Roberto Sassu wrote:
> Add the bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() helper, to give eBPF security modules
> the ability to check the validity of a signature against supplied data, by
> using user-provided or system-provided keys as trust anchor.
>
> The new helper makes it possible to enforce mandatory policies, as eBPF
> programs might be allowed to make security decisions only based on data
> sources the system administrator approves.
>
> The caller should provide both the data to be verified and the signature as
> eBPF dynamic pointers (to minimize the number of parameters).
>
> The caller should also provide a keyring pointer obtained with
> bpf_lookup_user_key() or, alternatively, a keyring ID with values defined
> in verification.h. While the first choice gives users more flexibility, the
> second offers better security guarantees, as the keyring selection will not
> depend on possibly untrusted user space but on the kernel itself.
>
> Defined keyring IDs are: 0 for the primary keyring (immutable keyring of
> system keys); 1 for both the primary and secondary keyring (where keys can
> be added only if they are vouched for by existing keys in those keyrings);
> 2 for the platform keyring (primarily used by the integrity subsystem to
> verify a kexec'ed kerned image and, possibly, the initramfs signature).
>
> Note: since the keyring ID assignment is understood only by
> verify_pkcs7_signature(), it must be passed directly to the corresponding
> helper, rather than to a separate new helper returning a struct key pointer
> with the keyring ID as a pointer value. If such pointer is passed to any
> other helper which does not check its validity, an illegal memory access
> could occur.
>
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx> (cast warning)
> ---
> include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 17 +++++++++++++++
> kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 17 +++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 73 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> index 7bbcf2cd105d..524bed4d7170 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> @@ -5339,6 +5339,22 @@ union bpf_attr {
> * bpf_lookup_user_key() helper.
> * Return
> * 0
> + *
> + * long bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature(struct bpf_dynptr *data_ptr, struct bpf_dynptr *sig_ptr, struct key *trusted_keys, unsigned long keyring_id)
> + * Description
> + * Verify the PKCS#7 signature *sig* against the supplied *data*
> + * with keys in *trusted_keys* or in a keyring with ID
> + * *keyring_id*.
Would be nice to give precedence here so that its obvious order between
trusted_keys and keyring_id.
> + *
> + * *keyring_id* can have the following values defined in
> + * verification.h: 0 for the primary keyring (immutable keyring of
> + * system keys); 1 for both the primary and secondary keyring
> + * (where keys can be added only if they are vouched for by
> + * existing keys in those keyrings); 2 for the platform keyring
> + * (primarily used by the integrity subsystem to verify a kexec'ed
> + * kerned image and, possibly, the initramfs signature).
> + * Return
> + * 0 on success, a negative value on error.
> */
