On Fri, Sep 21, 2012 at 1:54 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > This adds a short description of the no_new_privs bit, as described in > Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt. Thanks Kees. Applied. Cheers, Michael > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > --- > man2/prctl.2 | 15 +++++++++++++++ > 1 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/man2/prctl.2 b/man2/prctl.2 > index a44aa32..220c031 100644 > --- a/man2/prctl.2 > +++ b/man2/prctl.2 > @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ > .\" 2012-04-25 Michael Kerrisk, Document PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE and > .\" PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE > .\" 2012-09-20 Kees Cook, update PR_SET_SECCOMP for mode 2 > +.\" 2012-09-20 Kees Cook, document PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS > .\" > .\" FIXME: Document PR_SET_TIMERSLACK and PR_GET_TIMERSLACK (new in 2.6.28) > .\" commit 6976675d94042fbd446231d1bd8b7de71a980ada > @@ -216,6 +217,19 @@ in the buffer pointed to by > The buffer should allow space for up to 16 bytes; > the returned string will be null-terminated if it is shorter than that. > .TP > +.BR PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS " (since Linux 3.5)" > +Set the current process's \fIno_new_privs\fP bit to the value in > +\fIarg2\fP. With \fIno_new_privs\fP set to 1, execve promises not > +to grant the privilege to do anything that could not have been done > +without the execve call (for example, rendering setuid, setgid, and file > +capabilities non-functional). When enabled, this value is inherited > +across fork, clone, and execve and cannot be unset. > +.TP > +.BR PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS " (since Linux 3.5)" > +Return the value of the \fIno_new_privs\fP bit for the current process. A > +value of 0 indicates the regular execve behavior. A value of 1 indicates > +execve will operate in the privilege restricting mode described above. > +.TP > .BR PR_SET_PDEATHSIG " (since Linux 2.1.57)" > Set the parent process death signal > of the calling process to \fIarg2\fP (either a signal value > @@ -567,6 +581,7 @@ option. > On success, > .BR PR_GET_DUMPABLE , > .BR PR_GET_KEEPCAPS , > +.BR PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS , > .BR PR_CAPBSET_READ , > .BR PR_GET_TIMING , > .BR PR_GET_SECUREBITS , > -- > 1.7.0.4 > > > -- > Kees Cook > Chrome OS Security -- Michael Kerrisk Linux man-pages maintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/ Author of "The Linux Programming Interface"; http://man7.org/tlpi/ -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-man" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
