> On Sep 29, 2018, at 9:35 AM, Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > +cc linux-api; please keep them in CC for future versions of the patch > >> On Sat, Sep 29, 2018 at 4:29 PM Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> The primary motivation for the need for this flag is container runtimes >> which have to interact with malicious root filesystems in the host >> namespaces. One of the first requirements for a container runtime to be >> secure against a malicious rootfs is that they correctly scope symlinks >> (that is, they should be scoped as though they are chroot(2)ed into the >> container's rootfs) and ".."-style paths. The already-existing AT_XDEV >> and AT_NO_PROCLINKS help defend against other potential attacks in a >> malicious rootfs scenario. > > So, I really like the concept for patch 1 of this series (but haven't > read the code yet); but I dislike this patch because of its footgun > potential. > The code could do it differently: do the path walk and then, before accepting the result, walk back up and make sure the result is under the starting point. This is *not* a full solution, though, since a walk above the root gas side effects on timing, various caches, and possibly network traffic, so it’s open to Spectre-like attacks in which a malicious container could use a runtime-initiated AT_THIS_ROOT to infer the existence of directories outside the container. But what’s the container usecase? Any sane container is based on pivot_root or similar, so the runtime can just do the walk in the container context. IOW I’m a bit confused as to the exact intended use of the whole series. Can you elaborate?
