Hi Jeff,
Sorry for the delay.
Thanks for your v2 updates.
On 9/30/24 5:26 PM, jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
> From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
>
> Update doc after in-loop change: mprotect/madvise can have
> partially updated and munmap is atomic.
>
> Fix indentation and clarify some sections to improve readability.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Fixes: df2a7df9a9aa ("mm/munmap: replace can_modify_mm with can_modify_vma")
> Fixes: 4a2dd02b0916 ("mm/mprotect: replace can_modify_mm with can_modify_vma")
> Fixes: 38075679b5f1 ("mm/mremap: replace can_modify_mm with can_modify_vma")
> Fixes: 23c57d1fa2b9 ("mseal: replace can_modify_mm_madv with a vma variant")
> ---
> Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst | 304 ++++++++++++--------------
> 1 file changed, 144 insertions(+), 160 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
> index 4132eec995a3..04d34b5adb8f 100644
> --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
> @@ -23,177 +23,161 @@ applications can additionally seal security critical data at runtime.
> A similar feature already exists in the XNU kernel with the
> VM_FLAGS_PERMANENT flag [1] and on OpenBSD with the mimmutable syscall [2].
>
> -User API
> -========
> -mseal()
> ------------
> -The mseal() syscall has the following signature:
> -
> -``int mseal(void addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags)``
> -
> -**addr/len**: virtual memory address range.
> -
> -The address range set by ``addr``/``len`` must meet:
> - - The start address must be in an allocated VMA.
> - - The start address must be page aligned.
> - - The end address (``addr`` + ``len``) must be in an allocated VMA.
> - - no gap (unallocated memory) between start and end address.
> -
> -The ``len`` will be paged aligned implicitly by the kernel.
> -
> -**flags**: reserved for future use.
> -
> -**return values**:
> -
> -- ``0``: Success.
> -
> -- ``-EINVAL``:
> - - Invalid input ``flags``.
> - - The start address (``addr``) is not page aligned.
> - - Address range (``addr`` + ``len``) overflow.
> -
> -- ``-ENOMEM``:
> - - The start address (``addr``) is not allocated.
> - - The end address (``addr`` + ``len``) is not allocated.
> - - A gap (unallocated memory) between start and end address.
> -
> -- ``-EPERM``:
> - - sealing is supported only on 64-bit CPUs, 32-bit is not supported.
> -
> -- For above error cases, users can expect the given memory range is
> - unmodified, i.e. no partial update.
> -
> -- There might be other internal errors/cases not listed here, e.g.
> - error during merging/splitting VMAs, or the process reaching the max
> - number of supported VMAs. In those cases, partial updates to the given
> - memory range could happen. However, those cases should be rare.
> -
> -**Blocked operations after sealing**:
> - Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking the size,
> - via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty space, therefore
> - can be replaced with a VMA with a new set of attributes.
> -
> - Moving or expanding a different VMA into the current location,
> - via mremap().
> -
> - Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED).
> -
> - Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any
> - specific risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because
> - the use case is unclear. In any case, users can rely on
> - merging to expand a sealed VMA.
> -
> - mprotect() and pkey_mprotect().
> -
> - Some destructive madvice() behaviors (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED)
> - for anonymous memory, when users don't have write permission to the
> - memory. Those behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages,
> - effectively a memset(0) for anonymous memory.
> -
> - Kernel will return -EPERM for blocked operations.
> -
> - For blocked operations, one can expect the given address is unmodified,
> - i.e. no partial update. Note, this is different from existing mm
> - system call behaviors, where partial updates are made till an error is
> - found and returned to userspace. To give an example:
> -
> - Assume following code sequence:
> -
> - - ptr = mmap(null, 8192, PROT_NONE);
> - - munmap(ptr + 4096, 4096);
> - - ret1 = mprotect(ptr, 8192, PROT_READ);
> - - mseal(ptr, 4096);
> - - ret2 = mprotect(ptr, 8192, PROT_NONE);
> -
> - ret1 will be -ENOMEM, the page from ptr is updated to PROT_READ.
> -
> - ret2 will be -EPERM, the page remains to be PROT_READ.
> -
> -**Note**:
> -
> -- mseal() only works on 64-bit CPUs, not 32-bit CPU.
> -
> -- users can call mseal() multiple times, mseal() on an already sealed memory
> - is a no-action (not error).
> -
> -- munseal() is not supported.
> -
> -Use cases:
> -==========
> +SYSCALL
> +=======
> +mseal syscall signature
> +-----------------------
> + ``int mseal(void \* addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags)``
> +
> + **addr**/**len**: virtual memory address range.
> + The address range set by **addr**/**len** must meet:
> + - The start address must be in an allocated VMA.
> + - The start address must be page aligned.
> + - The end address (**addr** + **len**) must be in an allocated VMA.
