On Fri, Aug 05, 2022 at 03:28:50PM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote: > On 06.07.22 10:20, Chao Peng wrote: > > Introduce a new memfd_create() flag indicating the content of the > > created memfd is inaccessible from userspace through ordinary MMU > > access (e.g., read/write/mmap). However, the file content can be > > accessed via a different mechanism (e.g. KVM MMU) indirectly. > > > > It provides semantics required for KVM guest private memory support > > that a file descriptor with this flag set is going to be used as the > > source of guest memory in confidential computing environments such > > as Intel TDX/AMD SEV but may not be accessible from host userspace. > > > > The flag can not coexist with MFD_ALLOW_SEALING, future sealing is > > also impossible for a memfd created with this flag. > > It's kind of weird to have it that way. Why should the user have to > care? It's the notifier requirement to have that, no? > > Why can't we handle that when register a notifier? If anything is > already mapped, fail registering the notifier if the notifier has these > demands. If registering succeeds, block it internally. > > Or what am I missing? We might not need the memfile set flag semantics > eventually and would not have to expose such a flag to user space. Well, with the new shim-based[1] implementation the approach without uAPI does not work. We now have two struct file, one is a normal accessible memfd and the other one is wrapper around that hides the memfd from userspace and filters allowed operations. If we first create an accessible memfd that userspace see it would be hard to hide it as by the time userspace may have multiple fds in different processes that point to the same struct file. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220831142439.65q2gi4g2d2z4ofh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx -- Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
