Hi Andrew, If there is no objection, please pull this v3 patch to mm-unstable. I believe I already responded to all comments related to this patch. This will keep mseal.rst up-to-date with current implementation of memory sealing. Thanks -Jeff On Mon, Oct 7, 2024 at 9:09 PM <jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > > Update doc after in-loop change: mprotect/madvise can have > partially updated and munmap is atomic. > > Fix indentation and clarify some sections to improve readability. > > Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > Fixes: df2a7df9a9aa ("mm/munmap: replace can_modify_mm with can_modify_vma") > Fixes: 4a2dd02b0916 ("mm/mprotect: replace can_modify_mm with can_modify_vma") > Fixes: 38075679b5f1 ("mm/mremap: replace can_modify_mm with can_modify_vma") > Fixes: 23c57d1fa2b9 ("mseal: replace can_modify_mm_madv with a vma variant") > Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > --- > Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst | 307 +++++++++++++------------- > 1 file changed, 148 insertions(+), 159 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst > index 4132eec995a3..41102f74c5e2 100644 > --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst > +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst > @@ -23,177 +23,166 @@ applications can additionally seal security critical data at runtime. > A similar feature already exists in the XNU kernel with the > VM_FLAGS_PERMANENT flag [1] and on OpenBSD with the mimmutable syscall [2]. > > -User API > -======== > -mseal() > ------------ > -The mseal() syscall has the following signature: > - > -``int mseal(void addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags)`` > - > -**addr/len**: virtual memory address range. > - > -The address range set by ``addr``/``len`` must meet: > - - The start address must be in an allocated VMA. > - - The start address must be page aligned. > - - The end address (``addr`` + ``len``) must be in an allocated VMA. > - - no gap (unallocated memory) between start and end address. > - > -The ``len`` will be paged aligned implicitly by the kernel. > - > -**flags**: reserved for future use. > - > -**return values**: > - > -- ``0``: Success. > - > -- ``-EINVAL``: > - - Invalid input ``flags``. > - - The start address (``addr``) is not page aligned. > - - Address range (``addr`` + ``len``) overflow. > - > -- ``-ENOMEM``: > - - The start address (``addr``) is not allocated. > - - The end address (``addr`` + ``len``) is not allocated. > - - A gap (unallocated memory) between start and end address. > - > -- ``-EPERM``: > - - sealing is supported only on 64-bit CPUs, 32-bit is not supported. > - > -- For above error cases, users can expect the given memory range is > - unmodified, i.e. no partial update. > - > -- There might be other internal errors/cases not listed here, e.g. > - error during merging/splitting VMAs, or the process reaching the max > - number of supported VMAs. In those cases, partial updates to the given > - memory range could happen. However, those cases should be rare. > - > -**Blocked operations after sealing**: > - Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking the size, > - via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty space, therefore > - can be replaced with a VMA with a new set of attributes. > - > - Moving or expanding a different VMA into the current location, > - via mremap(). > - > - Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED). > - > - Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any > - specific risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because > - the use case is unclear. In any case, users can rely on > - merging to expand a sealed VMA. > - > - mprotect() and pkey_mprotect(). > - > - Some destructive madvice() behaviors (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED) > - for anonymous memory, when users don't have write permission to the > - memory. Those behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages, > - effectively a memset(0) for anonymous memory. > - > - Kernel will return -EPERM for blocked operations. > - > - For blocked operations, one can expect the given address is unmodified, > - i.e. no partial update. Note, this is different from existing mm > - system call behaviors, where partial updates are made till an error is > - found and returned to userspace. To give an example: > - > - Assume following code sequence: > - > - - ptr = mmap(null, 8192, PROT_NONE); > - - munmap(ptr + 4096, 4096); > - - ret1 = mprotect(ptr, 8192, PROT_READ); > - - mseal(ptr, 4096); > - - ret2 = mprotect(ptr, 8192, PROT_NONE); > - > - ret1 will be -ENOMEM, the page from ptr is updated to PROT_READ. > - > - ret2 will be -EPERM, the page remains to be PROT_READ. > - > -**Note**: > - > -- mseal() only works on 64-bit CPUs, not 32-bit CPU. > - > -- users can call mseal() multiple times, mseal() on an already sealed memory > - is a no-action (not error). > - > -- munseal() is not supported. > - > -Use cases: > -========== > +SYSCALL > +======= > +mseal syscall signature > +----------------------- > + ``int mseal(void \* addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags)`` > + > + **addr**/**len**: virtual memory address range. > + The address range set by **addr**/**len** must meet: > + - The start address must be in an allocated VMA. > + - The start address must be page aligned. > + - The end address (**addr** + **len**) must be in an allocated VMA. > + - no gap (unallocated memory) between start and end address. > + > + The ``len`` will be paged aligned implicitly by the kernel. > + > + **flags**: reserved for future use. > + > + **Return values**: > + - **0**: Success. > + - **-EINVAL**: > + * Invalid input ``flags``. > + * The start address (``addr``) is not page aligned. > + * Address range (``addr`` + ``len``) overflow. > + - **-ENOMEM**: > + * The start address (``addr``) is not allocated. > + * The end address (``addr`` + ``len``) is not allocated. > + * A gap (unallocated memory) between start and end address. > + - **-EPERM**: > + * sealing is supported only on 64-bit CPUs, 32-bit is not supported. > + > + **Note about error return**: > + - For above error cases, users can expect the given memory range is > + unmodified, i.e. no partial update. > + - There might be other internal errors/cases not listed here, e.g. > + error during merging/splitting VMAs, or the process reaching the maximum > + number of supported VMAs. In those cases, partial updates to the given > + memory range could happen. However, those cases should be rare. > + > + **Architecture support**: > + mseal only works on 64-bit CPUs, not 32-bit CPUs. > + > + **Idempotent**: > + users can call mseal multiple times. mseal on an already sealed memory > + is a no-action (not error). > + > + **no munseal** > + Once mapping is sealed, it can't be unsealed. The kernel should never > + have munseal, this is consistent with other sealing feature, e.g. > + F_SEAL_SEAL for file. > + > +Blocked mm syscall for sealed mapping > +------------------------------------- > + It might be important to note: **once the mapping is sealed, it will > + stay in the process's memory until the process terminates**. > + > + Example:: > + > + *ptr = mmap(0, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, 0, 0); > + rc = mseal(ptr, 4096, 0); > + /* munmap will fail */ > + rc = munmap(ptr, 4096); > + assert(rc < 0); > + > + Blocked mm syscall: > + - munmap > + - mmap > + - mremap > + - mprotect and pkey_mprotect > + - some destructive madvise behaviors: MADV_DONTNEED, MADV_FREE, > + MADV_DONTNEED_LOCKED, MADV_FREE, MADV_DONTFORK, MADV_WIPEONFORK > + > + The first set of syscalls to block is munmap, mremap, mmap. They can > + either leave an empty space in the address space, therefore allowing > + replacement with a new mapping with new set of attributes, or can > + overwrite the existing mapping with another mapping. > + > + mprotect and pkey_mprotect are blocked because they changes the > + protection bits (RWX) of the mapping. > + > + Certain destructive madvise behaviors, specifically MADV_DONTNEED, > + MADV_FREE, MADV_DONTNEED_LOCKED, and MADV_WIPEONFORK, can introduce > + risks when applied to anonymous memory by threads lacking write > + permissions. Consequently, these operations are prohibited under such > + conditions. The aforementioned behaviors have the potential to modify > + region contents by discarding pages, effectively performing a memset(0) > + operation on the anonymous memory. > + > + Kernel will return -EPERM for blocked syscalls. > + > + When blocked syscall return -EPERM due to sealing, the memory regions may > + or may not be changed, depends on the syscall being blocked: > + > + - munmap: munmap is atomic. If one of VMAs in the given range is > + sealed, none of VMAs are updated. > + - mprotect, pkey_mprotect, madvise: partial update might happen, e.g. > + when mprotect over multiple VMAs, mprotect might update the beginning > + VMAs before reaching the sealed VMA and return -EPERM. > + - mmap and mremap: undefined behavior. > + > +Use cases > +========= > - glibc: > The dynamic linker, during loading ELF executables, can apply sealing to > - non-writable memory segments. > - > -- Chrome browser: protect some security sensitive data-structures. > + mapping segments. > > -Notes on which memory to seal: > -============================== > +- Chrome browser: protect some security sensitive data structures. > > -It might be important to note that sealing changes the lifetime of a mapping, > -i.e. the sealed mapping won’t be unmapped till the process terminates or the > -exec system call is invoked. Applications can apply sealing to any virtual > -memory region from userspace, but it is crucial to thoroughly analyze the > -mapping's lifetime prior to apply the sealing. > +When not to use mseal > +===================== > +Applications