Re: [PATCH 34/64] fortify: Detect struct member overflows in memcpy() at compile-time

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On Wed, Jul 28, 2021 at 01:19:59PM +0200, Rasmus Villemoes wrote:
> On 27/07/2021 22.58, Kees Cook wrote:
> 
> > At its core, FORTIFY_SOURCE uses the compiler's __builtin_object_size()
> > internal[0] to determine the available size at a target address based on
> > the compile-time known structure layout details. It operates in two
> > modes: outer bounds (0) and inner bounds (1). In mode 0, the size of the
> > enclosing structure is used. In mode 1, the size of the specific field
> > is used. For example:
> > 
> > 	struct object {
> > 		u16 scalar1;	/* 2 bytes */
> > 		char array[6];	/* 6 bytes */
> > 		u64 scalar2;	/* 8 bytes */
> > 		u32 scalar3;	/* 4 bytes */
> > 	} instance;
> > 
> >
> > __builtin_object_size(instance.array, 0) == 18, since the remaining size
> > of the enclosing structure starting from "array" is 18 bytes (6 + 8 + 4).
> 
> I think the compiler would usually end up making that struct size 24,
> with 4 bytes of trailing padding (at least when alignof(u64) is 8). In
> that case, does __builtin_object_size(instance.array, 0) actually
> evaluate to 18, or to 22? A quick test on x86-64 suggests the latter, so
> the memcpy(, , 20) would not be a violation.
> 
> Perhaps it's better to base the example on something which doesn't have
> potential trailing padding - so either add another 4 byte member, or
> also make scalar2 u32.

Yup, totally right. Thanks! I've fixed the example now for v2.

-- 
Kees Cook



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