Test all of the various openat2(2) flags. A small stress-test of a
symlink-rename attack is included to show that the protections against
".."-based attacks are sufficient.
The main things these self-tests are enforcing are:
* The struct+usize ABI for openat2(2) and copy_struct_from_user() to
ensure that upgrades will be handled gracefully (in addition,
ensuring that misaligned structures are also handled correctly).
* The -EINVAL checks for openat2(2) are all correctly handled to avoid
userspace passing unknown or conflicting flag sets (most
importantly, ensuring that invalid flag combinations are checked).
* All of the RESOLVE_* semantics (including errno values) are
correctly handled with various combinations of paths and flags.
* RESOLVE_IN_ROOT correctly protects against the symlink rename(2)
attack that has been responsible for several CVEs (and likely will
be responsible for several more).
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/openat2/.gitignore | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/openat2/Makefile | 8 +
tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.c | 109 ++++
tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.h | 107 ++++
.../testing/selftests/openat2/openat2_test.c | 320 +++++++++++
.../selftests/openat2/rename_attack_test.c | 160 ++++++
.../testing/selftests/openat2/resolve_test.c | 523 ++++++++++++++++++
8 files changed, 1229 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/.gitignore
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/Makefile
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.h
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/openat2_test.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/rename_attack_test.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/resolve_test.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile
index 4cdbae6f4e61..28996856ed5e 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ TARGETS += powerpc
TARGETS += proc
TARGETS += pstore
TARGETS += ptrace
+TARGETS += openat2
TARGETS += rseq
TARGETS += rtc
TARGETS += seccomp
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bd68f6c3fd07
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+/*_test
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4b93b1417b86
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+
+CFLAGS += -Wall -O2 -g -fsanitize=address -fsanitize=undefined
+TEST_GEN_PROGS := openat2_test resolve_test rename_attack_test
+
+include ../lib.mk
+
+$(TEST_GEN_PROGS): helpers.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.c b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e9a6557ab16f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.c
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Author: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@xxxxxxxxxx>
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2019 SUSE LLC.
+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <syscall.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "helpers.h"
+
+bool needs_openat2(const struct open_how *how)
+{
+ return how->resolve != 0;
+}
+
+int raw_openat2(int dfd, const char *path, void *how, size_t size)
+{
+ int ret = syscall(__NR_openat2, dfd, path, how, size);
+ return ret >= 0 ? ret : -errno;
+}
+
+int sys_openat2(int dfd, const char *path, struct open_how *how)
+{
+ return raw_openat2(dfd, path, how, sizeof(*how));
+}
+
+int sys_openat(int dfd, const char *path, struct open_how *how)
+{
+ int ret = openat(dfd, path, how->flags, how->mode);
+ return ret >= 0 ? ret : -errno;
+}
+
+int sys_renameat2(int olddirfd, const char *oldpath,
+ int newdirfd, const char *newpath, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ int ret = syscall(__NR_renameat2, olddirfd, oldpath,
+ newdirfd, newpath, flags);
+ return ret >= 0 ? ret : -errno;
+}
+
+int touchat(int dfd, const char *path)
+{
+ int fd = openat(dfd, path, O_CREAT);
+ if (fd >= 0)
+ close(fd);
+ return fd;
+}
+
+char *fdreadlink(int fd)
+{
+ char *target, *tmp;
+
+ E_asprintf(&tmp, "/proc/self/fd/%d", fd);
+
+ target = malloc(PATH_MAX);
+ if (!target)
+ ksft_exit_fail_msg("fdreadlink: malloc failed\n");
+ memset(target, 0, PATH_MAX);
+
+ E_readlink(tmp, target, PATH_MAX);
+ free(tmp);
+ return target;
+}
+
+bool fdequal(int fd, int dfd, const char *path)
+{
+ char *fdpath, *dfdpath, *other;
+ bool cmp;
+
+ fdpath = fdreadlink(fd);
+ dfdpath = fdreadlink(dfd);
+
+ if (!path)
+ E_asprintf(&other, "%s", dfdpath);
+ else if (*path == '/')
+ E_asprintf(&other, "%s", path);
+ else
+ E_asprintf(&other, "%s/%s", dfdpath, path);
+
+ cmp = !strcmp(fdpath, other);
+
+ free(fdpath);
+ free(dfdpath);
+ free(other);
+ return cmp;
+}
+
+bool openat2_supported = false;
+
+void __attribute__((constructor)) init(void)
+{
+ struct open_how how = {};
+ int fd;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct open_how) != OPEN_HOW_SIZE_VER0);
+
+ /* Check openat2(2) support. */
+ fd = sys_openat2(AT_FDCWD, ".", &how);
+ openat2_supported = (fd >= 0);
+
+ if (fd >= 0)
+ close(fd);
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.h b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..43ca5ceab6e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.h
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Author: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@xxxxxxxxxx>
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2019 SUSE LLC.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __RESOLVEAT_H__
+#define __RESOLVEAT_H__
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include "../kselftest.h"
+
+#define ARRAY_LEN(X) (sizeof (X) / sizeof (*(X)))
+#define BUILD_BUG_ON(e) ((void)(sizeof(struct { int:(-!!(e)); })))
+
+#ifndef SYS_openat2
+#ifndef __NR_openat2
+#define __NR_openat2 437
+#endif /* __NR_openat2 */
+#define SYS_openat2 __NR_openat2
+#endif /* SYS_openat2 */
+
+/*
+ * Arguments for how openat2(2) should open the target path. If @resolve is
+ * zero, then openat2(2) operates very similarly to openat(2).
+ *
+ * However, unlike openat(2), unknown bits in @flags result in -EINVAL rather
+ * than being silently ignored. @mode must be zero unless one of {O_CREAT,
+ * O_TMPFILE} are set.
