Re: [PATCH v9 1/7] mseal sysmap: kernel config and header change

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On Wed, Mar 05, 2025 at 05:54:24AM +0000, Lorenzo Stoakes wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 05, 2025 at 02:17:05AM +0000, jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
> > From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> >
> > Provide infrastructure to mseal system mappings. Establish
> > two kernel configs (CONFIG_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS,
> > ARCH_SUPPORTS_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS) and VM_SEALED_SYSMAP
> > macro for future patches.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@xxxxxxxxxx>
>
> Umm... I reviewed this too? :) unless you made substantial changes here
> (doesn't appear so), please do propagate tags for each revision :>)
>
> Anyway, FWIW:
>
> Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@xxxxxxxxxx>
>

(you also forgot to propagate Liam's tag here)

> > ---
> >  include/linux/mm.h | 10 ++++++++++
> >  init/Kconfig       | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  security/Kconfig   | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
> >  3 files changed, 53 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
> > index 7b1068ddcbb7..8b800941678d 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/mm.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/mm.h
> > @@ -4155,4 +4155,14 @@ int arch_get_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long __user *st
> >  int arch_set_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long status);
> >  int arch_lock_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long status);
> >
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * mseal of userspace process's system mappings.
> > + */
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS
> > +#define VM_SEALED_SYSMAP	VM_SEALED
> > +#else
> > +#define VM_SEALED_SYSMAP	VM_NONE
> > +#endif
> > +
> >  #endif /* _LINUX_MM_H */
> > diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
> > index d0d021b3fa3b..7f67d8942a09 100644
> > --- a/init/Kconfig
> > +++ b/init/Kconfig
> > @@ -1882,6 +1882,28 @@ config ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_CALLBACKS
> >  config ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_SYNC_CORE
> >  	bool
> >
> > +config ARCH_SUPPORTS_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS
> > +	bool
> > +	help
> > +	  Control MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS access based on architecture.
> > +
> > +	  A 64-bit kernel is required for the memory sealing feature.
> > +	  No specific hardware features from the CPU are needed.
> > +
> > +	  To enable this feature, the architecture needs to update their
> > +	  special mappings calls to include the sealing flag and confirm
> > +	  that it doesn't unmap/remap system mappings during the life
> > +	  time of the process. The existence of this flag for an architecture
> > +	  implies that it does not require the remapping of the system
> > +	  mappings during process lifetime, so sealing these mappings is safe
> > +	  from a kernel perspective.
> > +
> > +	  After the architecture enables this, a distribution can set
> > +	  CONFIG_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPING to manage access to the feature.
> > +
> > +	  For complete descriptions of memory sealing, please see
> > +	  Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
> > +
> >  config HAVE_PERF_EVENTS
> >  	bool
> >  	help
> > diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> > index f10dbf15c294..a914a02df27e 100644
> > --- a/security/Kconfig
> > +++ b/security/Kconfig
> > @@ -51,6 +51,27 @@ config PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE
> >
> >  endchoice
> >
> > +config MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS
> > +	bool "mseal system mappings"
> > +	depends on 64BIT
> > +	depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS
> > +	depends on !CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
> > +	help
> > +	  Apply mseal on system mappings.
> > +	  The system mappings includes vdso, vvar, vvar_vclock,
> > +	  vectors (arm compat-mode), sigpage (arm compat-mode), uprobes.
> > +
> > +	  A 64-bit kernel is required for the memory sealing feature.
> > +	  No specific hardware features from the CPU are needed.
> > +
> > +	  WARNING: This feature breaks programs which rely on relocating
> > +	  or unmapping system mappings. Known broken software at the time
> > +	  of writing includes CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, UML, gVisor, rr. Therefore
> > +	  this config can't be enabled universally.
> > +
> > +	  For complete descriptions of memory sealing, please see
> > +	  Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
> > +
> >  config SECURITY
> >  	bool "Enable different security models"
> >  	depends on SYSFS
> > --
> > 2.48.1.711.g2feabab25a-goog
> >




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