CCing linux-fsdevel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
On 01/09/2022 15:06, xiujianfeng wrote:
Hi,
在 2022/8/30 0:01, Mickaël Salaün 写道:
On 29/08/2022 03:17, xiujianfeng wrote:
Hi,
在 2022/8/28 3:30, Günther Noack 写道:
Hello!
the mapping between Landlock rights to LSM hooks is now as follows in
your patch set:
* LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_CHMOD controls hook_path_chmod
* LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_CHGRP controls hook_path_chown
(this hook can restrict both the chown(2) and chgrp(2) syscalls)
Is this the desired mapping?
The previous discussion I found on the topic was in
[1]
https://lore.kernel.org/all/5873455f-fff9-618c-25b1-8b6a4ec94368@xxxxxxxxxxx/
[2]
https://lore.kernel.org/all/b1d69dfa-6d93-2034-7854-e2bc4017d20e@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/
[3]
https://lore.kernel.org/all/c369c45d-5aa8-3e39-c7d6-b08b165495fd@xxxxxxxxxxx/
In my understanding the main arguments were the ones in [2] and [3].
There were no further responses to [3], so I was under the impression
that we were gravitating towards an approach where the
file-metadata-modification operations were grouped more coarsely?
For example with the approach suggested in [3], which would be to
group the operations coarsely into (a) one Landlock right for
modifying file metadata that is used in security contexts, and (b) one
Landlock right for modifying metadata that was used in non-security
contexts. That would mean that there would be:
(a) LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MODIFY_SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES to control the
following operations:
* chmod(2)-variants through hook_path_chmod,
* chown(2)-variants and chgrp(2)-variants through hook_path_chown,
* setxattr(2)-variants and removexattr(2)-variants for extended
attributes that are not "user extended attributes" as described in
xattr(7) through hook_inode_setxattr and hook_inode_removexattr
(b) LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MODIFY_NON_SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES to control the
following operations:
* utimes(2) and other operations for setting other non-security
sensitive attributes, probably through hook_inode_setattr(?)
* xattr modifications like above, but for the "user extended
attributes", though hook_inode_setxattr and hook_inode_removexattr
In my mind, this would be a sensible grouping, and it would also help
to decouple the userspace-exposed API from the underlying
implementation, as Casey suggested to do in [2].
Specifically for this patch set, if you want to use this grouping, you
would only need to add one new Landlock right
(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MODIFY_SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES) as described above
under (a) (and maybe we can find a shorter name for it... :))?
Did I miss any operations here that would be necessary to restrict?
Would that make sense to you? Xiu, what is your opinion on how this
should be grouped? Do you have use cases in mind where a more
fine-grained grouping would be required?
I apologize I may missed that discussion when I prepared v2:(
Yes, agreed, this grouping is more sensible and resonnable. so in this
patchset only one right will be added, and I suppose the first commit
which expand access_mask_t to u32 can be droped.
—Günther
P.S.: Regarding utimes: The hook_inode_setattr hook *also* gets called
on a variety on attribute changes including file ownership, file size
and file mode, so it might potentially interact with a bunch of other
existing Landlock rights. Maybe that is not the right approach. In any
case, it seems like it might require more thinking and it might be
sensible to do that in a separate patch set IMHO.
Thanks for you reminder, that seems it's more complicated to support
utimes, so I think we'd better not support it in this patchset.
The issue with this approach is that it makes it impossible to properly
group such access rights. Indeed, to avoid inconsistencies and much more
complexity, we cannot extend a Landlock access right once it is defined.
We also need to consider that file ownership and permissions have a
default (e.g. umask), which is also a way to set them. How to
consistently manage that? What if the application wants to protect its
files with chmod 0400?
what do you mean by this? do you mean that we should have a set of
default permissions for files created by applications within the
sandbox, so that it can update metadata of its own file.
I mean that we need a consistent access control system, and for this we
need to consider all the ways an extended attribute can be set.
We can either extend the meaning of current access rights (controlled
with a ruleset flag for compatibility reasons), or create new access
rights. I think it would be better to add new dedicated rights to make
it more explicit and flexible.
I'm not sure about the right approach to properly control file
permission. We need to think about it. Do you have some ideas?
BTW, utimes can be controlled with the inode_setattr() LSM hook. Being
able to control arbitrary file time modification could be part of the
FS_WRITE_SAFE_METADATA, but modification and access time should always
be updated according to the file operation.
About the naming, I think we can start with:
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_METADATA (read any file/dir metadata);
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_SAFE_METADATA: change file times, user xattr;
do you mean we should have permission controls on metadata level or
operation level? e.g. should we allow update on user xattr but deny
update on security xattr? or should we disallow update on any xattr?
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_UNSAFE_METADATA: interpreted by the kernel
(could change non-Landlock DAC or MAC, which could be considered as a
policy bypass; or other various xattr that might be interpreted by
filesystems), this should be denied most of the time.
do you mean FS_WRITE_UNSAFE_METADATA is security-related? and
FS_WRITE_SAFE_METADATA is non-security-related?
Yes, FS_WRITE_UNSAFE_METADATA would be for security related
xattr/chmod/chown, and FS_WRITE_SAFE_METADATA for non-security xattr.
Both are mutually exclusive. This would involve the inode_setattr and
inode_setxattr LSM hooks. Looking at the calling sites, it seems
possible to replace all inode arguments with paths.