+ *
+ * @flags: O_* flags.
+ * @mode: O_CREAT/O_TMPFILE file mode.
+ * @resolve: RESOLVE_* flags.
+ */
+struct open_how {
+ __aligned_u64 flags;
+ __u16 mode;
+ __u16 __padding[3]; /* must be zeroed */
+ __aligned_u64 resolve;
+};
+
+#define OPEN_HOW_SIZE_VER0 24 /* sizeof first published struct */
+#define OPEN_HOW_SIZE_LATEST OPEN_HOW_SIZE_VER0
+
+bool needs_openat2(const struct open_how *how);
+
+#ifndef RESOLVE_IN_ROOT
+/* how->resolve flags for openat2(2). */
+#define RESOLVE_NO_XDEV 0x01 /* Block mount-point crossings
+ (includes bind-mounts). */
+#define RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS 0x02 /* Block traversal through procfs-style
+ "magic-links". */
+#define RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS 0x04 /* Block traversal through all symlinks
+ (implies OEXT_NO_MAGICLINKS) */
+#define RESOLVE_BENEATH 0x08 /* Block "lexical" trickery like
+ "..", symlinks, and absolute
+ paths which escape the dirfd. */
+#define RESOLVE_IN_ROOT 0x10 /* Make all jumps to "/" and ".."
+ be scoped inside the dirfd
+ (similar to chroot(2)). */
+#endif /* RESOLVE_IN_ROOT */
+
+#define E_func(func, ...) \
+ do { \
+ if (func(__VA_ARGS__) < 0) \
+ ksft_exit_fail_msg("%s:%d %s failed\n", \
+ __FILE__, __LINE__, #func);\
+ } while (0)
+
+#define E_asprintf(...) E_func(asprintf, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define E_chmod(...) E_func(chmod, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define E_dup2(...) E_func(dup2, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define E_fchdir(...) E_func(fchdir, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define E_fstatat(...) E_func(fstatat, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define E_kill(...) E_func(kill, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define E_mkdirat(...) E_func(mkdirat, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define E_mount(...) E_func(mount, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define E_prctl(...) E_func(prctl, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define E_readlink(...) E_func(readlink, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define E_setresuid(...) E_func(setresuid, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define E_symlinkat(...) E_func(symlinkat, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define E_touchat(...) E_func(touchat, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define E_unshare(...) E_func(unshare, __VA_ARGS__)
+
+#define E_assert(expr, msg, ...) \
+ do { \
+ if (!(expr)) \
+ ksft_exit_fail_msg("ASSERT(%s:%d) failed (%s): " msg "\n", \
+ __FILE__, __LINE__, #expr, ##__VA_ARGS__); \
+ } while (0)
+
+int raw_openat2(int dfd, const char *path, void *how, size_t size);
+int sys_openat2(int dfd, const char *path, struct open_how *how);
+int sys_openat(int dfd, const char *path, struct open_how *how);
+int sys_renameat2(int olddirfd, const char *oldpath,
+ int newdirfd, const char *newpath, unsigned int flags);
+
+int touchat(int dfd, const char *path);
+char *fdreadlink(int fd);
+bool fdequal(int fd, int dfd, const char *path);
+
+extern bool openat2_supported;
+
+#endif /* __RESOLVEAT_H__ */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/openat2_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/openat2_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0b64fedc008b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/openat2_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,320 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Author: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@xxxxxxxxxx>
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2019 SUSE LLC.
+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sched.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../kselftest.h"
+#include "helpers.h"
+
+/*
+ * O_LARGEFILE is set to 0 by glibc.
+ * XXX: This is wrong on {mips, parisc, powerpc, sparc}.
+ */
+#undef O_LARGEFILE
+#define O_LARGEFILE 0x8000
+
+struct open_how_ext {
+ struct open_how inner;
+ uint32_t extra1;
+ char pad1[128];
+ uint32_t extra2;
+ char pad2[128];
+ uint32_t extra3;
+};
+
+struct struct_test {
+ const char *name;
+ struct open_how_ext arg;
+ size_t size;
+ int err;
+};
+
+#define NUM_OPENAT2_STRUCT_TESTS 10
+#define NUM_OPENAT2_STRUCT_VARIATIONS 13
+
+void test_openat2_struct(void)
+{
+ int misalignments[] = { 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 17, 87 };
+
+ struct struct_test tests[] = {
+ /* Normal struct. */
+ { .name = "normal struct",
+ .arg.inner.flags = O_RDONLY,
+ .size = sizeof(struct open_how) },
