Re: [PATCH] proc.5: Fix SELinux /proc/pid/attr/current example.

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Hello Stephen,

On 02/23/2015 04:36 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> Since the /proc/pid/attr API was added to the kernel, there have
> been a couple of changes to the SELinux handling of /proc/pid/attr/current.
> Fix the SELinux /proc/pid/attr/current example text to reflect these
> changes

Thanks for attending to this.

> and note which kernel versions first included the changes.

Perfect!

Applied.

Cheers,

Michael


> 
> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>  man5/proc.5 | 20 +++++++++++++++++---
>  1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/man5/proc.5 b/man5/proc.5
> index d01a7a9..68772f3 100644
> --- a/man5/proc.5
> +++ b/man5/proc.5
> @@ -101,13 +101,27 @@ This directory is present only if the kernel was configured with
>  The contents of this file represent the current
>  security attributes of the process.
>  
> -In SELinux, this file is used to get the security context of a process,
> -but not to set the security context (a write is always denied),
> -since SELinux limits process security transitions to
> +In SELinux, this file is used to get the security context of a process.
> +Prior to Linux 2.6.11, this file could not be used to set the security
> +context (a write was always denied), since SELinux limited process security
> +transitions to
>  .BR execve (2)
>  (see the description of
>  .IR /proc/[pid]/attr/exec ,
>  below).
> +Since Linux 2.6.11, SELinux lifted this restriction and began supporting
> +"set" operations via writes to this node if authorized by policy,
> +although use of this operation is only suitable for applications that are
> +trusted to maintain any desired separation between the old and new security
> +contexts.  Prior to Linux 2.6.28, SELinux did not allow threads within a
> +multi-threaded process to set their security context via this node
> +as it would yield an inconsistency among the security contexts of the
> +threads sharing the same memory space.  Since Linux 2.6.28, SELinux lifted
> +this restriction and began supporting "set" operations for threads within
> +a multi-threaded process if the new security context is bounded by the old
> +security context, where the bounded relation is defined in policy and
> +guarantees that the new security context has a subset of the permissions
> +of the old security context.
>  Other security modules may choose to support "set" operations via
>  writes to this node.
>  .TP
> 


-- 
Michael Kerrisk
Linux man-pages maintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/
Linux/UNIX System Programming Training: http://man7.org/training/
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