviledge? Since > >> creating user namespaces without CAP_SYS_ADMIN was not possible before > >> Linux 3.8, programs should already expect a potential EPERM upon calling > >> clone. Since creating a user namespace without CAP_SYS_USER_NS would > >> also cause EPERM, we should be on the safe side. > > > > In case of doubt, yes it will break existing software. > > Hiding user namespaces behind CAP_SYS_USER_NS will not magically > > make them secure. > > The goal is not to make user namespaces secure, but to limit access to > them somewhat in order to reduce the potential attack surface. the irony is that disallowing non-privileged processes access to userns means processes cannot jail themselves and thus make themselves more secure. i've been adding userns to various projects purely to get access to things like mount, net, pid, sysv, and ipc namespaces. putting this behind a cap also breaks the Chromium sandbox -- they were able to drop set*id on the sandbox binary and utilize userns instead. https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/docs/linux_sandboxing.md https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=312380 -mike
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