+ /* Bigger struct, with zeroed out end. */
+ { .name = "bigger struct (zeroed out)",
+ .arg.inner.flags = O_RDONLY,
+ .size = sizeof(struct open_how_ext) },
+
+ /* Normal struct with broken padding. */
+ { .name = "normal struct (non-zero padding[0])",
+ .arg.inner.flags = O_RDONLY,
+ .arg.inner.__padding = {0xa0, 0x00, 0x00},
+ .size = sizeof(struct open_how_ext), .err = -EINVAL },
+ { .name = "normal struct (non-zero padding[1])",
+ .arg.inner.flags = O_RDONLY,
+ .arg.inner.__padding = {0x00, 0x1a, 0x00},
+ .size = sizeof(struct open_how_ext), .err = -EINVAL },
+ { .name = "normal struct (non-zero padding[2])",
+ .arg.inner.flags = O_RDONLY,
+ .arg.inner.__padding = {0x00, 0x00, 0xef},
+ .size = sizeof(struct open_how_ext), .err = -EINVAL },
+
+ /* TODO: Once expanded, check zero-padding. */
+
+ /* Smaller than version-0 struct. */
+ { .name = "zero-sized 'struct'",
+ .arg.inner.flags = O_RDONLY, .size = 0, .err = -EINVAL },
+ { .name = "smaller-than-v0 struct",
+ .arg.inner.flags = O_RDONLY,
+ .size = OPEN_HOW_SIZE_VER0 - 1, .err = -EINVAL },
+
+ /* Bigger struct, with non-zero trailing bytes. */
+ { .name = "bigger struct (non-zero data in first 'future field')",
+ .arg.inner.flags = O_RDONLY, .arg.extra1 = 0xdeadbeef,
+ .size = sizeof(struct open_how_ext), .err = -E2BIG },
+ { .name = "bigger struct (non-zero data in middle of 'future fields')",
+ .arg.inner.flags = O_RDONLY, .arg.extra2 = 0xfeedcafe,
+ .size = sizeof(struct open_how_ext), .err = -E2BIG },
+ { .name = "bigger struct (non-zero data at end of 'future fields')",
+ .arg.inner.flags = O_RDONLY, .arg.extra3 = 0xabad1dea,
+ .size = sizeof(struct open_how_ext), .err = -E2BIG },
+ };
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_LEN(misalignments) != NUM_OPENAT2_STRUCT_VARIATIONS);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_LEN(tests) != NUM_OPENAT2_STRUCT_TESTS);
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < ARRAY_LEN(tests); i++) {
+ struct struct_test *test = &tests[i];
+ struct open_how_ext how_ext = test->arg;
+
+ for (int j = 0; j < ARRAY_LEN(misalignments); j++) {
+ int fd, misalign = misalignments[j];
+ char *fdpath = NULL;
+ bool failed;
+ void (*resultfn)(const char *msg, ...) = ksft_test_result_pass;
+
+ void *copy = NULL, *how_copy = &how_ext;
+
+ if (!openat2_supported) {
+ ksft_print_msg("openat2(2) unsupported\n");
+ resultfn = ksft_test_result_skip;
+ goto skip;
+ }
+
+ if (misalign) {
+ /*
+ * Explicitly misalign the structure copying it with the given
+ * (mis)alignment offset. The other data is set to be non-zero to
+ * make sure that non-zero bytes outside the struct aren't checked
+ *
+ * This is effectively to check that is_zeroed_user() works.
+ */
+ copy = malloc(misalign + sizeof(how_ext));
+ how_copy = copy + misalign;
+ memset(copy, 0xff, misalign);
+ memcpy(how_copy, &how_ext, sizeof(how_ext));
+ }
+
+ fd = raw_openat2(AT_FDCWD, ".", how_copy, test->size);
+ if (test->err >= 0)
+ failed = (fd < 0);
+ else
+ failed = (fd != test->err);
+ if (fd >= 0) {
+ fdpath = fdreadlink(fd);
+ close(fd);
+ }
+
+ if (failed) {
+ resultfn = ksft_test_result_fail;
+
+ ksft_print_msg("openat2 unexpectedly returned ");
+ if (fdpath)
+ ksft_print_msg("%d['%s']\n", fd, fdpath);
+ else
+ ksft_print_msg("%d (%s)\n", fd, strerror(-fd));
+ }
+
+skip:
+ if (test->err >= 0)
+ resultfn("openat2 with %s argument [misalign=%d] succeeds\n",
+ test->name, misalign);
+ else
+ resultfn("openat2 with %s argument [misalign=%d] fails with %d (%s)\n",
+ test->name, misalign, test->err,
+ strerror(-test->err));
+
+ free(copy);
+ free(fdpath);
+ fflush(stdout);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+struct flag_test {
+ const char *name;
+ struct open_how how;
+ int err;
+};
+
+#define NUM_OPENAT2_FLAG_TESTS 21
+
+void test_openat2_flags(void)
+{
+ struct flag_test tests[] = {
+ /* O_TMPFILE is incompatible with O_PATH and O_CREAT. */
+ { .name = "incompatible flags (O_TMPFILE | O_PATH)",
+ .how.flags = O_TMPFILE | O_PATH | O_RDWR, .err = -EINVAL },
+ { .name = "incompatible flags (O_TMPFILE | O_CREAT)",
+ .how.flags = O_TMPFILE | O_CREAT | O_RDWR, .err = -EINVAL },
+
+ /* O_PATH only permits certain other flags to be set ... */
+ { .name = "compatible flags (O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC)",
+ .how.flags = O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC },
+ { .name = "compatible flags (O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY)",
+ .how.flags = O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY },
+ { .name = "compatible flags (O_PATH | O_NOFOLLOW)",
+ .how.flags = O_PATH | O_NOFOLLOW },
