Hi On Fri, Jan 9, 2015 at 1:49 PM, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) <mtk.manpages@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Hello David at al. > > @David: I took your man-page patches (the new memfd_create(2) > page, and your patches to fcntl(2) from > http://cgit.freedesktop.org/~dvdhrm/man-pages/log/?h=memfd ) > into a branch in man-pages. I've done some very heavy editing of > of the memfd_create(2) page, and added a lot of further detail > under NOTES, as well as some example programs in a new EXAMPLE > section. I've also done some fairly substantial editing > of your patch to fcntl(2). > > @all: I'm looking to get review of these new man pages. > In particular, I've added quite a number of FIXMEs on points > that I'd like people to check or where there are details I am > unsure of. > > You can find the pages inline below and also in the Git branch at > http://git.kernel.org/cgit/docs/man-pages/man-pages.git/log/?h=draft_memfd_create > My preference review feedback is as inline comments to the text > below. > > Thanks, > > Michael > > ==================== memfd_create.2 ==================== > > .\" Copyright (C) 2014 Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@xxxxxxxxx> > .\" and Copyright (C) 2014 David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@xxxxxxxxx> > .\" > .\" %%%LICENSE_START(GPLv2+_SW_3_PARA) > .\" > .\" FIXME What is _SW_3_PARA? No idea.. if that's due to my initial version, please feel free to drop it. > .\" > .\" This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify > .\" it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by > .\" the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or > .\" (at your option) any later version. > .\" > .\" This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, > .\" but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of > .\" MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the > .\" GNU General Public License for more details. > .\" > .\" You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public > .\" License along with this manual; if not, see > .\" <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. > .\" %%%LICENSE_END > .\" > .TH MEMFD_CREATE 2 2014-07-08 Linux "Linux Programmer's Manual" > .SH NAME > memfd_create \- create an anonymous file > .SH SYNOPSIS > .B #include <sys/memfd.h> > .sp > .BI "int memfd_create(const char *" name ", unsigned int " flags ");" > .SH DESCRIPTION > .BR memfd_create () > creates an anonymous file and returns a file descriptor that refers to it. > The file behaves like a regular file, and so can be modified, > truncated, memory-mapped, and so on. > However, unlike a regular file, > it lives in RAM and has a volatile backing storage. > .\" FIXME In the following sentence I changed "released" to > .\" "destroyed". Okay? Sounds good. > Once all references to the file are dropped, it is automatically released. > Anonymous memory is used for all backing pages of the file. > .\" FIXME In the following sentence I changed "they" to > .\" "files created by memfd_create()". Okay? Sounds good. > Therefore, files created by > .BR memfd_create () > are subject to the same restrictions as other anonymous > .\" FIXME Can you give some examples of some of the restrictions please. memfd uses VM_NORESERVE so each page is accounted on first access. This means, the overcommit-limits (see __vm_enough_memory()) and the memory-cgroup limits (mem_cgroup_try_charge()) are applied. Note that those are accounted on "current" and "current->mm", that is, the process doing the first page access. > memory allocations such as those allocated using > .BR mmap (2) > with the > .BR MAP_ANONYMOUS > flag. > > The initial size of the file is set to 0. > .\" FIXME I added the following sentence. Please review. Looks good. It's not needed if you use write(), as it adjusts the size accordingly. But people usually use mmap() so the recommendation sounds useful. > Following the call, the file size should be set using > .BR ftruncate (2). > > The name supplied in > .I name > is used as an internal filename and will be displayed > .\" FIXME What does "internal" in the previous line mean? 'internal' can be dropped. It's the normal filename. > as the target of the corresponding symbolic link in the directory > .