On Tue, Dec 9, 2014 at 12:42 PM, Eric W. Biederman
<ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> - Expose the knob to user space through a proc file /proc/<pid>/setgroups
>
> A value of "deny" means the setgroups system call is disabled in the
> current processes user namespace and can not be enabled in the
> future in this user namespace.
>
> A value of "allow" means the segtoups system call is enabled.
>
> - Descendant user namespaces inherit the value of setgroups from
> their parents.
>
> - A proc file is used (instead of a sysctl) as sysctls
> currently do not pass in a struct file so file_ns_capable
> is unusable.
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
But I still don't like the name "setgroups". People may look at that
and have no clue what the scope of the setting is. And anyone who, as
root, writes "deny" to /proc/self/setgroups, thinking that it acts on
self, will be in for a surprise.
--Andy
>
> Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> fs/proc/base.c | 31 +++++++++----
> include/linux/user_namespace.h | 7 +++
> kernel/user.c | 1 +
> kernel/user_namespace.c | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 134 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index 772efa45a452..4ebed9f01d97 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -2386,7 +2386,7 @@ static int proc_tgid_io_accounting(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
> #endif /* CONFIG_TASK_IO_ACCOUNTING */
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
> -static int proc_id_map_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
> +static int proc_userns_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
> const struct seq_operations *seq_ops)
> {
> struct user_namespace *ns = NULL;
> @@ -2418,7 +2418,7 @@ err:
> return ret;
> }
>
> -static int proc_id_map_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> +static int proc_userns_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> {
> struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
> struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
> @@ -2428,17 +2428,17 @@ static int proc_id_map_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
>
> static int proc_uid_map_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> {
> - return proc_id_map_open(inode, file, &proc_uid_seq_operations);
> + return proc_userns_open(inode, file, &proc_uid_seq_operations);
> }
>
> static int proc_gid_map_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> {
> - return proc_id_map_open(inode, file, &proc_gid_seq_operations);
> + return proc_userns_open(inode, file, &proc_gid_seq_operations);
> }
>
> static int proc_projid_map_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> {
> - return proc_id_map_open(inode, file, &proc_projid_seq_operations);
> + return proc_userns_open(inode, file, &proc_projid_seq_operations);
> }
>
> static const struct file_operations proc_uid_map_operations = {
> @@ -2446,7 +2446,7 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_uid_map_operations = {
> .write = proc_uid_map_write,
> .read = seq_read,
> .llseek = seq_lseek,
> - .release = proc_id_map_release,
> + .release = proc_userns_release,
> };
>
> static const struct file_operations proc_gid_map_operations = {
> @@ -2454,7 +2454,7 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_gid_map_operations = {
> .write = proc_gid_map_write,
> .read = seq_read,
> .llseek = seq_lseek,
> - .release = proc_id_map_release,
> + .release = proc_userns_release,
> };
>
> static const struct file_operations proc_projid_map_operations = {
> @@ -2462,7 +2462,20 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_projid_map_operations = {
> .write = proc_projid_map_write,
> .read = seq_read,
> .llseek = seq_lseek,
> - .release = proc_id_map_release,
> + .release = proc_userns_release,
> +};
> +
> +static int proc_setgroups_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> +{
> + return proc_userns_open(inode, file, &proc_setgroups_seq_operations);
> +}
> +
> +static const struct file_operations proc_setgroups_operations = {
> + .open = proc_setgroups_open,
> + .write = proc_setgroups_write,
> + .read = seq_read,
> + .llseek = seq_lseek,
> + .release = proc_userns_release,
> };
> #endif /* CONFIG_USER_NS */
>
> @@ -2572,6 +2585,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = {
> REG("uid_map", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_uid_map_operations),
> REG("gid_map", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_gid_map_operations),
> REG("projid_map", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_projid_map_operations),
> + REG("setgroups", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_setgroups_operations),
> #endif
> #ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
> REG("timers", S_IRUGO, proc_timers_operations),
> @@ -2913,6 +2927,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_stuff[] = {
> REG("uid_map", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_uid_map_operations),
> REG("gid_map", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_gid_map_operations),
> REG("projid_map", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_projid_map_operations),
> + REG("setgroups", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_setgroups_operations),
> #endif
> };
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
> index 8d493083486a..feb0f4ec5573 100644
> --- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
> +++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
> @@ -17,6 +17,10 @@ struct uid_gid_map { /* 64 bytes -- 1 cache line */
> } extent[UID_GID_MAP_MAX_EXTENTS];
> };
>
> +#define USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED 1UL
> +
