On Thu, Dec 16, 2021 at 01:35:57PM -0700, Peter Gonda wrote:
> )
>
>
> On Thu, Dec 16, 2021 at 10:18 AM Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > Add interfaces to allow tests to create/manage SEV guests. The
> > additional state associated with these guests is encapsulated in a new
> > struct sev_vm, which is a light wrapper around struct kvm_vm. These
> > VMs will use vm_set_memory_encryption() and vm_get_encrypted_phy_pages()
> > under the covers to configure and sync up with the core kvm_util
> > library on what should/shouldn't be treated as encrypted memory.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
> > ---
> > tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile | 9 +-
> > .../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h | 44 ++++
> > tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c | 245 ++++++++++++++++++
> > 3 files changed, 297 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
> > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
> >
> > diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
> > index 412de8093e6c..ccc382a827f1 100644
> > --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
> > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
> > @@ -33,8 +33,14 @@ ifeq ($(ARCH),s390)
> > UNAME_M := s390x
> > endif
> >
> > +# On some systems the SEV device path may not be present in the standard
> > +# location, so allow it to be configured via, e.g.:
> > +# make TARGETS=kvm SEV_PATH=/path/to/sev_device ...
> > +SEV_PATH=/dev/sev
> > +
> > LIBKVM = lib/assert.c lib/elf.c lib/io.c lib/kvm_util.c lib/rbtree.c lib/sparsebit.c lib/test_util.c lib/guest_modes.c lib/perf_test_util.c lib/ucall_common.c
> > LIBKVM_x86_64 = lib/x86_64/apic.c lib/x86_64/processor.c lib/x86_64/vmx.c lib/x86_64/svm.c lib/x86_64/ucall.c lib/x86_64/handlers.S
> > +LIBKVM_x86_64 += lib/x86_64/sev.c
> > LIBKVM_aarch64 = lib/aarch64/processor.c lib/aarch64/ucall.c lib/aarch64/handlers.S lib/aarch64/spinlock.c lib/aarch64/gic.c lib/aarch64/gic_v3.c lib/aarch64/vgic.c
> > LIBKVM_s390x = lib/s390x/processor.c lib/s390x/ucall.c lib/s390x/diag318_test_handler.c
> >
> > @@ -134,7 +140,8 @@ endif
> > CFLAGS += -Wall -Wstrict-prototypes -Wuninitialized -O2 -g -std=gnu99 \
> > -fno-stack-protector -fno-PIE -I$(LINUX_TOOL_INCLUDE) \
> > -I$(LINUX_TOOL_ARCH_INCLUDE) -I$(LINUX_HDR_PATH) -Iinclude \
> > - -I$(<D) -Iinclude/$(UNAME_M) -I..
> > + -I$(<D) -Iinclude/$(UNAME_M) -I.. \
> > + -DSEV_DEV_PATH=\"$(SEV_PATH)\"
> >
> > no-pie-option := $(call try-run, echo 'int main() { return 0; }' | \
> > $(CC) -Werror -no-pie -x c - -o "$$TMP", -no-pie)
> > diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..2f7f7c741b12
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
> > @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
> > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
> > +/*
> > + * Helpers used for SEV guests
> > + *
> > + * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices
> > + */
> > +#ifndef SELFTEST_KVM_SEV_H
> > +#define SELFTEST_KVM_SEV_H
> > +
> > +#include <stdint.h>
> > +#include <stdbool.h>
> > +#include "kvm_util.h"
> > +
> > +/* Makefile might set this separately for user-overrides */
> > +#ifndef SEV_DEV_PATH
> > +#define SEV_DEV_PATH "/dev/sev"
> > +#endif
>
> Similar logic is already in open_sev_dev_path_or_exit() should we move
> that function here?
Yes, I think that makes sense now that there's a dedicated sev.c
library, and then both tests can inherit the `make SEV_PATH=` option as
well.