> + - no gap (unallocated memory) between start and end address.
> +
> + The ``len`` will be paged aligned implicitly by the kernel.
> +
> + **flags**: reserved for future use.
> +
> + **Return values**:
> + - **0**: Success.
> + - **-EINVAL**:
> + * Invalid input ``flags``.
> + * The start address (``addr``) is not page aligned.
> + * Address range (``addr`` + ``len``) overflow.
> + - **-ENOMEM**:
> + * The start address (``addr``) is not allocated.
> + * The end address (``addr`` + ``len``) is not allocated.
> + * A gap (unallocated memory) between start and end address.
> + - **-EPERM**:
> + * sealing is supported only on 64-bit CPUs, 32-bit is not supported.
> +
> + **Note about error return**:
> + - For above error cases, users can expect the given memory range is
> + unmodified, i.e. no partial update.
> + - There might be other internal errors/cases not listed here, e.g.
> + error during merging/splitting VMAs, or the process reaching the max
maximum
> + number of supported VMAs. In those cases, partial updates to the given
> + memory range could happen. However, those cases should be rare.
> +
> + **Architecture support**:
> + mseal only works on 64-bit CPUs, not 32-bit CPUs.
> +
> + **Idempotent**:
> + users can call mseal multiple times. mseal on an already sealed memory
> + is a no-action (not error).
> +
> + **no munseal**
> + Once mapping is sealed, it can't be unsealed. kernel should never
The kernel
> + have munseal, this is consistent with other sealing feature, e.g.
> + F_SEAL_SEAL for file.
> +
> +Blocked mm syscall for sealed mapping
> +-------------------------------------
> + It might be important to note: **once the mapping is sealed, it will
> + stay in the process's memory until the process terminates**.
> +
> + Example::
> +
> + *ptr = mmap(0, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, 0, 0);
> + rc = mseal(ptr, 4096, 0);
> + /* munmap will fail */
> + rc = munmap(ptr, 4096);
> + assert(rc < 0);
> +
> + Blocked mm syscall:
> + - munmap
> + - mmap
> + - mremap
> + - mprotect and pkey_mprotect
> + - some destructive madvise behaviors: MADV_DONTNEED, MADV_FREE,
> + MADV_DONTNEED_LOCKED, MADV_FREE, MADV_DONTFORK, MADV_WIPEONFORK
> +
> + The first set of syscall to block is munmap, mremap, mmap. They can
syscalls
> + either leave an empty space in the address space, therefore allow
allowing
> + replacement with a new mapping with new set of attributes, or can
> + overwrite the existing mapping with another mapping.
> +
> + mprotect and pkey_mprotect are blocked because they changes the
> + protection bits (RWX) of the mapping.
> +
> + Some destructive madvise behaviors (MADV_DONTNEED, MADV_FREE,> + MADV_DONTNEED_LOCKED, MADV_FREE, MADV_DONTFORK, MADV_WIPEONFORK)
> + for anonymous memory, when users don't have write permission to the
> + memory. Those behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages,
above is not a sentence but I don't know how to fix it.
> + effectively a memset(0) for anonymous memory.
> +
> + Kernel will return -EPERM for blocked syscalls.
> +
> + When blocked syscall return -EPERM due to sealing, the memory regions may or may not be changed, depends on the syscall being blocked:
a blocked syscall returns depending on
and split that line into 2 lines.
> + - munmap: munmap is atomic. If one of VMAs in the given range is
> + sealed, none of VMAs are updated.
> + - mprotect, pkey_mprotect, madvise: partial update might happen, e.g.
> + when mprotect over multiple VMAs, mprotect might update the beginning
> + VMAs before reaching the sealed VMA and return -EPERM.
> + - mmap and mremap: undefined behavior.
> +
> +Use cases
> +=========
> - glibc:
> The dynamic linker, during loading ELF executables, can apply sealing to
> - non-writable memory segments.
> -
> -- Chrome browser: protect some security sensitive data-structures.
> + mapping segments.
>
> -Notes on which memory to seal:
> -==============================
> +- Chrome browser: protect some security sensitive data structures.
>
> -It might be important to note that sealing changes the lifetime of a mapping,
> -i.e. the sealed mapping won’t be unmapped till the process terminates or the
> -exec system call is invoked. Applications can apply sealing to any virtual
> -memory region from userspace, but it is crucial to thoroughly analyze the
> -mapping's lifetime prior to apply the sealing.
> +When not to use mseal
> +=====================
> +Applications can apply sealing to any virtual memory region from userspace,
> +but it is *crucial to thoroughly analyze the mapping's lifetime* prior to
> +apply the sealing. This is because the sealed mapping *won’t be unmapped*
> +until the process terminates or the exec system call is invoked.
>
> For example:
> + - aio/shm
> + aio/shm can call mmap and munmap on behalf of userspace, e.g.
