Re: [PATCH RFC v2 02/29] x86: Create CONFIG_MITIGATION_ADDRESS_SPACE_ISOLATION

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On Fri, Jan 10, 2025 at 06:40:28PM +0000, Brendan Jackman wrote:
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 7b9a7e8f39acc8e9aeb7d4213e87d71047865f5c..5a50582eb210e9d1309856a737d32b76fa1bfc85 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2519,6 +2519,20 @@ config MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 
 	  See Documentation/arch/x86/pti.rst for more details.
 
+config MITIGATION_ADDRESS_SPACE_ISOLATION
+	bool "Allow code to run with a reduced kernel address space"
+	default n
+	depends on X86_64 && !PARAVIRT && !UML
+	help
+	  This feature provides the ability to run some kernel code

s/This feature provide/Provide/

+	  with a reduced kernel address space. This can be used to
+	  mitigate some speculative execution attacks.
+
+	  The !PARAVIRT dependency is only because of lack of testing; in theory
+	  the code is written to work under paravirtualization. In practice
+	  there are likely to be unhandled cases, in particular concerning TLB
+	  flushes.

Right, this paragraph should be under the "---" line too until PARAVIRT gets
tested, ofc.

Thx.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette




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