On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 12:07:12PM -0600, Tycho Andersen wrote: > On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 10:30:00AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > > On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 10:48:30AM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote: > > > This allows the seccomp notifier to continue a syscall. A positive > > > discussion about this feature was triggered by a post to the > > > ksummit-discuss mailing list (cf. [3]) and took place during KSummit > > > (cf. [1]) and again at the containers/checkpoint-restore > > > micro-conference at Linux Plumbers. > > > > > > Recently we landed seccomp support for SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF (cf. [4]) > > > which enables a process (watchee) to retrieve an fd for its seccomp > > > filter. This fd can then be handed to another (usually more privileged) > > > process (watcher). The watcher will then be able to receive seccomp > > > messages about the syscalls having been performed by the watchee. > > > > > > This feature is heavily used in some userspace workloads. For example, > > > it is currently used to intercept mknod() syscalls in user namespaces > > > aka in containers. > > > The mknod() syscall can be easily filtered based on dev_t. This allows > > > us to only intercept a very specific subset of mknod() syscalls. > > > Furthermore, mknod() is not possible in user namespaces toto coelo and > > > so intercepting and denying syscalls that are not in the whitelist on > > > accident is not a big deal. The watchee won't notice a difference. > > > > > > In contrast to mknod(), a lot of other syscall we intercept (e.g. > > > setxattr()) cannot be easily filtered like mknod() because they have > > > pointer arguments. Additionally, some of them might actually succeed in > > > user namespaces (e.g. setxattr() for all "user.*" xattrs). Since we > > > currently cannot tell seccomp to continue from a user notifier we are > > > stuck with performing all of the syscalls in lieu of the container. This > > > is a huge security liability since it is extremely difficult to > > > correctly assume all of the necessary privileges of the calling task > > > such that the syscall can be successfully emulated without escaping > > > other additional security restrictions (think missing CAP_MKNOD for > > > mknod(), or MS_NODEV on a filesystem etc.). This can be solved by > > > telling seccomp to resume the syscall. > > > > > > One thing that came up in the discussion was the problem that another > > > thread could change the memory after userspace has decided to let the > > > syscall continue which is a well known TOCTOU with seccomp which is > > > present in other ways already. > > > The discussion showed that this feature is already very useful for any > > > syscall without pointer arguments. For any accidentally intercepted > > > non-pointer syscall it is safe to continue. > > > For syscalls with pointer arguments there is a race but for any cautious > > > userspace and the main usec cases the race doesn't matter. The notifier > > > is intended to be used in a scenario where a more privileged watcher > > > supervises the syscalls of lesser privileged watchee to allow it to get > > > around kernel-enforced limitations by performing the syscall for it > > > whenever deemed save by the watcher. Hence, if a user tricks the watcher > > > into allowing a syscall they will either get a deny based on > > > kernel-enforced restrictions later or they will have changed the > > > arguments in such a way that they manage to perform a syscall with > > > arguments that they would've been allowed to do anyway. > > > In general, it is good to point out again, that the notifier fd was not > > > intended to allow userspace to implement a security policy but rather to > > > work around kernel security mechanisms in cases where the watcher knows > > > that a given action is safe to perform. > > > > > > /* References */ > > > [1]: https://linuxplumbersconf.org/event/4/contributions/560 > > > [2]: https://linuxplumbersconf.org/event/4/contributions/477 > > > [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190719093538.dhyopljyr5ns33qx@xxxxxxxxxx > > > [4]: commit 6a21cc50f0c7 ("seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace") > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@xxxxxxxxxx> > > > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > > > Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > > Cc: Will Drewry <wad@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > > > Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@xxxxxxxx> > > > CC: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > > Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx> > > > --- > > > include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h | 2 ++ > > > kernel/seccomp.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++---- > > > 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > > > > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h > > > index 90734aa5aa36..2c23b9aa6383 100644 > > > --- a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h > > > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h > > > @@ -76,6 +76,8 @@ struct seccomp_notif { > > > struct seccomp_data data; > > > }; > > > > > > +#define SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF_ALLOW 0x00000001 > > > > nit: I'd like to avoid confusion here about what "family" these flags > > belong to. "SECCOMP_RET_..." is used for the cBPF filter return action > > value, so let's instead call this: > > > > #define SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_CONTINUE BIT(0) > > +1, I was thinking maybe even SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE. I'll flip a coin between yours and Kees suggestion. :) > > But the whole series (minus the patch that already exists) looks good > to me if we make this change: > > Reviewed-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@xxxxxxxx> Thanks for the review! :) Christian
