On Mon, 2022-11-07 at 08:00 -0800, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 7, 2022 at 4:33 AM Roberto Sassu
> <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > On Fri, 2022-11-04 at 17:42 -0700, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> > > On Fri, Nov 4, 2022 at 8:29 AM Roberto Sassu
> > > <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > > On Thu, 2022-11-03 at 16:09 +0100, KP Singh wrote:
> > > > > On Fri, Oct 28, 2022 at 6:55 PM Roberto Sassu
> > > > > <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > > > > From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > > > > >
> > > > > > BPF LSM defines a bpf_lsm_*() function for each LSM hook, so that
> > > > > > security modules can define their own implementation for the desired hooks.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Unfortunately, BPF LSM does not restrict which values security modules can
> > > > > > return (for non-void LSM hooks). Security modules might follow the
> > > > > > conventions stated in include/linux/lsm_hooks.h, or put arbitrary values.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > This could cause big troubles, as the kernel is not ready to handle
> > > > > > possibly malicious return values from LSMs. Until now, it was not the
> > > > >
> > > > > I am not sure I would call this malicious. This would be incorrect, if
> > > > > someone is writing a BPF LSM program they already have the powers
> > > > > to willingly do a lot of malicious stuff.
> > > > >
> > > > > It's about unknowingly returning values that can break the system.
> > > >
> > > > Maybe it is possible to return specific values that lead to acquire
> > > > more information/do actions that the eBPF program is not supposed to
> > > > cause.
> > > >
> > > > I don't have a concrete example, so I will use the word you suggested.
> > > >
> > > > > > case, as each LSM is carefully reviewed and it won't be accepted if it
> > > > > > does not meet the return value conventions.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > The biggest problem is when an LSM returns a positive value, instead of a
> > > > > > negative value, as it could be converted to a pointer. Since such pointer
> > > > > > escapes the IS_ERR() check, its use later in the code can cause
> > > > > > unpredictable consequences (e.g. invalid memory access).
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Another problem is returning zero when an LSM is supposed to have done some
> > > > > > operations. For example, the inode_init_security hook expects that their
> > > > > > implementations return zero only if they set the name and value of the new
> > > > > > xattr to be added to the new inode. Otherwise, other kernel subsystems
> > > > > > might encounter unexpected conditions leading to a crash (e.g.
> > > > > > evm_protected_xattr_common() getting NULL as argument).
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Finally, there are LSM hooks which are supposed to return just one as
> > > > > > positive value, or non-negative values. Also in these cases, although it
> > > > > > seems less critical, it is safer to return to callers of the LSM
> > > > > > infrastructure more precisely what they expect.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > As eBPF allows code outside the kernel to run, it is its responsibility
> > > > > > to ensure that only expected values are returned to LSM infrastructure
> > > > > > callers.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Create four new BTF ID sets, respectively for hooks that can return
> > > > > > positive values, only one as positive value, that cannot return zero, and
> > > > > > that cannot return negative values. Create also corresponding functions to
> > > > > > check if the hook a security module is attached to belongs to one of the
> > > > > > defined sets.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Finally, check in the eBPF verifier the value returned by security modules
> > > > > > for each attached LSM hook, and return -EINVAL (the security module cannot
> > > > > > run) if the hook implementation does not satisfy the hook return value
> > > > > > policy.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > > > > Fixes: 9d3fdea789c8 ("bpf: lsm: Provide attachment points for BPF LSM programs")
> > > > > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > > > > > ---
> > > > > > include/linux/bpf_lsm.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++
> > > > > > kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > > > > kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++---
> > > > > > 3 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> > > > > >
> > > > > > diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h b/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h
> > > > > > index 4bcf76a9bb06..cd38aca4cfc0 100644
> > > > > > --- a/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h
> > > > > > +++ b/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h
> > > > > > @@ -28,6 +28,10 @@ int bpf_lsm_verify_prog(struct bpf_verifier_log *vlog,
> > > > > > const struct bpf_prog *prog);
> > > > > >
> > > > > > bool bpf_lsm_is_sleepable_hook(u32 btf_id);
> > > > > > +bool bpf_lsm_can_ret_pos_value(u32 btf_id);
> > > > > > +bool bpf_lsm_can_ret_only_one_as_pos_value(u32 btf_id);
> > > > > > +bool bpf_lsm_cannot_ret_zero(u32 btf_id);
> > > > > > +bool bpf_lsm_cannot_ret_neg_value(u32 btf_id);
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > This does not need to be exported to the rest of the kernel. Please
> > > > > have this logic in bpf_lsm.c and export a single verify function.
> > > > >
> > > > > Also, these really don't need to be such scattered logic, Could we
> > > > > somehow encode this into the LSM_HOOK definition?
> > > >
> > > > The problem is that a new LSM_HOOK definition would apply to every LSM
> > > > hook, while we need the ability to select subsets.
> > > >
> > > > I was thinking, but I didn't check yet, what about using BTF_ID_FLAGS,
> > > > introducing a flag for each interval (<0, 0, 1, >1) and setting the
> > > > appropriate flags for each LSM hook?
> > >
> > > Before adding infra to all hooks, let's analyze all hooks first.
> > > I thought the number of exceptions is very small.
> > > 99% of hooks will be fine with IS_ERR.
> > > If so, adding an extra flag to every hook will cause too much churn.
> >
> > If I counted them correctly, there are 12 hooks which can return a
> > positive value. Among them, 6 can return only 1. 3 should not return a
> > negative value.
> >
> > A reason for making this change in the LSM infrastructure would be that
> > the return values provided there would be the official reference for
> > anyone dealing with LSM hooks (e.g. redefining the LSM_HOOK macro).
> >
> > Another reason would be that for new hooks, the developer introducing
> > them would have to provide the information. BPF LSM would use that
> > automatically (otherwise it might get out of sync).
>
> I'd prefer these 12 hooks to get converted to IS_ERR instead.
> Especially those that can only return 1... why aren't they void?
Sorry, I meant can only return 1 as positive value (but can return 0 or
a negative value).
Not sure it is a good idea to change the conventions.
> > The idea would be to use BTF_ID_FLAGS() with the flags coming from
> > lsm_hook_defs.h, and to check if a flag is set depending on the
> > interval of the return value provided by the eBPF program.
>
> BTF_ID_FLAGS is not appropriate for this.
Uhm, why not? If you store the flags in the BTF ID set, the
implementation would be something like this.
Assuming that a hook definition becomes:
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, LSM_RET_NEG | LSM_RET_ZERO, path_unlink,
const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
In bpf_lsm.c, we would have:
#include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
#undef LSM_HOOK
#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, RET_FLAGS, NAME, ...) \
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_lsm_##NAME, RET_FLAGS)
BTF_SET_START(bpf_lsm_hooks)
#include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
#undef LSM_HOOK
BTF_SET_END(bpf_lsm_hooks)
bool bpf_lsm_ret_value_allowed(u32 btf_id, ...)
{
u32 *flags = btf_id_set8_contains(&bpf_lsm_hooks, btf_id);
if (lsm_ret < 0 && !(*flags & LSM_RET_NEG))
return false;
...
return true;
}
Thanks
Roberto