+ /* ... and others are absolutely not permitted. */
+ { .name = "incompatible flags (O_PATH | O_RDWR)",
+ .how.flags = O_PATH | O_RDWR, .err = -EINVAL },
+ { .name = "incompatible flags (O_PATH | O_CREAT)",
+ .how.flags = O_PATH | O_CREAT, .err = -EINVAL },
+ { .name = "incompatible flags (O_PATH | O_EXCL)",
+ .how.flags = O_PATH | O_EXCL, .err = -EINVAL },
+ { .name = "incompatible flags (O_PATH | O_NOCTTY)",
+ .how.flags = O_PATH | O_NOCTTY, .err = -EINVAL },
+ { .name = "incompatible flags (O_PATH | O_DIRECT)",
+ .how.flags = O_PATH | O_DIRECT, .err = -EINVAL },
+ { .name = "incompatible flags (O_PATH | O_LARGEFILE)",
+ .how.flags = O_PATH | O_LARGEFILE, .err = -EINVAL },
+
+ /* ->mode must only be set with O_{CREAT,TMPFILE}. */
+ { .name = "non-zero how.mode and O_RDONLY",
+ .how.flags = O_RDONLY, .how.mode = 0600, .err = -EINVAL },
+ { .name = "non-zero how.mode and O_PATH",
+ .how.flags = O_PATH, .how.mode = 0600, .err = -EINVAL },
+ { .name = "valid how.mode and O_CREAT",
+ .how.flags = O_CREAT, .how.mode = 0600 },
+ { .name = "valid how.mode and O_TMPFILE",
+ .how.flags = O_TMPFILE | O_RDWR, .how.mode = 0600 },
+ /* ->mode must only contain 0777 bits. */
+ { .name = "invalid how.mode and O_CREAT",
+ .how.flags = O_CREAT,
+ .how.mode = 0xFFFF, .err = -EINVAL },
+ { .name = "invalid how.mode and O_TMPFILE",
+ .how.flags = O_TMPFILE | O_RDWR,
+ .how.mode = 0x1337, .err = -EINVAL },
+
+ /* ->resolve must only contain RESOLVE_* flags. */
+ { .name = "invalid how.resolve and O_RDONLY",
+ .how.flags = O_RDONLY,
+ .how.resolve = 0x1337, .err = -EINVAL },
+ { .name = "invalid how.resolve and O_CREAT",
+ .how.flags = O_CREAT,
+ .how.resolve = 0x1337, .err = -EINVAL },
+ { .name = "invalid how.resolve and O_TMPFILE",
+ .how.flags = O_TMPFILE | O_RDWR,
+ .how.resolve = 0x1337, .err = -EINVAL },
+ { .name = "invalid how.resolve and O_PATH",
+ .how.flags = O_PATH,
+ .how.resolve = 0x1337, .err = -EINVAL },
+ };
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_LEN(tests) != NUM_OPENAT2_FLAG_TESTS);
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < ARRAY_LEN(tests); i++) {
+ int fd, fdflags = -1;
+ char *path, *fdpath = NULL;
+ bool failed = false;
+ struct flag_test *test = &tests[i];
+ void (*resultfn)(const char *msg, ...) = ksft_test_result_pass;
+
+ if (!openat2_supported) {
+ ksft_print_msg("openat2(2) unsupported\n");
+ resultfn = ksft_test_result_skip;
+ goto skip;
+ }
+
+ path = (test->how.flags & O_CREAT) ? "/tmp/ksft.openat2_tmpfile" : ".";
+ unlink(path);
+
+ fd = sys_openat2(AT_FDCWD, path, &test->how);
+ if (test->err >= 0)
+ failed = (fd < 0);
+ else
+ failed = (fd != test->err);
+ if (fd >= 0) {
+ int otherflags;
+
+ fdpath = fdreadlink(fd);
+ fdflags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL);
+ otherflags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFD);
+ close(fd);
+
+ E_assert(fdflags >= 0, "fcntl F_GETFL of new fd");
+ E_assert(otherflags >= 0, "fcntl F_GETFD of new fd");
+
+ /* O_CLOEXEC isn't shown in F_GETFL. */
+ if (otherflags & FD_CLOEXEC)
+ fdflags |= O_CLOEXEC;
+ /* O_CREAT is hidden from F_GETFL. */
+ if (test->how.flags & O_CREAT)
+ fdflags |= O_CREAT;
+ if (!(test->how.flags & O_LARGEFILE))
+ fdflags &= ~O_LARGEFILE;
+ failed |= (fdflags != test->how.flags);
+ }
+
+ if (failed) {
+ resultfn = ksft_test_result_fail;
+
+ ksft_print_msg("openat2 unexpectedly returned ");
+ if (fdpath)
+ ksft_print_msg("%d['%s'] with %X (!= %X)\n",
+ fd, fdpath, fdflags,
+ test->how.flags);
+ else
+ ksft_print_msg("%d (%s)\n", fd, strerror(-fd));
+ }
+
+skip:
+ if (test->err >= 0)
+ resultfn("openat2 with %s succeeds\n", test->name);
+ else
+ resultfn("openat2 with %s fails with %d (%s)\n",
+ test->name, test->err, strerror(-test->err));
+
+ free(fdpath);
+ fflush(stdout);
+ }
+}
+
+#define NUM_TESTS (NUM_OPENAT2_STRUCT_VARIATIONS * NUM_OPENAT2_STRUCT_TESTS + \
+ NUM_OPENAT2_FLAG_TESTS)
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ ksft_print_header();
+ ksft_set_plan(NUM_TESTS);
+
+ test_openat2_struct();
+ test_openat2_flags();
+
+ if (ksft_get_fail_cnt() + ksft_get_error_cnt() > 0)
+ ksft_exit_fail();
+ else
+ ksft_exit_pass();
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/rename_attack_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/rename_attack_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0a770728b436
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/rename_attack_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Author: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@xxxxxxxxxx>
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2019 SUSE LLC.
