Re: [PATCH v3 10/29] riscv/mm : ensure PROT_WRITE leads to VM_READ | VM_WRITE

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On Sun, May 12, 2024 at 06:24:45PM +0200, Alexandre Ghiti wrote:
Hi Deepak,

On 04/04/2024 01:34, Deepak Gupta wrote:
`arch_calc_vm_prot_bits` is implemented on risc-v to return VM_READ |
VM_WRITE if PROT_WRITE is specified. Similarly `riscv_sys_mmap` is
updated to convert all incoming PROT_WRITE to (PROT_WRITE | PROT_READ).
This is to make sure that any existing apps using PROT_WRITE still work.

Earlier `protection_map[VM_WRITE]` used to pick read-write PTE encodings.
Now `protection_map[VM_WRITE]` will always pick PAGE_SHADOWSTACK PTE
encodings for shadow stack. Above changes ensure that existing apps
continue to work because underneath kernel will be picking
`protection_map[VM_WRITE|VM_READ]` PTE encodings.

Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 arch/riscv/include/asm/mman.h    | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h |  1 +
 arch/riscv/kernel/sys_riscv.c    | 11 +++++++++++
 arch/riscv/mm/init.c             |  2 +-
 mm/mmap.c                        |  1 +
 5 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/riscv/include/asm/mman.h

diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/mman.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ef9fedf32546
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/mman.h
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __ASM_MMAN_H__
+#define __ASM_MMAN_H__
+
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <uapi/asm/mman.h>
+
+static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(unsigned long prot,
+	unsigned long pkey __always_unused)
+{
+	unsigned long ret = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * If PROT_WRITE was specified, force it to VM_READ | VM_WRITE.
+	 * Only VM_WRITE means shadow stack.
+	 */
+	if (prot & PROT_WRITE)
+		ret = (VM_READ | VM_WRITE);
+	return ret;
+}
+#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey)
+
+#endif /* ! __ASM_MMAN_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 6066822e7396..4d5983bc6766 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ extern struct pt_alloc_ops pt_ops __initdata;
 #define PAGE_READ_EXEC		__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_EXEC)
 #define PAGE_WRITE_EXEC		__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_READ |	\
 					 _PAGE_EXEC | _PAGE_WRITE)
+#define PAGE_SHADOWSTACK       __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_WRITE)
 #define PAGE_COPY		PAGE_READ
 #define PAGE_COPY_EXEC		PAGE_READ_EXEC
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/sys_riscv.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/sys_riscv.c
index f1c1416a9f1e..846c36b1b3d5 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/sys_riscv.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/sys_riscv.c
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm-generic/mman-common.h>
+#include <vdso/vsyscall.h>
+#include <asm/mman.h>
 static long riscv_sys_mmap(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
 			   unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
@@ -17,6 +19,15 @@ static long riscv_sys_mmap(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
 	if (unlikely(offset & (~PAGE_MASK >> page_shift_offset)))
 		return -EINVAL;
+	/*
+	 * If only PROT_WRITE is specified then extend that to PROT_READ
+	 * protection_map[VM_WRITE] is now going to select shadow stack encodings.
+	 * So specifying PROT_WRITE actually should select protection_map [VM_WRITE | VM_READ]
+	 * If user wants to create shadow stack then they should use `map_shadow_stack` syscall.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(prot & PROT_READ)))
+		prot |= PROT_READ;
+
 	return ksys_mmap_pgoff(addr, len, prot, flags, fd,
 			       offset >> (PAGE_SHIFT - page_shift_offset));
 }
diff --git a/arch/riscv/mm/init.c b/arch/riscv/mm/init.c
index fa34cf55037b..98e5ece4052a 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/mm/init.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/mm/init.c
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ pgd_t early_pg_dir[PTRS_PER_PGD] __initdata __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
 static const pgprot_t protection_map[16] = {
 	[VM_NONE]					= PAGE_NONE,
 	[VM_READ]					= PAGE_READ,
-	[VM_WRITE]					= PAGE_COPY,
+	[VM_WRITE]					= PAGE_SHADOWSTACK,
 	[VM_WRITE | VM_READ]				= PAGE_COPY,
 	[VM_EXEC]					= PAGE_EXEC,
 	[VM_EXEC | VM_READ]				= PAGE_READ_EXEC,
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index d89770eaab6b..57a974f49b00 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
 #include <linux/oom.h>
 #include <linux/sched/mm.h>
 #include <linux/ksm.h>
+#include <linux/processor.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>


What happens if someone restricts the permission to PROT_WRITE using mprotect()? I would say this is an issue since it would turn the pages into shadow stack pages.

look at this patch in this patch series.
"riscv/mm : ensure PROT_WRITE leads to VM_READ | VM_WRITE"

It implements `arch_calc_vm_prot_bits` for risc-v and enforces that incoming
PROT_WRITE is converted to VM_READ | VM_WRITE. And thus it'll become read/write
memory. This way `mprotect` can be used to convert a shadow stack page to
read/write memory but not a regular memory to shadow stack page.







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