> +#define USERNS_INIT_FLAGS USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED
> +
> struct user_namespace {
> struct uid_gid_map uid_map;
> struct uid_gid_map gid_map;
> @@ -27,6 +31,7 @@ struct user_namespace {
> kuid_t owner;
> kgid_t group;
> unsigned int proc_inum;
> + unsigned long flags;
>
> /* Register of per-UID persistent keyrings for this namespace */
> #ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
> @@ -60,9 +65,11 @@ struct seq_operations;
> extern const struct seq_operations proc_uid_seq_operations;
> extern const struct seq_operations proc_gid_seq_operations;
> extern const struct seq_operations proc_projid_seq_operations;
> +extern const struct seq_operations proc_setgroups_seq_operations;
> extern ssize_t proc_uid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
> extern ssize_t proc_gid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
> extern ssize_t proc_projid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
> +extern ssize_t proc_setgroups_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
> extern bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns);
> #else
>
> diff --git a/kernel/user.c b/kernel/user.c
> index 4efa39350e44..2d09940c9632 100644
> --- a/kernel/user.c
> +++ b/kernel/user.c
> @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ struct user_namespace init_user_ns = {
> .owner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
> .group = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
> .proc_inum = PROC_USER_INIT_INO,
> + .flags = USERNS_INIT_FLAGS,
> #ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
> .persistent_keyring_register_sem =
> __RWSEM_INITIALIZER(init_user_ns.persistent_keyring_register_sem),
> diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> index 44a555ac6104..b507f9af7ff2 100644
> --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
> +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> @@ -100,6 +100,11 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
> ns->owner = owner;
> ns->group = group;
>
> + /* Inherit USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED from our parent */
> + mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex);
> + ns->flags = parent_ns->flags;
> + mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
> +
> set_cred_user_ns(new, ns);
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
> @@ -839,6 +844,102 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
> return false;
> }
>
> +static void *setgroups_m_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *ppos)
> +{
> + struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
> +
> + return (*ppos == 0) ? ns : NULL;
> +}
> +
> +static void *setgroups_m_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *ppos)
> +{
> + ++*ppos;
> + return NULL;
> +}
> +
> +static void setgroups_m_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
> +{
> +}
> +
> +static int setgroups_m_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
> +{
> + struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
> +
> + seq_printf(seq, "%s\n",
> + test_bit(USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED, &ns->flags) ?
> + "allow" : "deny");
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +const struct seq_operations proc_setgroups_seq_operations = {
> + .start = setgroups_m_start,
> + .stop = setgroups_m_stop,
> + .next = setgroups_m_next,
> + .show = setgroups_m_show,
> +};
> +
> +ssize_t proc_setgroups_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> + size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
> +{
> + struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
> + struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
> + char kbuf[8], *pos;
> + bool setgroups_allowed;
> + ssize_t ret;
> +
> + ret = -EACCES;
> + if (!file_ns_capable(file, ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + goto out;
> +
> + /* Only allow a very narrow range of strings to be written */
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + if ((*ppos != 0) || (count >= sizeof(kbuf)))
> + goto out;
> +
> + /* What was written? */
> + ret = -EFAULT;
> + if (copy_from_user(kbuf, buf, count))
> + goto out;
> + kbuf[count] = '\0';
> + pos = kbuf;
> +
> + /* What is being requested? */
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + if (strncmp(pos, "allow", 5) == 0) {
> + pos += 5;
> + setgroups_allowed = true;
> + }
> + else if (strncmp(pos, "deny", 4) == 0) {
> + pos += 4;
> + setgroups_allowed = false;
> + }
> + else
> + goto out;
> +
> + /* Verify there is not trailing junk on the line */
> + pos = skip_spaces(pos);
> + if (*pos != '\0')
> + goto out;
> +
> + mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex);
> + if (setgroups_allowed) {
> + ret = -EPERM;
> + if (!(ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED)) {
> + mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
> + goto out;
> + }
> + } else {
> + ns->flags &= ~USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED;
> + }
> + mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
> +
> + /* Report a successful write */
> + *ppos = count;
> + ret = count;
> +out:
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns)
> {
> bool allowed;
> @@ -848,6 +949,8 @@ bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns)
> * the user namespace has been established.
> */
> allowed = ns->gid_map.nr_extents != 0;
> + /* Is setgroups allowed? */
> + allowed = allowed && (ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED);
> mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
>
> return allowed;
> --
> 1.9.1
>
--
Andy Lutomirski
AMA Capital Management, LLC
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-man" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
