On Fri, 10 Jan 2025, Dan Carpenter wrote:
> Ping.
>
> regards,
> dan carpenter
>
> On Wed, Dec 04, 2024 at 03:07:15PM +0300, Dan Carpenter wrote:
> > Most of these sizes and counts are capped at 256MB so the math doesn't
> > result in an integer overflow. The "relocs" count needs to be checked
> > as well. Otherwise on 32bit systems the calculation of "full_data"
> > could be wrong.
> >
> > full_data = data_len + relocs * sizeof(unsigned long);
> >
> > Fixes: c995ee28d29d ("binfmt_flat: prevent kernel dammage from corrupted executable headers")
> > Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@xxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <npitre@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > ---
> > fs/binfmt_flat.c | 2 +-
> > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/fs/binfmt_flat.c b/fs/binfmt_flat.c
> > index 390808ce935d..b5b5ca1a44f7 100644
> > --- a/fs/binfmt_flat.c
> > +++ b/fs/binfmt_flat.c
> > @@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ static int load_flat_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
> > * 28 bits (256 MB) is way more than reasonable in this case.
> > * If some top bits are set we have probable binary corruption.
> > */
> > - if ((text_len | data_len | bss_len | stack_len | full_data) >> 28) {
> > + if ((text_len | data_len | bss_len | stack_len | relocs | full_data) >> 28) {
> > pr_err("bad header\n");
> > ret = -ENOEXEC;
> > goto err;
> > --
> > 2.45.2
>