+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sched.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <syscall.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "../kselftest.h"
+#include "helpers.h"
+
+/* Construct a test directory with the following structure:
+ *
+ * root/
+ * |-- a/
+ * | `-- c/
+ * `-- b/
+ */
+int setup_testdir(void)
+{
+ int dfd;
+ char dirname[] = "/tmp/ksft-openat2-rename-attack.XXXXXX";
+
+ /* Make the top-level directory. */
+ if (!mkdtemp(dirname))
+ ksft_exit_fail_msg("setup_testdir: failed to create tmpdir\n");
+ dfd = open(dirname, O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY);
+ if (dfd < 0)
+ ksft_exit_fail_msg("setup_testdir: failed to open tmpdir\n");
+
+ E_mkdirat(dfd, "a", 0755);
+ E_mkdirat(dfd, "b", 0755);
+ E_mkdirat(dfd, "a/c", 0755);
+
+ return dfd;
+}
+
+/* Swap @dirfd/@a and @dirfd/@b constantly. Parent must kill this process. */
+pid_t spawn_attack(int dirfd, char *a, char *b)
+{
+ pid_t child = fork();
+ if (child != 0)
+ return child;
+
+ /* If the parent (the test process) dies, kill ourselves too. */
+ E_prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGKILL);
+
+ /* Swap @a and @b. */
+ for (;;)
+ renameat2(dirfd, a, dirfd, b, RENAME_EXCHANGE);
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+#define NUM_RENAME_TESTS 2
+#define ROUNDS 400000
+
+const char *flagname(int resolve)
+{
+ switch (resolve) {
+ case RESOLVE_IN_ROOT:
+ return "RESOLVE_IN_ROOT";
+ case RESOLVE_BENEATH:
+ return "RESOLVE_BENEATH";
+ }
+ return "(unknown)";
+}
+
+void test_rename_attack(int resolve)
+{
+ int dfd, afd;
+ pid_t child;
+ void (*resultfn)(const char *msg, ...) = ksft_test_result_pass;
+ int escapes = 0, other_errs = 0, exdevs = 0, eagains = 0, successes = 0;
+
+ struct open_how how = {
+ .flags = O_PATH,
+ .resolve = resolve,
+ };
+
+ if (!openat2_supported) {
+ how.resolve = 0;
+ ksft_print_msg("openat2(2) unsupported -- using openat(2) instead\n");
+ }
+
+ dfd = setup_testdir();
+ afd = openat(dfd, "a", O_PATH);
+ if (afd < 0)
+ ksft_exit_fail_msg("test_rename_attack: failed to open 'a'\n");
+
+ child = spawn_attack(dfd, "a/c", "b");
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < ROUNDS; i++) {
+ int fd;
+ char *victim_path = "c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../../c/../..";
+
+ if (openat2_supported)
+ fd = sys_openat2(afd, victim_path, &how);
+ else
+ fd = sys_openat(afd, victim_path, &how);
+
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ if (fd == -EAGAIN)
+ eagains++;
+ else if (fd == -EXDEV)
+ exdevs++;
+ else if (fd == -ENOENT)
+ escapes++; /* escaped outside and got ENOENT... */
+ else
+ other_errs++; /* unexpected error */
+ } else {
+ if (fdequal(fd, afd, NULL))
+ successes++;
+ else
+ escapes++; /* we got an unexpected fd */
+ }
+ close(fd);
+ }
+
+ if (escapes > 0)
+ resultfn = ksft_test_result_fail;
+ ksft_print_msg("non-escapes: EAGAIN=%d EXDEV=%d E<other>=%d success=%d\n",
+ eagains, exdevs, other_errs, successes);
+ resultfn("rename attack with %s (%d runs, got %d escapes)\n",
+ flagname(resolve), ROUNDS, escapes);
+
+ /* Should be killed anyway, but might as well make sure. */
+ E_kill(child, SIGKILL);
+}
+
+#define NUM_TESTS NUM_RENAME_TESTS
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ ksft_print_header();
+ ksft_set_plan(NUM_TESTS);
+
+ test_rename_attack(RESOLVE_BENEATH);
+ test_rename_attack(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT);
+
+ if (ksft_get_fail_cnt() + ksft_get_error_cnt() > 0)
+ ksft_exit_fail();
+ else
+ ksft_exit_pass();
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/resolve_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/resolve_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7a94b1da8e7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/resolve_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,523 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Author: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@xxxxxxxxxx>
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2019 SUSE LLC.
+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sched.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../kselftest.h"
+#include "helpers.h"
+
+/*
+ * Construct a test directory with the following structure:
+ *
+ * root/
+ * |-- procexe -> /proc/self/exe
+ * |-- procroot -> /proc/self/root
+ * |-- root/
+ * |-- mnt/ [mountpoint]
+ * | |-- self -> ../mnt/
+ * | `-- absself -> /mnt/
+ * |-- etc/
+ * | `-- passwd
+ * |-- creatlink -> /newfile3
+ * |-- reletc -> etc/
+ * |-- relsym -> etc/passwd
+ * |-- absetc -> /etc/
+ * |-- abssym -> /etc/passwd
+ * |-- abscheeky -> /cheeky
+ * `-- cheeky/
+ * |-- absself -> /
+ * |-- self -> ../../root/
+ * |-- garbageself -> /../../root/
+ * |-- passwd -> ../cheeky/../cheeky/../etc/../etc/passwd
+ * |-- abspasswd -> /../cheeky/../cheeky/../etc/../etc/passwd
+ * |-- dotdotlink -> ../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
+ * `-- garbagelink -> /../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
+ */
+int setup_testdir(void)
+{
+ int dfd, tmpfd;
+ char dirname[] = "/tmp/ksft-openat2-testdir.XXXXXX";
+
+ /* Unshare and make /tmp a new directory. */
+ E_unshare(CLONE_NEWNS);
+ E_mount("", "/tmp", "", MS_PRIVATE, "");
+
+ /* Make the top-level directory. */
+ if (!mkdtemp(dirname))
+ ksft_exit_fail_msg("setup_testdir: failed to create tmpdir\n");
+ dfd = open(dirname, O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY);
+ if (dfd < 0)
+ ksft_exit_fail_msg("setup_testdir: failed to open tmpdir\n");
+
+ /* A sub-directory which is actually used for tests. */
+ E_mkdirat(dfd, "root", 0755);
+ tmpfd = openat(dfd, "root", O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY);
+ if (tmpfd < 0)
+ ksft_exit_fail_msg("setup_testdir: failed to open tmpdir\n");
+ close(dfd);
+ dfd = tmpfd;
+
+ E_symlinkat("/proc/self/exe", dfd, "procexe");
+ E_symlinkat("/proc/self/root", dfd, "procroot");
+ E_mkdirat(dfd, "root", 0755);
+
+ /* There is no mountat(2), so use chdir. */
+ E_mkdirat(dfd, "mnt", 0755);
+ E_fchdir(dfd);
+ E_mount("tmpfs", "./mnt", "tmpfs", MS_NOSUID | MS_NODEV, "");
+ E_symlinkat("../mnt/", dfd, "mnt/self");
+ E_symlinkat("/mnt/", dfd, "mnt/absself");
+
+ E_mkdirat(dfd, "etc", 0755);
+ E_touchat(dfd, "etc/passwd");
+
+ E_symlinkat("/newfile3", dfd, "creatlink");
+ E_symlinkat("etc/", dfd, "reletc");
+ E_symlinkat("etc/passwd", dfd, "relsym");