can apply sealing to any virtual memory region from userspace, > +but it is *crucial to thoroughly analyze the mapping's lifetime* prior to > +apply the sealing. This is because the sealed mapping *won’t be unmapped* > +until the process terminates or the exec system call is invoked. > > For example: > + - aio/shm > + aio/shm can call mmap and munmap on behalf of userspace, e.g. > + ksys_shmdt() in shm.c. The lifetimes of those mapping are not tied to > + the lifetime of the process. If those memories are sealed from userspace, > + then munmap will fail, causing leaks in VMA address space during the > + lifetime of the process. > + > + - ptr allocated by malloc (heap) > + Don't use mseal on the memory ptr return from malloc(). > + malloc() is implemented by allocator, e.g. by glibc. Heap manager might > + allocate a ptr from brk or mapping created by mmap. > + If an app calls mseal on a ptr returned from malloc(), this can affect > + the heap manager's ability to manage the mappings; the outcome is > + non-deterministic. > + > + Example:: > + > + ptr = malloc(size); > + /* don't call mseal on ptr return from malloc. */ > + mseal(ptr, size); > + /* free will success, allocator can't shrink heap lower than ptr */ > + free(ptr); > + > +mseal doesn't block > +=================== > +In a nutshell, mseal blocks certain mm syscall from modifying some of VMA's > +attributes, such as protection bits (RWX). Sealed mappings doesn't mean the > +memory is immutable. > > -- aio/shm > - > - aio/shm can call mmap()/munmap() on behalf of userspace, e.g. ksys_shmdt() in > - shm.c. The lifetime of those mapping are not tied to the lifetime of the > - process. If those memories are sealed from userspace, then munmap() will fail, > - causing leaks in VMA address space during the lifetime of the process. > - > -- Brk (heap) > - > - Currently, userspace applications can seal parts of the heap by calling > - malloc() and mseal(). > - let's assume following calls from user space: > - > - - ptr = malloc(size); > - - mprotect(ptr, size, RO); > - - mseal(ptr, size); > - - free(ptr); > - > - Technically, before mseal() is added, the user can change the protection of > - the heap by calling mprotect(RO). As long as the user changes the protection > - back to RW before free(), the memory range can be reused. > - > - Adding mseal() into the picture, however, the heap is then sealed partially, > - the user can still free it, but the memory remains to be RO. If the address > - is re-used by the heap manager for another malloc, the process might crash > - soon after. Therefore, it is important not to apply sealing to any memory > - that might get recycled. > - > - Furthermore, even if the application never calls the free() for the ptr, > - the heap manager may invoke the brk system call to shrink the size of the > - heap. In the kernel, the brk-shrink will call munmap(). Consequently, > - depending on the location of the ptr, the outcome of brk-shrink is > - nondeterministic. > - > - > -Additional notes: > -================= > As Jann Horn pointed out in [3], there are still a few ways to write > -to RO memory, which is, in a way, by design. Those cases are not covered > -by mseal(). If applications want to block such cases, sandbox tools (such as > -seccomp, LSM, etc) might be considered. > +to RO memory, which is, in a way, by design. And those could be blocked > +by different security measures. > > Those cases are: > > -- Write to read-only memory through /proc/self/mem interface. > -- Write to read-only memory through ptrace (such as PTRACE_POKETEXT). > -- userfaultfd. > + - Write to read-only memory through /proc/self/mem interface (FOLL_FORCE). > + - Write to read-only memory through ptrace (such as PTRACE_POKETEXT). > + - userfaultfd. > > The idea that inspired this patch comes from Stephen Röttger’s work in V8 > CFI [4]. Chrome browser in ChromeOS will be the first user of this API. > > -Reference: > -========== > -[1] https://github.com/apple-oss-distributions/xnu/blob/1031c584a5e37aff177559b9f69dbd3c8c3fd30a/osfmk/mach/vm_statistics.h#L274 > - > -[2] https://man.openbsd.org/mimmutable.2 > - > -[3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez3ShUYey+ZAFsU2i1RpQn0a5eOs2hzQ426FkcgnfUGLvA@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx > - > -[4] https://docs.google.com/document/d/1O2jwK4dxI3nRcOJuPYkonhTkNQfbmwdvxQMyXgeaRHo/edit#heading=h.bvaojj9fu6hc > +Reference > +========= > +- [1] https://github.com/apple-oss-distributions/xnu/blob/1031c584a5e37aff177559b9f69dbd3c8c3fd30a/osfmk/mach/vm_statistics.h#L274 > +- [2] https://man.openbsd.org/mimmutable.2 > +- [3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez3ShUYey+ZAFsU2i1RpQn0a5eOs2hzQ426FkcgnfUGLvA@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx > +- [4] https://docs.google.com/document/d/1O2jwK4dxI3nRcOJuPYkonhTkNQfbmwdvxQMyXgeaRHo/edit#heading=h.bvaojj9fu6hc > -- > 2.47.0.rc0.187.ge670bccf7e-goog >