Smatch has a new check for Rosenberg type information leaks where
structs are copied to the user with uninitialized stack data in them.
In this case, the hiddev_devinfo struct has a two byte hole.
struct hiddev_devinfo {
__u32 bustype; /* 0 4 */
__u32 busnum; /* 4 4 */
__u32 devnum; /* 8 4 */
__u32 ifnum; /* 12 4 */
__s16 vendor; /* 16 2 */
__s16 product; /* 18 2 */
__s16 version; /* 20 2 */
/* XXX 2 bytes hole, try to pack */
__u32 num_applications; /* 24 4 */
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@xxxxxxxxxx>
diff --git a/drivers/hid/usbhid/hiddev.c b/drivers/hid/usbhid/hiddev.c
index 7c1188b..4ef02b2 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/usbhid/hiddev.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/usbhid/hiddev.c
@@ -641,6 +641,8 @@ static long hiddev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
struct usb_device *dev = hid_to_usb_dev(hid);
struct usbhid_device *usbhid = hid->driver_data;
+ memset(&dinfo, 0, sizeof(dinfo));
+
dinfo.bustype = BUS_USB;
dinfo.busnum = dev->bus->busnum;
dinfo.devnum = dev->devnum;
--
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