+ E_symlinkat("/etc/", dfd, "absetc");
+ E_symlinkat("/etc/passwd", dfd, "abssym");
+ E_symlinkat("/cheeky", dfd, "abscheeky");
+
+ E_mkdirat(dfd, "cheeky", 0755);
+
+ E_symlinkat("/", dfd, "cheeky/absself");
+ E_symlinkat("../../root/", dfd, "cheeky/self");
+ E_symlinkat("/../../root/", dfd, "cheeky/garbageself");
+
+ E_symlinkat("../cheeky/../etc/../etc/passwd", dfd, "cheeky/passwd");
+ E_symlinkat("/../cheeky/../etc/../etc/passwd", dfd, "cheeky/abspasswd");
+
+ E_symlinkat("../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd",
+ dfd, "cheeky/dotdotlink");
+ E_symlinkat("/../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd",
+ dfd, "cheeky/garbagelink");
+
+ return dfd;
+}
+
+struct basic_test {
+ const char *name;
+ const char *dir;
+ const char *path;
+ struct open_how how;
+ bool pass;
+ union {
+ int err;
+ const char *path;
+ } out;
+};
+
+#define NUM_OPENAT2_OPATH_TESTS 88
+
+void test_openat2_opath_tests(void)
+{
+ int rootfd, hardcoded_fd;
+ char *procselfexe, *hardcoded_fdpath;
+
+ E_asprintf(&procselfexe, "/proc/%d/exe", getpid());
+ rootfd = setup_testdir();
+
+ hardcoded_fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY);
+ E_assert(hardcoded_fd >= 0, "open fd to hardcode");
+ E_asprintf(&hardcoded_fdpath, "self/fd/%d", hardcoded_fd);
+
+ struct basic_test tests[] = {
+ /** RESOLVE_BENEATH **/
+ /* Attempts to cross dirfd should be blocked. */
+ { .name = "[beneath] jump to /",
+ .path = "/", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[beneath] absolute link to $root",
+ .path = "cheeky/absself", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[beneath] chained absolute links to $root",
+ .path = "abscheeky/absself", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[beneath] jump outside $root",
+ .path = "..", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[beneath] temporary jump outside $root",
+ .path = "../root/", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[beneath] symlink temporary jump outside $root",
+ .path = "cheeky/self", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[beneath] chained symlink temporary jump outside $root",
+ .path = "abscheeky/self", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[beneath] garbage links to $root",
+ .path = "cheeky/garbageself", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[beneath] chained garbage links to $root",
+ .path = "abscheeky/garbageself", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ /* Only relative paths that stay inside dirfd should work. */
+ { .name = "[beneath] ordinary path to 'root'",
+ .path = "root", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.path = "root", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[beneath] ordinary path to 'etc'",
+ .path = "etc", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.path = "etc", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[beneath] ordinary path to 'etc/passwd'",
+ .path = "etc/passwd", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[beneath] relative symlink inside $root",
+ .path = "relsym", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[beneath] chained-'..' relative symlink inside $root",
+ .path = "cheeky/passwd", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[beneath] absolute symlink component outside $root",
+ .path = "abscheeky/passwd", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[beneath] absolute symlink target outside $root",
+ .path = "abssym", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[beneath] absolute path outside $root",
+ .path = "/etc/passwd", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[beneath] cheeky absolute path outside $root",
+ .path = "cheeky/abspasswd", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[beneath] chained cheeky absolute path outside $root",
+ .path = "abscheeky/abspasswd", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ /* Tricky paths should fail. */
+ { .name = "[beneath] tricky '..'-chained symlink outside $root",
+ .path = "cheeky/dotdotlink", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[beneath] tricky absolute + '..'-chained symlink outside $root",
+ .path = "abscheeky/dotdotlink", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[beneath] tricky garbage link outside $root",
+ .path = "cheeky/garbagelink", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[beneath] tricky absolute + garbage link outside $root",
+ .path = "abscheeky/garbagelink", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+
+ /** RESOLVE_IN_ROOT **/
+ /* All attempts to cross the dirfd will be scoped-to-root. */
+ { .name = "[in_root] jump to /",
+ .path = "/", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = NULL, .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[in_root] absolute symlink to /root",
+ .path = "cheeky/absself", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = NULL, .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[in_root] chained absolute symlinks to /root",
+ .path = "abscheeky/absself", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = NULL, .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[in_root] '..' at root",
+ .path = "..", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = NULL, .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[in_root] '../root' at root",
+ .path = "../root/", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "root", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[in_root] relative symlink containing '..' above root",
+ .path = "cheeky/self", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "root", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[in_root] garbage link to /root",
+ .path = "cheeky/garbageself", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "root", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[in_root] chainged garbage links to /root",
+ .path = "abscheeky/garbageself", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "root", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[in_root] relative path to 'root'",
+ .path = "root", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "root", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[in_root] relative path to 'etc'",
+ .path = "etc", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "etc", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[in_root] relative path to 'etc/passwd'",