\" FIXME I added the previous line. Is it correct? Yes, this is correct. > .IR /proc/self/fd/ . > .\" FIXME In the next line, I added "as displayed in that > The displayed name is always prefixed with > .IR memfd: > and serves only for debugging purposes. > Names do not affect the behavior of the memfd, > .\" FIXME The term "memfd" appears here without having previously been > .\" defined. Would the correct definition of "the memfd" be > .\" "the file descriptor created by memfd_create"? Yes. > and as such multiple files can have the same name without any side effects. > > The following values may be bitwise ORed in > .IR flags > to change the behaviour of > .BR memfd_create (): > .TP > .BR MFD_CLOEXEC > Set the close-on-exec > .RB ( FD_CLOEXEC ) > flag on the new file descriptor. > See the description of the > .B O_CLOEXEC > flag in > .BR open (2) > for reasons why this may be useful. > .TP > .BR MFD_ALLOW_SEALING > Allow sealing operations on this file. > See the discussion of the > .B F_ADD_SEALS > and > .BR F_GET_SEALS > operations in > .BR fcntl (2), > and also NOTES, below. > The initial set of seals is empty. > If this flag is not set, the initial set of seals will be > .BR F_SEAL_SEAL , > meaning that no other seals can be set on the file. > .\" FIXME Why is the MFD_ALLOW_SEALING behavior not simply the default? > .\" Is it worth adding some text explaining this? memfds are quite useful without sealing. It's a replacement for files in /tmp or O_TMPFILE if you never intended to actually link the file anywhere. Therefore, sealing is not enabled by default. > .PP > Unused bits in > .I flags > must be 0. > > As its return value, > .BR memfd_create () > returns a new file descriptor that can be used to refer to the file. > This file descriptor is opened for both reading and writing > .RB ( O_RDWR ) > and > .B O_LARGEFILE > is set for the descriptor. > > With respect to > .BR fork (2) > and > .BR execve (2), > the usual semantics apply for the file descriptor created by > .BR memfd_create (). > A copy of the file descriptor is inherited by the child produced by > .BR fork (2) > and refers to the same file. > The file descriptor is preserved across > .BR execve (2), > unless the close-on-exec flag has been set. > .SH RETURN VALUE > On success, > .BR memfd_create () > returns a new file descriptor. > On error, \-1 is returned and > .I errno > is set to indicate the error. > .SH ERRORS > .TP > .B EFAULT > The address in > .IR name > points to invalid memory. > .TP > .B EINVAL > An unsupported value was specified in one of the arguments: > .I flags > included unknown bits, or > .I name > was too long. > .TP > .B EMFILE > The per-process limit on open file descriptors has been reached. > .TP > .B ENFILE > The system-wide limit on the total number of open files has been reached. > .TP > .B ENOMEM > There was insufficient memory to create a new anonymous file. > .SH VERSIONS > The > .BR memfd_create () > system call first appeared in Linux 3.17. > .\" FIXME . When glibc support appears, update the following sentence: > Support in the GNU C library is pending. > .SH CONFORMING TO > The > .BR memfd_create () > system call is Linux-specific. > .\" FIXME I added the NOTES section below. Please review. > .SH NOTES > .\" See also http://lwn.net/Articles/593918/ > .\" and http://lwn.net/Articles/594919/ and http://lwn.net/Articles/591108/ > The > .BR memfd_create () > system call provides a simple alternative to manually mounting a > .I tmpfs > filesystem and creating and opening a file in that filesystem. > The primary purpose of > .BR memfd_create () > is to create files and associated file descriptors that are > used with the file-sealing APIs provided by > .BR fcntl (2). > .SS File sealing > In the absence of file sealing, > processes that communicate via shared memory must either trust each other, > or take measures to deal with the possibility that an untrusted peer > may manipulate the shared memory region in problematic ways. > For example, an untrusted peer might modify the contents of the > shared memory at any time, or shrink the shared memory region. > The former possibility leaves the local process vulnerable to > time-of-check-to-time-of-use race conditions > (typically dealt with by copying data from > the shared memory region before checking and using it). > The latter possibility leaves the local process vulnerable to > .BR SIGBUS > signals when an attempt is made to access a now-nonexistent > location in the shared memory region. > (Dealing with this possibility necessitates the use of a handler for the > .BR SIGBUS > signal.) > > Dealing with untrusted peers imposes extra complexity on > code that employs shared memory. > Memory sealing enables that extra complexity to be eliminated, > by allowing a process to operate secure in the knowledge that > its peer can't modify the shared memory in an undesired fashion. > > An example of the usage of the sealing mechanism is as follows: > > .IP 1. 