>
> > +
> > +#define SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MAJOR 0
> > +#define SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MINOR 17
> > +
> > +#define SEV_POLICY_NO_DBG (1UL << 0)
> > +#define SEV_POLICY_ES (1UL << 2)
> > +
> > +enum {
> > + SEV_GSTATE_UNINIT = 0,
> > + SEV_GSTATE_LUPDATE,
> > + SEV_GSTATE_LSECRET,
> > + SEV_GSTATE_RUNNING,
> > +};
> > +
> > +struct sev_vm;
> > +
> > +void kvm_sev_ioctl(struct sev_vm *sev, int cmd, void *data);
> > +struct kvm_vm *sev_get_vm(struct sev_vm *sev);
> > +uint8_t sev_get_enc_bit(struct sev_vm *sev);
> > +
> > +struct sev_vm *sev_vm_create(uint32_t policy, uint64_t npages);
> > +void sev_vm_free(struct sev_vm *sev);
> > +void sev_vm_launch(struct sev_vm *sev);
> > +void sev_vm_launch_measure(struct sev_vm *sev, uint8_t *measurement);
> > +void sev_vm_launch_finish(struct sev_vm *sev);
> > +
> > +#endif /* SELFTEST_KVM_SEV_H */
> > diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..4a99862d62e6
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
> > @@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
> > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> > +/*
> > + * Helpers used for SEV guests
> > + *
> > + * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices
> > + */
> > +
> > +#include <stdint.h>
> > +#include <stdbool.h>
> > +#include "kvm_util.h"
> > +#include "linux/psp-sev.h"
> > +#include "processor.h"
> > +#include "sev.h"
> > +
> > +#define PAGE_SHIFT 12
> > +#define PAGE_SIZE (1UL << PAGE_SHIFT)
> > +
> > +struct sev_vm {
> > + struct kvm_vm *vm;
> > + int fd;
> > + int enc_bit;
> > + uint32_t sev_policy;
> > +};
> > +
> > +/* Common SEV helpers/accessors. */
> > +
> > +struct kvm_vm *sev_get_vm(struct sev_vm *sev)
> > +{
> > + return sev->vm;
> > +}
> > +
> > +uint8_t sev_get_enc_bit(struct sev_vm *sev)
> > +{
> > + return sev->enc_bit;
> > +}
> > +
> > +void sev_ioctl(int sev_fd, int cmd, void *data)
> > +{
> > + int ret;
> > + struct sev_issue_cmd arg;
> > +
> > + arg.cmd = cmd;
> > + arg.data = (unsigned long)data;
> > + ret = ioctl(sev_fd, SEV_ISSUE_CMD, &arg);
> > + TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0,
> > + "SEV ioctl %d failed, error: %d, fw_error: %d",
> > + cmd, ret, arg.error);
> > +}
> > +
> > +void kvm_sev_ioctl(struct sev_vm *sev, int cmd, void *data)
> > +{
> > + struct kvm_sev_cmd arg = {0};
> > + int ret;
> > +
> > + arg.id = cmd;
> > + arg.sev_fd = sev->fd;
> > + arg.data = (__u64)data;
> > +
> > + ret = ioctl(vm_get_fd(sev->vm), KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP, &arg);
>
> If the helper vm_get_fd() exists why not add another which takes a
> struct sev_vm. So you can do __vm_get_fd(sev) here?
I can add it as a local helper for now, maybe sev_get_kvm_fd(), to
distinguish from the SEV_PATH fd? I'm not sure it's worth exporting it
as part of the library though since vm_get_fd(sev_get_vm(sev)) would be
more familiar to callers that are already used to the kvm_util library.
>
> > + TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0,
> > + "SEV KVM ioctl %d failed, rc: %i errno: %i (%s), fw_error: %d",
> > + cmd, ret, errno, strerror(errno), arg.error);
> > +}
>
> Can you dedup this from sev_ioctl() in sev_migrate_tests.c? That
> function already correctly asserts the fw_error.
This is a little bit awkward since sev_ioctl() in sev_migrate_tests opens
SEV_PATH on demand whereas this one pulls it out of struct sev_vm. I
could make kvm_sev_ioctl() expect the KVM fd as a parameter but that
means external callers need another call to pull it out of struct
sev_vm.
So maybe it would be better to handle that part as part of a separate patch
that moves sev_migrate_tests over to using this library?
