On a 32bit system the "keylen + sizeof(struct tipc_aead_key)" math could
have an integer wrapping issue. It doesn't matter because the "keylen"
is checked on the next line, but just to make life easier for static
analysis tools, let's re-order these conditions and avoid the integer
overflow.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
net/tipc/crypto.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/tipc/crypto.c b/net/tipc/crypto.c
index 43c3f1c971b8..c524421ec652 100644
--- a/net/tipc/crypto.c
+++ b/net/tipc/crypto.c
@@ -2293,8 +2293,8 @@ static bool tipc_crypto_key_rcv(struct tipc_crypto *rx, struct tipc_msg *hdr)
keylen = ntohl(*((__be32 *)(data + TIPC_AEAD_ALG_NAME)));
/* Verify the supplied size values */
- if (unlikely(size != keylen + sizeof(struct tipc_aead_key) ||
- keylen > TIPC_AEAD_KEY_SIZE_MAX)) {
+ if (unlikely(keylen > TIPC_AEAD_KEY_SIZE_MAX ||
+ size != keylen + sizeof(struct tipc_aead_key))) {
pr_debug("%s: invalid MSG_CRYPTO key size\n", rx->name);
goto exit;
}
--
2.45.2