3 > The first process creates a > .I tmpfs > file using > .BR memfd_create (). > The call yields a file descriptor used in subsequent steps. > .IP 2. > The first process > sizes the file created in the previous step using > .BR ftruncate (2), > maps it using > .BR mmap (2), > and populates the shared memory with the desired data. > .IP 3. > The first process uses the > .BR fcntl (2) > .B F_ADD_SEALS > operation to place one or more seals on the file, > in order to restrict further modifications on the file. > (If placing the seal > .BR F_SEAL_WRITE , > then it will be necessary to first unmap the shared writable mapping > created in the previous step.) > .IP 4. > A second process obtains a file descriptor for the > .I tmpfs > file and maps it. > This could happen in one of two ways: 3rd case: file-descriptor passing via AF_UNIX. Further mechanisms (like kdbus) might allow fd-passing in the future, so I would reword this to an example, not a definite list. Also note that in you examples (opening /proc or fork()) you have a natural trust-relationship as you run as the same uid. So in those cases sealing is usually not needed. > .RS > .IP * 3 > The second process is created via > .BR fork (2) > and thus automatically inherits the file descriptor and mapping. > .IP * > The second process opens the file > .IR /proc/<pd>/fd/<fd> , > where > .I <pid> > is the PID of the first process (the one that called > .BR memfd_create ()), > and > .I <fd> > is the number of the file descriptor returned by the call to > .BR memfd_create () > in that process. > The second process then maps the file using > .BR mmap (2). > .RE > .IP 5. > The second process uses the > .BR fcntl (2) > .B F_GET_SEALS > operation to retrieve the bit mask of seals > that has been applied to the file. > This bit mask can be inspected in order to determine > what kinds of restrictions have been placed on file modifications. > If desired, the second process can apply further seals > to impose additional restrictions (so long as the > .BR F_SEAL_SEAL > seal has not yet been applied). > .\" FIXME I added the EXAMPLE section below. Please review. > .SH EXAMPLE > Below are shown two example programs that demonstrate the use of > .BR memfd_create () > and the file sealing API. > > The first program, > .IR t_memfd_create.c , > creates a > .I tmpfs > file using > .BR memfd_create (), > sets a size for the file, maps it into memory, > and optionally places some seals on the file. > The program accepts up to three command-line arguments, > of which the first two are required. > The first argument is the name to associate with the file, > the second argument is the size to be set for the file, > and the optional third is a string of characters that specify > seals to be set on file. > > The second program, > .IR t_get_seals.c , > can be used to open an existing file that was created via > .BR memfd_create () > and inspect the set of seals that have been applied to that file. > > The following shell session demonstrates the use of these programs. > First we create a > .I tmpfs > file and set some seals on it: > > .in +4n > .nf > $ \fB./t_memfd_create my_memfd_file 4096 sw &\fP > [1] 11775 > PID: 11775; fd: 3; /proc/11775/fd/3 > .fi > .in > > At this point, the > .I t_memfd_create > program continues to run in the background. > From another program, we can obtain a file descriptor for the > memfd file by opening the > .IR /proc/PID/fd > file that corresponds to the descriptor opened by > .BR memfd_create (). > Using that pathname, we inspect the content of the > .IR /proc/PID/fd > symbolic link, and use our > .I t_get_seals > program to view the seals that have been placed on the file: > > .in +4n > .nf > $ \fBreadlink /proc/11775/fd/3\fP > /memfd:my_memfd_file (deleted) > $ \fB./t_get_seals /proc/11775/fd/3\fP > Existing seals: WRITE SHRINK > .fi > .in > .SS Program source: t_memfd_create.c > \& > .nf > #include <sys/memfd.h> > #include <fcntl.h> > #include <stdlib.h> > #include <unistd.h> > #include <string.h> > #include <stdio.h> > > #define errExit(msg) do { perror(msg); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); \\ > } while (0) > > int > main(int argc, char *argv[]) > { > int fd; > unsigned int seals; > char *addr; > char *name, *seals_arg; > ssize_t len; > > if (argc < 3) { > fprintf(stderr, "%s name size [seals]\\n", argv[0]); > fprintf(stderr, "\\t\(aqseals\(aq can contain any of the " > "following characters:\\n"); > fprintf(stderr, "\\t\\tg \- F_SEAL_GROW\\n"); > fprintf(stderr, "\\t\\ts \- F_SEAL_SHRINK\\n"); > fprintf(stderr, "\\t\\tw \- F_SEAL_WRITE\\n"); > fprintf(stderr, "\\t\\tS \- F_SEAL_SEAL\\n"); > exit(EXIT_FAILURE); > } > > name = argv[1]; > len = atoi(argv[2]); > seals_arg = argv[3]; > > /* Create an anonymous file in tmpfs; allow seals to be > placed on the file */ > > fd = memfd_create(name, MFD_ALLOW_SEALING); > if (fd == \-1) > errExit("memfd_create"); > > /* Size the file as specified on the command line */ > > if (ftruncate(fd, len) == \-1) > errExit("truncate"); > > printf("PID: %ld; fd: %d; /proc/%ld/fd/%d\\n", > (long) getpid(), fd, (long) getpid(), fd); > > /* Code to map the file and populate the mapping with data > omitted */ > > /* If a \(aqseals\(aq command\-line argument was supplied, set some > seals on the file */ > > if (seals_arg != NULL) { > seals = 0; > > if (strchr(seals_arg, \(aqg\(aq) != NULL) > seals |= F_SEAL_GROW; > if (strchr(seals_arg, \(aqs\(aq) != NULL) > seals |= F_SEAL_SHRINK; > if (strchr(seals_arg, \(aqw\(aq) != NULL) > seals |= F_SEAL_WRITE; > if (strchr(seals_arg, \(aqS\(aq) != NULL) > seals |= F_SEAL_SEAL; > > if (fcntl(fd, F_ADD_SEALS, seals) == \-1) > errExit("fcntl"); > } > > /* Keep running, so that the file created by memfd_create() > continues to exist */ > > pause(); > > exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); > } > .fi > .SS Program source: t_get_seals.c > \& > .nf > #include <sys/memfd.h> > #include <fcntl.h> > #include <unistd.h> > #include <stdlib.h> > #include <string.h> > #include <stdio.h> > > #define errExit(msg) do { perror(msg); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); \\ > } while (0) > > int > main(int argc, char *argv[]) > { > int fd; > unsigned int seals; > > if (argc != 2) { > fprintf(stderr, "%s /proc/PID/fd/FD\\n", argv[0]); > exit(EXIT_FAILURE); > } > > fd = open(argv[1], O_RDWR); > if (fd == \-1) > errExit("open"); > > seals = fcntl(fd, F_GET_SEALS); > if (seals == \-1) > errExit("fcntl"); > > printf("Existing seals:"); > if (seals & F_SEAL_SEAL) > printf(" SEAL"); > if (seals & F_SEAL_GROW) > printf(" GROW"); > if (seals & F_SEAL_WRITE) > printf(" WRITE"); > if (seals & F_SEAL_SHRINK) > printf(" SHRINK"); > printf("\\n"); > > /* Code to map the file and access the contents of the > resulting mapping omitted */ > > exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); > } > .fi > .SH SEE ALSO > .BR fcntl (2), > .BR ftruncate (2), > .BR mmap (2), > .\" FIXME Why the reference to shmget(2) in particular (and not, > .\" e.g., shm_open(3))? No particular reason. > .BR shmget (2) > > ==================== fcntl.2 (partial) ==================== > ... > .SH DESCRIPTION > ... > .SS File Sealing > File seals limit the set of allowed operations on a given file. > For each seal that is set on a file, > a specific set of operations will fail with > .B EPERM > on this file from now on. > The file is said to be sealed. > The default set of seals depends on the type of the underlying > file and filesystem. > For an overview of file sealing, a discussion of its purpose, > and some code examples, see > .BR memfd_create (2). > > .\" FIXME I changed "shmem" to "tmpfs" in the next sentence. Okay? Sounds good. > Currently, only the > .I tmpfs > filesystem supports sealing. > On other filesystems, all > .BR fcntl (2) > operations that operate on seals will return > .BR EINVAL . > > Seals are a property of an inode. > .