Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas

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On 22.02.21 10:38, David Hildenbrand wrote:
On 17.02.21 17:19, James Bottomley wrote:
On Tue, 2021-02-16 at 18:16 +0100, David Hildenbrand wrote:
[...]
    The discussion regarding migratability only really popped up
because this is a user-visible thing and not being able to
migrate can be a real problem (fragmentation, ZONE_MOVABLE, ...).

I think the biggest use will potentially come from hardware
acceleration.  If it becomes simple to add say encryption to a
secret page with no cost, then no flag needed.  However, if we only
have a limited number of keys so once we run out no more encrypted
memory then it becomes a costly resource and users might want a
choice of being backed by encryption or not.

Right. But wouldn't HW support with configurable keys etc. need more
syscall parameters (meaning, even memefd_secret() as it is would not
be sufficient?). I suspect the simplistic flag approach might not
be sufficient. I might be wrong because I have no clue about MKTME
and friends.

The theory I was operating under is key management is automatic and
hidden, but key scarcity can't be, so if you flag requesting hardware
backing then you either get success (the kernel found a key) or failure
(the kernel is out of keys).  If we actually want to specify the key
then we need an extra argument and we *must* have a new system call.

Anyhow, I still think extending memfd_create() might just be good
enough - at least for now.

I really think this is the wrong approach for a user space ABI.  If we
think we'll ever need to move to a separate syscall, we should begin
with one.  The pain of trying to shift userspace from memfd_create to a
new syscall would be enormous.  It's not impossible (see clone3) but
it's a pain we should avoid if we know it's coming.

Sorry for the late reply, there is just too much going on :)

*If* we ever realize we need to pass more parameters we can easily have
a new syscall for that purpose. *Then*, we know how that syscall will
look like. Right now, it's just pure speculation.

Until then, going with memfd_create() works just fine IMHO.

The worst think that could happen is that we might not be able to create
all fancy sectremem flavors in the future via memfd_create() but only
via different, highly specialized syscall. I don't see a real problem
with that.


Adding to that, I'll give up arguing now as I have more important things to do. It has been questioned by various people why we need a dedicate syscall and at least for me, without a satisfying answer.

Worst thing is that we end up with a syscall that could have been avoided, for example, because 1. We add existing/future memfd_create() flags to memfd_secret() as well when we need them (sealing, hugetlb., ..). 2. We decide in the future to still add MFD_SECRET support to memfd_secret().

So be it.

--
Thanks,

David / dhildenb




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