On Wed, Nov 17, 2021 at 1:05 PM Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Kyle Huey <me@xxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
>
> > On Wed, Nov 17, 2021 at 11:05 AM Kyle Huey <me@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>
> >> On Wed, Nov 17, 2021 at 10:51 AM Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >> >
> >> > On Wed, Nov 17, 2021 at 10:47:13AM -0800, Kyle Huey wrote:
> >> > > rr, a userspace record and replay debugger[0], is completely broken on
> >> > > 5.16rc1. I bisected this to 00b06da29cf9dc633cdba87acd3f57f4df3fd5c7.
> >> > >
> >> > > That patch makes two changes, it blocks sigaction from changing signal
> >> > > handlers once the kernel has decided to force the program to take a
> >> > > signal and it also stops notifying ptracers of the signal in the same
> >> > > circumstances. The latter behavior is just wrong. There's no reason
> >> > > that ptrace should not be able to observe and even change
> >> > > (non-SIGKILL) forced signals. It should be reverted.
> >> > >
> >> > > This behavior change is also observable in gdb. If you take a program
> >> > > that sets SIGSYS to SIG_IGN and then raises a SIGSYS via
> >> > > SECCOMP_RET_TRAP and run it under gdb on a good kernel gdb will stop
> >> > > when the SIGSYS is raised, let you inspect program state, etc. After
> >> > > the SA_IMMUTABLE change gdb won't stop until the program has already
> >> > > died of SIGSYS.
> >> >
> >> > Ah, hm, this was trying to fix the case where a program trips
> >> > SECCOMP_RET_KILL (which is a "fatal SIGSYS"), and had been unobservable
> >> > before. I guess the fix was too broad...
> >>
> >> Perhaps I don't understand precisely what you mean by this, but gdb's
> >> behavior for a program that is SECCOMP_RET_KILLed was not changed by
> >> this patch (the SIGSYS is not observed until after program exit before
> >> or after this change).
> >
> > Ah, maybe that behavior changed in 5.15 (my "before" here is a 5.14
> > kernel). I would argue that the debugger seeing the SIGSYS for
> > SECCOMP_RET_KILL is desirable though ...
>
> This is definitely worth discussing, and probably in need of fixing (aka
> something in rr seems to have broken).
I mean this in the nicest possible way: fixing this is not optional.
> We definitely need protection against the race with sigaction.
Sure, no argument here, and that doesn't cause any problems for us.
> The fundamental question becomes does it make sense and is it safe
> to allow a debugger to stop at, and possibly change these signals.
And the answer is yes, because at least some of these signals are
generated by actions of the debugger (e.g. setting a breakpoint).
> Stopping at something SA_IMMUTABLE as long as the signal is allowed to
> continue and kill the process when PTRACE_CONT happens seems harmless.
>
> Allowing the debugger to change the signal, or change it's handling
> I don't know.
This is required to support breakpoints.
> All of this is channeled through the following function.
>
> > static int
> > force_sig_info_to_task(struct kernel_siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t, bool sigdfl)
> > {
> > unsigned long int flags;
> > int ret, blocked, ignored;
> > struct k_sigaction *action;
> > int sig = info->si_signo;
> >
> > spin_lock_irqsave(&t->sighand->siglock, flags);
> > action = &t->sighand->action[sig-1];
> > ignored = action->sa.sa_handler == SIG_IGN;
> > blocked = sigismember(&t->blocked, sig);
> > if (blocked || ignored || sigdfl) {
> > action->sa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL;
> > action->sa.sa_flags |= SA_IMMUTABLE;
> > if (blocked) {
> > sigdelset(&t->blocked, sig);
> > recalc_sigpending_and_wake(t);
> > }
> > }
> > /*
> > * Don't clear SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE for traced tasks, users won't expect
> > * debugging to leave init killable.