+ .path = "etc/passwd", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[in_root] relative symlink to 'etc/passwd'",
+ .path = "relsym", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[in_root] chained-'..' relative symlink to 'etc/passwd'",
+ .path = "cheeky/passwd", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[in_root] chained-'..' absolute + relative symlink to 'etc/passwd'",
+ .path = "abscheeky/passwd", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[in_root] absolute symlink to 'etc/passwd'",
+ .path = "abssym", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[in_root] absolute path 'etc/passwd'",
+ .path = "/etc/passwd", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[in_root] cheeky absolute path 'etc/passwd'",
+ .path = "cheeky/abspasswd", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[in_root] chained cheeky absolute path 'etc/passwd'",
+ .path = "abscheeky/abspasswd", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[in_root] tricky '..'-chained symlink outside $root",
+ .path = "cheeky/dotdotlink", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[in_root] tricky absolute + '..'-chained symlink outside $root",
+ .path = "abscheeky/dotdotlink", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[in_root] tricky absolute path + absolute + '..'-chained symlink outside $root",
+ .path = "/../../../../abscheeky/dotdotlink", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[in_root] tricky garbage link outside $root",
+ .path = "cheeky/garbagelink", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[in_root] tricky absolute + garbage link outside $root",
+ .path = "abscheeky/garbagelink", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[in_root] tricky absolute path + absolute + garbage link outside $root",
+ .path = "/../../../../abscheeky/garbagelink", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ /* O_CREAT should handle trailing symlinks correctly. */
+ { .name = "[in_root] O_CREAT of relative path inside $root",
+ .path = "newfile1", .how.flags = O_CREAT,
+ .how.mode = 0700,
+ .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "newfile1", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[in_root] O_CREAT of absolute path",
+ .path = "/newfile2", .how.flags = O_CREAT,
+ .how.mode = 0700,
+ .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "newfile2", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[in_root] O_CREAT of tricky symlink outside root",
+ .path = "/creatlink", .how.flags = O_CREAT,
+ .how.mode = 0700,
+ .how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+ .out.path = "newfile3", .pass = true },
+
+ /** RESOLVE_NO_XDEV **/
+ /* Crossing *down* into a mountpoint is disallowed. */
+ { .name = "[no_xdev] cross into $mnt",
+ .path = "mnt", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_XDEV,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[no_xdev] cross into $mnt/",
+ .path = "mnt/", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_XDEV,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[no_xdev] cross into $mnt/.",
+ .path = "mnt/.", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_XDEV,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ /* Crossing *up* out of a mountpoint is disallowed. */
+ { .name = "[no_xdev] goto mountpoint root",
+ .dir = "mnt", .path = ".", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_XDEV,
+ .out.path = "mnt", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[no_xdev] cross up through '..'",
+ .dir = "mnt", .path = "..", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_XDEV,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[no_xdev] temporary cross up through '..'",
+ .dir = "mnt", .path = "../mnt", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_XDEV,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[no_xdev] temporary relative symlink cross up",
+ .dir = "mnt", .path = "self", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_XDEV,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[no_xdev] temporary absolute symlink cross up",
+ .dir = "mnt", .path = "absself", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_XDEV,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ /* Jumping to "/" is ok, but later components cannot cross. */
+ { .name = "[no_xdev] jump to / directly",
+ .dir = "mnt", .path = "/", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_XDEV,
+ .out.path = "/", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[no_xdev] jump to / (from /) directly",
+ .dir = "/", .path = "/", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_XDEV,
+ .out.path = "/", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[no_xdev] jump to / then proc",
+ .path = "/proc/1", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_XDEV,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[no_xdev] jump to / then tmp",
+ .path = "/tmp", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_XDEV,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ /* Magic-links are blocked since they can switch vfsmounts. */
+ { .name = "[no_xdev] cross through magic-link to self/root",
+ .dir = "/proc", .path = "self/root", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_XDEV,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[no_xdev] cross through magic-link to self/cwd",
+ .dir = "/proc", .path = "self/cwd", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_XDEV,
+ .out.err = -EXDEV, .pass = false },
+ /* Except magic-link jumps inside the same vfsmount. */
+ { .name = "[no_xdev] jump through magic-link to same procfs",
+ .dir = "/proc", .path = hardcoded_fdpath, .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_XDEV,
+ .out.path = "/proc", .pass = true, },
+
+ /** RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS **/
+ /* Regular symlinks should work. */
+ { .name = "[no_magiclinks] ordinary relative symlink",
+ .path = "relsym", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ /* Magic-links should not work. */
+ { .name = "[no_magiclinks] symlink to magic-link",
+ .path = "procexe", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS,
+ .out.err = -ELOOP, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[no_magiclinks] normal path to magic-link",
+ .path = "/proc/self/exe", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS,