>
> > +
> > +/* Local helpers. */
> > +
> > +static void
> > +sev_register_user_region(struct sev_vm *sev, void *hva, uint64_t size)
> > +{
> > + struct kvm_enc_region range = {0};
> > + int ret;
> > +
> > + pr_debug("%s: hva: %p, size: %lu\n", __func__, hva, size);
> > +
> > + range.addr = (__u64)hva;
> > + range.size = size;
> > +
> > + ret = ioctl(vm_get_fd(sev->vm), KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION, &range);
> > + TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0, "failed to register user range, errno: %i\n", errno);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void
> > +sev_encrypt_phy_range(struct sev_vm *sev, vm_paddr_t gpa, uint64_t size)
> > +{
> > + struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data ksev_update_data = {0};
> > +
> > + pr_debug("%s: addr: 0x%lx, size: %lu\n", __func__, gpa, size);
> > +
> > + ksev_update_data.uaddr = (__u64)addr_gpa2hva(sev->vm, gpa);
> > + ksev_update_data.len = size;
> > +
> > + kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, &ksev_update_data);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void sev_encrypt(struct sev_vm *sev)
> > +{
> > + const struct sparsebit *enc_phy_pages;
> > + struct kvm_vm *vm = sev->vm;
> > + sparsebit_idx_t pg = 0;
> > + vm_paddr_t gpa_start;
> > + uint64_t memory_size;
> > +
> > + /* Only memslot 0 supported for now. */
> > + enc_phy_pages = vm_get_encrypted_phy_pages(sev->vm, 0, &gpa_start, &memory_size);
> > + TEST_ASSERT(enc_phy_pages, "Unable to retrieve encrypted pages bitmap");
> > + while (pg < (memory_size / vm_get_page_size(vm))) {
>
> For readability could we save have a new variable:
>
> const uint64_t page_size = vm_get_page_size(vm);
Makes sense, would reduce some repitition as well.
>
> > + sparsebit_idx_t pg_cnt;
> > +
> > + if (sparsebit_is_clear(enc_phy_pages, pg)) {
> > + pg = sparsebit_next_set(enc_phy_pages, pg);
> > + if (!pg)
> > + break;
> > + }
> > +
> > + pg_cnt = sparsebit_next_clear(enc_phy_pages, pg) - pg;
> > + if (pg_cnt <= 0)
> > + pg_cnt = 1;
> > +
> > + sev_encrypt_phy_range(sev,
> > + gpa_start + pg * vm_get_page_size(vm),
> > + pg_cnt * vm_get_page_size(vm));
> > + pg += pg_cnt;
> > + }
> > +}
> > +
> > +/* SEV VM implementation. */
> > +
> > +static struct sev_vm *sev_vm_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm)
> > +{
> > + struct sev_user_data_status sev_status = {0};
> > + uint32_t eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
> > + struct sev_vm *sev;
> > + int sev_fd;
> > +
> > + sev_fd = open(SEV_DEV_PATH, O_RDWR);
>
> As noted above please use open_sev_dev_path_or_exit()
Will do.
>
> > + if (sev_fd < 0) {
> > + pr_info("Failed to open SEV device, path: %s, error: %d, skipping test.\n",
> > + SEV_DEV_PATH, sev_fd);
> > + return NULL;
> > + }
> > +
> > + sev_ioctl(sev_fd, SEV_PLATFORM_STATUS, &sev_status);
> > +
> > + if (!(sev_status.api_major > SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MAJOR ||
> > + (sev_status.api_major == SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MAJOR &&
> > + sev_status.api_minor >= SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MINOR))) {
> > + pr_info("SEV FW version too old. Have API %d.%d (build: %d), need %d.%d, skipping test.\n",
> > + sev_status.api_major, sev_status.api_minor, sev_status.build,
> > + SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MAJOR, SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MINOR);
>
> Technically we are returning NULL not skipping the test.
Yah, "SEV is not supported on this host" would probably be a more
accurate message.
>
> > + return NULL;
> > + }
> > +
> > + sev = calloc(1, sizeof(*sev));
> > + sev->fd = sev_fd;
> > + sev->vm = vm;
> > +
> > + /* Get encryption bit via CPUID. */
> > + eax = 0x8000001f;
> > + ecx = 0;
> > + cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
> > + sev->enc_bit = ebx & 0x3F;
>
> Can we get macros for these magics?
Will do.