> > */
> > if (action->sa.sa_handler == SIG_DFL && !t->ptrace)
> > t->signal->flags &= ~SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE;
> > ret = send_signal(sig, info, t, PIDTYPE_PID);
> > spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->sighand->siglock, flags);
> >
> > return ret;
> > }
>
> Right now we have 3 conditions that trigger SA_IMMUTABLE.
> - The sigdfl parameter is passed asking that userspace not be able to
> change the handling of the signal.
>
> - A synchronous exception is taken and the signal is blocked.
>
> - A synchronous exception is taken and the signal is ignored.
Delivering signals to a ptracee in the latter two cases is simply not
optional. As it stands with your change, a program that blocks SIGTRAP
or sets its SIGTRAP handler to SIG_IGN becomes undebuggable. If a
debugger injects a breakpoint or uses PTRACE_SINGLESTEP on a tracee
the delivery of that signal can't be controlled by the tracee's signal
state.
> Today because of how things are implemented the code most change the
> userspace state to allow the signal to kill the process. I really want
> to get rid of that, because that has other side effects. As part of
> getting rid of changing the state it is my plan to get rid of
> SA_IMMUTABLE as well. If I don't have to allow the debugger to stop and
> observe what is happening with the signal that change is much easier to
> implement.
>
> The classic trigger of sigdfl is a recursive SIGSEGV.
>
> However we have other cases like SECCOMP_RET_KILL where the kernel
> has never allowed userspace to intercept the killing of the
> process. Things that have messages like: "seccomp tried to change
> syscall nr or ip"
>
> My brain is drawing a blank on how to analyze those.
>
> Kees I am back to asking the question I had before I figured out
> SA_IMMUTABLE. Are there security concerns with debuggers intercepting
> SECCOMP_RET_KILL.
>
> I think I can modify dequeue_synchronous_signal so that we can perform
> the necessary logic in get_signal rather than hack up the signal
> handling state in force_sig_info_to_task.
>
> Except for the cases like SECCOMP_RET_KILL where the kernel has never
> allowed userspace to intercept the handling. I don't see any
> fundamental reason why ptrace could not intercept the signal. The
> handling is overriden to force the process to die, because the way
> userspace is currently configured to handle the signal does not work so
> it is necessary to kill the process.
>
> I think there are cases where the userspace state is known to be
> sufficiently wrong that the kernel can not safely allow anything more
> than inspecting the state.
>
> I can revisit the code to see if the kernel will get confused if
> something more is allowed. Still I really like the current semantics of
> SA_IMMUTABLE because these are cases where something wrong. If someone
> miscalculates how things are wrong it could result in the kernel getting
> confused and doing the wrong thing. Allowing the debugger to intercept
> the signal requires we risk miscalculating what is wrong.
>
> Kyle how exactly is rr broken? Certainly a historical usage does not
> work. How does this affect actual real world debugging sessions?
rr is broken across the board because of specific things related to
its handling of exit_group (namely we first block all signals in the
tracee, so that we don't catch a signal during our handling of it,
then we hijack the tracee to do some cleanup before exit_group is
really allowed to execute, and we use e.g. PTRACE_SINGLESTEP that
expects to punch through the signal blocking). But even if I fixed
that, I expect there would be other issues. The expectation that these
signals will be delivered is deeply embedded.
> You noticed this and bisected the change quickly so I fully expect
> this does affect real world debugging sessions. I just want to know
> exactly how so that exactly what is wrong can be fixed.
I noticed this because we have a test suite we run against new kernel
releases precisely to catch regressions like this.
You don't need rr to reproduce the underlying issue though. Compile
the following
```
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main() {
signal(SIGTRAP, SIG_IGN);
printf("Hello World\n");
return 0;
}
```
And try to break on the printf under gdb. After you fix that (and the
equivalent where SIGTRAP is blocked) rr should be fine.
- Kyle
> As far as I can tell SA_IMMUTABLE has only been backported to v5.15.x
> where in cleaning things up I made SECCOMP_RET_KILL susceptible to races
> with sigaction, and ptrace. Those races need to be closed or we need to
> decide that we don't actually care if the debugger does things.
>
> Eric