> + ksys_shmdt() in shm.c. The lifetimes of those mapping are not tied to
> + the lifetime of the process. If those memories are sealed from userspace,
> + then munmap will fail, causing leaks in VMA address space during the
> + lifetime of the process.
> +
> + - ptr allocated by malloc (heap)
> + Don't use mseal on the memory ptr return from malloc().
> + malloc() is implemented by allocator, e.g. by glibc. Heap manager might
> + allocate a ptr from brk or mapping created by mmap.
> + If an app calls mseal on a ptr returned from malloc(), this can affect
> + the heap manager's ability to manage the mappings; the outcome is
> + non-deterministic.
> +
> + Example::
> +
> + ptr = malloc(size);
> + /* don't call mseal on ptr return from malloc. */
> + mseal(ptr, size);
> + /* free will success, allocator can't shrink heap lower than ptr */
> + free(ptr);
> +
> +mseal doesn't block
> +===================
> +In a nutshell, mseal blocks certain mm syscall from modifying some of VMA's
> +attributes, such as protection bits (RWX). Sealed mappings doesn't mean the
> +memory is immutable.
>
> -- aio/shm
> -
> - aio/shm can call mmap()/munmap() on behalf of userspace, e.g. ksys_shmdt() in
> - shm.c. The lifetime of those mapping are not tied to the lifetime of the
> - process. If those memories are sealed from userspace, then munmap() will fail,
> - causing leaks in VMA address space during the lifetime of the process.
> -
> -- Brk (heap)
> -
> - Currently, userspace applications can seal parts of the heap by calling
> - malloc() and mseal().
> - let's assume following calls from user space:
> -
> - - ptr = malloc(size);
> - - mprotect(ptr, size, RO);
> - - mseal(ptr, size);
> - - free(ptr);
> -
> - Technically, before mseal() is added, the user can change the protection of
> - the heap by calling mprotect(RO). As long as the user changes the protection
> - back to RW before free(), the memory range can be reused.
> -
> - Adding mseal() into the picture, however, the heap is then sealed partially,
> - the user can still free it, but the memory remains to be RO. If the address
> - is re-used by the heap manager for another malloc, the process might crash
> - soon after. Therefore, it is important not to apply sealing to any memory
> - that might get recycled.
> -
> - Furthermore, even if the application never calls the free() for the ptr,
> - the heap manager may invoke the brk system call to shrink the size of the
> - heap. In the kernel, the brk-shrink will call munmap(). Consequently,
> - depending on the location of the ptr, the outcome of brk-shrink is
> - nondeterministic.
> -
> -
> -Additional notes:
> -=================
> As Jann Horn pointed out in [3], there are still a few ways to write
> -to RO memory, which is, in a way, by design. Those cases are not covered
> -by mseal(). If applications want to block such cases, sandbox tools (such as
> -seccomp, LSM, etc) might be considered.
> +to RO memory, which is, in a way, by design. And those could be blocked
> +by different security measures.
>
> Those cases are:
> -
> -- Write to read-only memory through /proc/self/mem interface.
> -- Write to read-only memory through ptrace (such as PTRACE_POKETEXT).
> -- userfaultfd.
> + - Write to read-only memory through /proc/self/mem interface (FOLL_FORCE).
> + - Write to read-only memory through ptrace (such as PTRACE_POKETEXT).
> + - userfaultfd.
>
> The idea that inspired this patch comes from Stephen Röttger’s work in V8
> CFI [4]. Chrome browser in ChromeOS will be the first user of this API.
>
> -Reference:
> -==========
> -[1] https://github.com/apple-oss-distributions/xnu/blob/1031c584a5e37aff177559b9f69dbd3c8c3fd30a/osfmk/mach/vm_statistics.h#L274
> -
> -[2] https://man.openbsd.org/mimmutable.2
> -
> -[3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez3ShUYey+ZAFsU2i1RpQn0a5eOs2hzQ426FkcgnfUGLvA@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> -
> -[4] https://docs.google.com/document/d/1O2jwK4dxI3nRcOJuPYkonhTkNQfbmwdvxQMyXgeaRHo/edit#heading=h.bvaojj9fu6hc
> +Reference
> +=========
> +- [1] https://github.com/apple-oss-distributions/xnu/blob/1031c584a5e37aff177559b9f69dbd3c8c3fd30a/osfmk/mach/vm_statistics.h#L274
> +- [2] https://man.openbsd.org/mimmutable.2
> +- [3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez3ShUYey+ZAFsU2i1RpQn0a5eOs2hzQ426FkcgnfUGLvA@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> +- [4] https://docs.google.com/document/d/1O2jwK4dxI3nRcOJuPYkonhTkNQfbmwdvxQMyXgeaRHo/edit#heading=h.bvaojj9fu6hc
With those few changes:
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
--
~Randy