+ .out.err = -ELOOP, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[no_magiclinks] normal path to magic-link with O_NOFOLLOW",
+ .path = "/proc/self/exe", .how.flags = O_NOFOLLOW,
+ .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS,
+ .out.path = procselfexe, .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[no_magiclinks] symlink to magic-link path component",
+ .path = "procroot/etc", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS,
+ .out.err = -ELOOP, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[no_magiclinks] magic-link path component",
+ .path = "/proc/self/root/etc", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS,
+ .out.err = -ELOOP, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[no_magiclinks] magic-link path component with O_NOFOLLOW",
+ .path = "/proc/self/root/etc", .how.flags = O_NOFOLLOW,
+ .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS,
+ .out.err = -ELOOP, .pass = false },
+
+ /** RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS **/
+ /* Normal paths should work. */
+ { .name = "[no_symlinks] ordinary path to '.'",
+ .path = ".", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS,
+ .out.path = NULL, .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[no_symlinks] ordinary path to 'root'",
+ .path = "root", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS,
+ .out.path = "root", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[no_symlinks] ordinary path to 'etc'",
+ .path = "etc", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS,
+ .out.path = "etc", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[no_symlinks] ordinary path to 'etc/passwd'",
+ .path = "etc/passwd", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS,
+ .out.path = "etc/passwd", .pass = true },
+ /* Regular symlinks are blocked. */
+ { .name = "[no_symlinks] relative symlink target",
+ .path = "relsym", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS,
+ .out.err = -ELOOP, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[no_symlinks] relative symlink component",
+ .path = "reletc/passwd", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS,
+ .out.err = -ELOOP, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[no_symlinks] absolute symlink target",
+ .path = "abssym", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS,
+ .out.err = -ELOOP, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[no_symlinks] absolute symlink component",
+ .path = "absetc/passwd", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS,
+ .out.err = -ELOOP, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[no_symlinks] cheeky garbage link",
+ .path = "cheeky/garbagelink", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS,
+ .out.err = -ELOOP, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[no_symlinks] cheeky absolute + garbage link",
+ .path = "abscheeky/garbagelink", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS,
+ .out.err = -ELOOP, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[no_symlinks] cheeky absolute + absolute symlink",
+ .path = "abscheeky/absself", .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS,
+ .out.err = -ELOOP, .pass = false },
+ /* Trailing symlinks with NO_FOLLOW. */
+ { .name = "[no_symlinks] relative symlink with O_NOFOLLOW",
+ .path = "relsym", .how.flags = O_NOFOLLOW,
+ .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS,
+ .out.path = "relsym", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[no_symlinks] absolute symlink with O_NOFOLLOW",
+ .path = "abssym", .how.flags = O_NOFOLLOW,
+ .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS,
+ .out.path = "abssym", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[no_symlinks] trailing symlink with O_NOFOLLOW",
+ .path = "cheeky/garbagelink", .how.flags = O_NOFOLLOW,
+ .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS,
+ .out.path = "cheeky/garbagelink", .pass = true },
+ { .name = "[no_symlinks] multiple symlink components with O_NOFOLLOW",
+ .path = "abscheeky/absself", .how.flags = O_NOFOLLOW,
+ .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS,
+ .out.err = -ELOOP, .pass = false },
+ { .name = "[no_symlinks] multiple symlink (and garbage link) components with O_NOFOLLOW",
+ .path = "abscheeky/garbagelink", .how.flags = O_NOFOLLOW,
+ .how.resolve = RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS,
+ .out.err = -ELOOP, .pass = false },
+ };
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_LEN(tests) != NUM_OPENAT2_OPATH_TESTS);
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < ARRAY_LEN(tests); i++) {
+ int dfd, fd;
+ char *fdpath = NULL;
+ bool failed;
+ void (*resultfn)(const char *msg, ...) = ksft_test_result_pass;
+ struct basic_test *test = &tests[i];
+
+ if (!openat2_supported) {
+ ksft_print_msg("openat2(2) unsupported\n");
+ resultfn = ksft_test_result_skip;
+ goto skip;
+ }
+
+ /* Auto-set O_PATH. */
+ if (!(test->how.flags & O_CREAT))
+ test->how.flags |= O_PATH;
+
+ if (test->dir)
+ dfd = openat(rootfd, test->dir, O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY);
+ else
+ dfd = dup(rootfd);
+ E_assert(dfd, "failed to openat root '%s': %m", test->dir);
+
+ E_dup2(dfd, hardcoded_fd);
+
+ fd = sys_openat2(dfd, test->path, &test->how);
+ if (test->pass)
+ failed = (fd < 0 || !fdequal(fd, rootfd, test->out.path));
+ else
+ failed = (fd != test->out.err);
+ if (fd >= 0) {
+ fdpath = fdreadlink(fd);
+ close(fd);
+ }
+ close(dfd);
+
+ if (failed) {
+ resultfn = ksft_test_result_fail;
+
+ ksft_print_msg("openat2 unexpectedly returned ");
+ if (fdpath)
+ ksft_print_msg("%d['%s']\n", fd, fdpath);
+ else
+ ksft_print_msg("%d (%s)\n", fd, strerror(-fd));
+ }
+
+skip:
+ if (test->pass)
+ resultfn("%s gives path '%s'\n", test->name,
+ test->out.path ?: ".");
+ else
+ resultfn("%s fails with %d (%s)\n", test->name,
+ test->out.err, strerror(-test->out.err));
+
+ fflush(stdout);
+ free(fdpath);
+ }
+
+ free(procselfexe);
+ close(rootfd);
+
+ free(hardcoded_fdpath);
+ close(hardcoded_fd);
+}
+
+#define NUM_TESTS NUM_OPENAT2_OPATH_TESTS
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ ksft_print_header();
+ ksft_set_plan(NUM_TESTS);
+
+ /* NOTE: We should be checking for CAP_SYS_ADMIN here... */
+ if (geteuid() != 0)
+ ksft_exit_skip("all tests require euid == 0\n");
+
+ test_openat2_opath_tests();
+
+ if (ksft_get_fail_cnt() + ksft_get_error_cnt() > 0)
+ ksft_exit_fail();
+ else
+ ksft_exit_pass();
+}
--
2.24.0