>
> > +
> > + return sev;
> > +}
> > +
> > +void sev_vm_free(struct sev_vm *sev)
> > +{
> > + kvm_vm_free(sev->vm);
> > + close(sev->fd);
> > + free(sev);
> > +}
> > +
> > +struct sev_vm *sev_vm_create(uint32_t policy, uint64_t npages)
> > +{
> > + struct sev_vm *sev;
> > + struct kvm_vm *vm;
> > +
> > + /* Need to handle memslots after init, and after setting memcrypt. */
> > + vm = vm_create(VM_MODE_DEFAULT, 0, O_RDWR);
> > + sev = sev_vm_alloc(vm);
> > + if (!sev)
> > + return NULL;
> > + sev->sev_policy = policy;
> > +
> > + kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_INIT, NULL);
> > +
> > + vm_set_memory_encryption(vm, true, true, sev->enc_bit);
> > + vm_userspace_mem_region_add(vm, VM_MEM_SRC_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0, npages, 0);
> > + sev_register_user_region(sev, addr_gpa2hva(vm, 0),
> > + npages * vm_get_page_size(vm));
> > +
> > + pr_info("SEV guest created, policy: 0x%x, size: %lu KB\n",
> > + sev->sev_policy, npages * vm_get_page_size(vm) / 1024);
> > +
> > + return sev;
> > +}
> > +
> > +void sev_vm_launch(struct sev_vm *sev)
> > +{
> > + struct kvm_sev_launch_start ksev_launch_start = {0};
> > + struct kvm_sev_guest_status ksev_status = {0};
> > +
> > + /* Need to use ucall_shared for synchronization. */
> > + ucall_init_ops(sev_get_vm(sev), NULL, &ucall_ops_halt);
> > +
> > + ksev_launch_start.policy = sev->sev_policy;
> > + kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START, &ksev_launch_start);
> > + kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &ksev_status);
> > + TEST_ASSERT(ksev_status.policy == sev->sev_policy, "Incorrect guest policy.");
> > + TEST_ASSERT(ksev_status.state == SEV_GSTATE_LUPDATE,
> > + "Unexpected guest state: %d", ksev_status.state);
>
> In this file we've done this a lot. Thoughts about a helper like this?
>
> + void assert_guest_state(uint32_t expected_state, struct sev_vm *sev)
> + {
> + struct kvm_sev_guest_status ksev_status = {0};
> +
> + TEST_ASSERT(ksev_status.state == SEV_GSTATE_LUPDATE,
> + "Unexpected guest state: %d", ksev_status.state);
> + }
Yah, that would be pretty useful.
>
>
> > +
> > + sev_encrypt(sev);
> > +}
> > +
> > +void sev_vm_launch_measure(struct sev_vm *sev, uint8_t *measurement)
> > +{
> > + struct kvm_sev_launch_measure ksev_launch_measure = {0};
> > + struct kvm_sev_guest_status ksev_guest_status = {0};
> > +
> > + ksev_launch_measure.len = 256;
> > + ksev_launch_measure.uaddr = (__u64)measurement;
>
> Can we document that this measure pointer must be backed by at least a
> given amount of memory?
Yah, maybe I should just have the caller report the buffer length and
then assert the minimum length here. Maybe with an accompanying
SEV_MEASURE_BUF_LEN_MIN or something along that line.
>
> Also should this be 48 as the length required (256bits for MEASURE and
> 128 for MNONCE?
The measurement buffer format is documented, but the spec doesn't
document the minimum size and seems to be written so that it can return
INVALID_LENGTH if more fields needed to be added in the future, so I
figured some additional bytes couldn't hurt since we're expecting
callers to allocate a sufficiently sized buffer in advance and hope for
the best.
The proper way to do this would probably be to probe for the measurement
length, which is supposed to be reported as part of INVALID_LENGTH, but
callers don't really have a way to recover in that situation if they are
using a static buffer. So maybe I should just allocate/return the buffer
and buffer length as part of this command and let the caller free() it
after.
>
> > + kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE, &ksev_launch_measure);
> > +
> > + /* Measurement causes a state transition, check that. */
> > + kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &ksev_guest_status);
> > + TEST_ASSERT(ksev_guest_status.state == SEV_GSTATE_LSECRET,
> > + "Unexpected guest state: %d", ksev_guest_status.state);
> > +}
> > +
> > +void sev_vm_launch_finish(struct sev_vm *sev)
> > +{
> > + struct kvm_sev_guest_status ksev_status = {0};
> > +
> > + kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &ksev_status);
> > + TEST_ASSERT(ksev_status.state == SEV_GSTATE_LUPDATE ||
> > + ksev_status.state == SEV_GSTATE_LSECRET,
> > + "Unexpected guest state: %d", ksev_status.state);
>
> We don't pre check the state in any other calls, should we? Or why are we here?
Yes, I think we should add similar checks in the others as well.
Thanks!
-Mike
>
>
> > +
> > + kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH, NULL);
> > +
> > + kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &ksev_status);
> > + TEST_ASSERT(ksev_status.state == SEV_GSTATE_RUNNING,
> > + "Unexpected guest state: %d", ksev_status.state);
> > +}
> > --
> > 2.25.1
> >