\" FIXME: I reworded the following sentence a little. Please check it. Looks fine. > Thus, all open file descriptors referring to the same inode share > the same set of seals. > Furthermore, seals can never be removed, only added. > .TP > .BR F_ADD_SEALS " (\fIint\fP; since Linux 3.17)" > Add the seals given in the bit-mask argument > .I arg > to the set of seals of the inode referred to by the file descriptor > .IR fd . > Seals cannot be removed again. > Once this call succeeds, the seals are enforced by the kernel immediately. > If the current set of seals includes > .BR F_SEAL_SEAL > (see below), then this call will be rejected with > .BR EPERM . > Adding a seal that is already set is a no-op, in case > .B F_SEAL_SEAL > is not set already. > In order to place a seal, the file descriptor > .I fd > must be writable. > .TP > .BR F_GET_SEALS " (\fIvoid\fP; since Linux 3.17)" > Return (as the function result) the current set of seals > of the inode referred to by > .IR fd . > If no seals are set, 0 is returned. > If the file does not support sealing, \-1 is returned and > .I errno > is set to > .BR EINVAL . > .PP > The following set of seals is available so far: > .TP > .BR F_SEAL_SEAL > If this seal is set, any further call to > .BR fcntl (2) > with > .B F_ADD_SEALS > will fail with > .BR EPERM . > Therefore, this seal prevents any modifications to the set of seals itself. > If the initial set of seals of a file includes > .BR F_SEAL_SEAL , > then this effectively causes the set of seals to be constant and locked. > .TP > .BR F_SEAL_SHRINK > If this seal is set, the file in question cannot be reduced in size. > This affects > .BR open (2) > with the > .B O_TRUNC > flag and > .BR ftruncate (2). > .\" FIXME and also truncate(2)? Yes. > Those calls will fail with > .B EPERM > if you try to shrink the file in question. > Increasing the file size is still possible. > .TP > .BR F_SEAL_GROW > If this seal is set, the size of the file in question cannot be increased. > This affects > .BR write (2) > if you write across size boundaries, > .BR ftruncate (2), > .\" FIXME and also truncate(2)? Yes. > and > .BR fallocate (2). > These calls will fail with > .B EPERM > if you use them to increase the file size or write beyond size boundaries. > .\" FIXME What does "size boundaries" mean here? It means writing past the end of the file. > If you keep the size or shrink it, those calls still work as expected. > .TP > .BR F_SEAL_WRITE > If this seal is set, you cannot modify the contents of the file. > Note that shrinking or growing the size of the file is > still possible and allowed. > .\" FIXME So, just to confirm my understanding of the previous sentence: > .\" Given a file with the F_SEAL_WRITE seal set, then: > .\" > .\" * Writing zeros into (say) the last 100 bytes of the file is > .\" NOT be permitted. > .\" > .\" * Shrinking the file by 100 bytes using ftruncate(), and then > .\" increasing the file size by 100 bytes, which would have the > .\" effect of replacing the last hundred bytes by zeros, IS > .\" permitted. > .\" > .\" Either my understanding is incorrect, or the above two cases > .\" seem a little anomalous. Can you comment? Your understanding is correct. That's why you usually want SEAL_WRITE in combination with either SEAL_SHRINK _or_ SEAL_GROW. SEAL_WRITE by itself only protects data-overwrite, but not removal or addition of data (which, effectively, can be used to achieve the same, but in a racy manner). > .\" > Thus, this seal is normally used in combination with one of the other seals. > This seal affects > .BR write (2) > and > .BR fallocate (2) > (only in combination with the > .B FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE > flag). > Those calls will fail with > .B EPERM > if this seal is set. > Furthermore, trying to create new shared, writable memory-mappings via Comma after "new"? > .BR mmap (2) > will also fail with > .BR EPERM . > > Setting > .B F_SEAL_WRITE > via > .BR fcntl (2) > with > .B F_ADD_SEALS > will fail with > .B EBUSY > if any writable, shared mapping exists. > Such mappings must be unmapped before you can add this seal. > Furthermore, if there are any asynchronous > .\" FIXME Does this mean io_submit(2)? Yes. > I/O operations pending on the file, > all outstanding writes will be discarded. Both man-pages look really good. Thanks a lot! Thanks David -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-man" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
