On Sun, Nov 16, 2014 at 5:32 AM, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@xxxxxxx> wrote: > On Sat, Nov 15, 2014 at 09:08:07PM -0600, Eric W. Biederman wrote: >> >> That may be a bug with the user namespace permission check. Perhaps we >> shouldn't allow dropping groups that aren't mapped in the user >> namespace. > > I'm not saying that we can't change the behavior of whether or not a > user can drop a group permission. I'm just saying that we need to do > so consciously. The setgroups()/getgroups() ABI isn't part of > POSIX/SuSv3 so we wouldn't be breaking POSIX compatibility, for those > people who care about that. It may make sense to reach out to some place like oss-security. FWIW, I think we should ask, at the same time, about: - Dropping supplementary groups. - Switching gid/egid/sgid to a supplementary group. - Denying ptrace of a process with supplementary groups that the tracer doesn't have. Also, I much prefer a sysctl to a boot option. Boot options are nasty to configure in many distributions. --Andy > > The bigger deal is that it's very different from how BSD 4.x has > handled things, which means there is two decades of history that we're > looking at here. And there are times when taking away permissions in > an expected fashion can cause security problems. (As a silly example; > some architect at Digital wrote a spec that said that setuid must > return EINVAL for values greater than 32k --- back in the days when > uid's were a signed short. The junior programmer who implemented this > for Ultrix made the check for 32,000 decimal. Guess what happened > when /bin/login got a failure with setuid when it wasn't expecting one > --- since root could never get an error with that system call, right? > And MIT Project Athena started ran out of lower numbered uid's and > froshlings started getting assigned uid's > 32,000....) > > In this particular case, the change is probably a little less likely > to cause serious problems, although the fact that sudo does allow > negative group assignments is an example of another potential > breakage. > > OTOH, I'm aware of how this could cause major problems to the concept > of allowing an untrusted user to set up their own containers to > constrain what program with a possibly untrusted provinance might be > able to do. I can see times when I might want to run in a container > where the user didn't have access to groups that I have access to by > default --- including groups such as disk, sudo, lpadmin, etc. > > If we do want to make such a change, my suggestion is to keep things > *very* simple. Let it be a boot-time option whether or not users are > allowed to drop group permissions, and let it affect all possible ways > that users can drop groups. And we can create a shell script that > will search for the obvious ways that a user could get screwed by > enabling this, which we can encourage distributions to package up for > their end users. And then we document the heck out of the fact that > this option exists, and when/if we want to make it the default, so > it's perfectly clear and transparent to all what is happening. > > One of the things that scare me about the addition of the forced > capability "setuid" binary was that the feature was just silently slid > in, and we didn't do a good job reaching out to the tripwire and > rootkit and other such programs out there, such that several years > after we enabled capability support, most sysadmins and security > scanning programs are still apparently obivious to the this very > convenient feature that we gave to rootkit and malware authors. Now > we can say that we're just adding new features, and we owe no debt > other parts of the ecosystem --- this is the attitude used by upower > and other freedesktop.org components when they made incompatible > changes made available by new features provided by systemd[1]. > > [1] http://m.memegen.com/u7o1tk.jpg > > But as kernel developers, who pride ourselves on not breaking > userspace, I think we should try for a higher standard than this. And > perhaps this change with allowing groups to be dropped --- which is > admittedly a useful thing to be able to allow --- is a good place to > start trying to model a better way of doing things. We should try to > be responsible about how we add new features, and think of all of the > potential downstream consequences to the _all_ of the ecosystem. > > - Ted > > P.S. And we really should try reaching out to the security scanners > about capabilities, too.... -- Andy Lutomirski AMA Capital Management, LLC -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-man" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
