Re: [RFC V1 PATCH 0/5] selftests: KVM: selftests for fd-based approach of supporting private memory

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On Fri, Apr 8, 2022, at 2:05 PM, Vishal Annapurve wrote:
> This series implements selftests targeting the feature floated by Chao
> via:
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20220310140911.50924-1-chao.p.peng@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/
>
> Below changes aim to test the fd based approach for guest private memory
> in context of normal (non-confidential) VMs executing on non-confidential
> platforms.
>
> Confidential platforms along with the confidentiality aware software
> stack support a notion of private/shared accesses from the confidential
> VMs.
> Generally, a bit in the GPA conveys the shared/private-ness of the
> access. Non-confidential platforms don't have a notion of private or
> shared accesses from the guest VMs. To support this notion,
> KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE
> is modified to allow marking an access from a VM within a GPA range as
> always shared or private. Any suggestions regarding implementing this ioctl
> alternatively/cleanly are appreciated.

This is fantastic.  I do think we need to decide how this should work in general.  We have a few platforms with somewhat different properties:

TDX: The guest decides, per memory access (using a GPA bit), whether an access is private or shared.  In principle, the same address could be *both* and be distinguished by only that bit, and the two addresses would refer to different pages.

SEV: The guest decides, per memory access (using a GPA bit), whether an access is private or shared.  At any given time, a physical address (with that bit masked off) can be private, shared, or invalid, but it can't be valid as private and shared at the same time.

pKVM (currently, as I understand it): the guest decides by hypercall, in advance of an access, which addresses are private and which are shared.

This series, if I understood it correctly, is like TDX except with no hardware security.

Sean or Chao, do you have a clear sense of whether the current fd-based private memory proposal can cleanly support SEV and pKVM?  What, if anything, needs to be done on the API side to get that working well?  I don't think we need to support SEV or pKVM right away to get this merged, but I do think we should understand how the API can map to them.



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