Mark these cases as non-recoverable to later prevent them from being cought when they occur during speculative path verification. Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@xxxxxx> Acked-by: Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@xxxxxx> Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@xxxxxxxxx> Cc: Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@xxxxxx> --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 199a6341ac82..6234d0bb59d6 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -8889,7 +8889,7 @@ static int resolve_map_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, if (!meta->map_ptr) { /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->type\n"); - return -EACCES; + return -EFAULT; } switch (meta->map_ptr->map_type) { @@ -9577,7 +9577,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, * that kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->key\n"); - return -EACCES; + return -EFAULT; } key_size = meta->map_ptr->key_size; err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, key_size, BPF_READ, false, NULL); @@ -9604,7 +9604,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, if (!meta->map_ptr) { /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->value\n"); - return -EACCES; + return -EFAULT; } meta->raw_mode = arg_type & MEM_UNINIT; err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, meta->map_ptr->value_size, @@ -10903,7 +10903,7 @@ record_func_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, if (map == NULL) { verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); - return -EINVAL; + return -EFAULT; } /* In case of read-only, some additional restrictions @@ -10942,7 +10942,7 @@ record_func_key(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, return 0; if (!map || map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) { verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); - return -EINVAL; + return -EFAULT; } reg = ®s[BPF_REG_3]; @@ -11196,7 +11196,7 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn if (changes_data && fn->arg1_type != ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) { verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d: r1 != ctx\n", func_id_name(func_id), func_id); - return -EINVAL; + return -EFAULT; } memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); @@ -11498,7 +11498,7 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) { verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); - return -EINVAL; + return -EFAULT; } if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && @@ -16528,7 +16528,7 @@ static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) dst_reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; } else { verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); - return -EINVAL; + return -EFAULT; } return 0; @@ -16575,7 +16575,7 @@ static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) if (!env->ops->gen_ld_abs) { verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); - return -EINVAL; + return -EFAULT; } if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 || @@ -20614,7 +20614,7 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) -(subprogs[0].stack_depth + 8)); if (epilogue_cnt >= INSN_BUF_SIZE) { verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); - return -EINVAL; + return -EFAULT; } else if (epilogue_cnt) { /* Save the ARG_PTR_TO_CTX for the epilogue to use */ cnt = 0; @@ -20637,13 +20637,13 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) if (ops->gen_prologue || env->seen_direct_write) { if (!ops->gen_prologue) { verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); - return -EINVAL; + return -EFAULT; } cnt = ops->gen_prologue(insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write, env->prog); if (cnt >= INSN_BUF_SIZE) { verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); - return -EINVAL; + return -EFAULT; } else if (cnt) { new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt); if (!new_prog) @@ -20800,7 +20800,7 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) if (type == BPF_WRITE) { verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx access misconfigured\n"); - return -EINVAL; + return -EFAULT; } size_code = BPF_H; @@ -20819,7 +20819,7 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= INSN_BUF_SIZE || (ctx_field_size && !target_size)) { verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); - return -EINVAL; + return -EFAULT; } if (is_narrower_load && size < target_size) { @@ -20827,7 +20827,7 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) off, size, size_default) * 8; if (shift && cnt + 1 >= INSN_BUF_SIZE) { verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx load misconfigured\n"); - return -EINVAL; + return -EFAULT; } if (ctx_field_size <= 4) { if (shift) @@ -21590,7 +21590,7 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) cnt = env->ops->gen_ld_abs(insn, insn_buf); if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= INSN_BUF_SIZE) { verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); - return -EINVAL; + return -EFAULT; } new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); @@ -21926,7 +21926,7 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) goto patch_map_ops_generic; if (cnt <= 0 || cnt >= INSN_BUF_SIZE) { verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); - return -EINVAL; + return -EFAULT; } new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, @@ -22286,7 +22286,7 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack || !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_run) { verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); - return -EINVAL; + return -EFAULT; } ret = map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track(map_ptr, prog->aux); -- 2.48.1