On Thu, Mar 20, 2025 at 01:02:13PM +0100, Lennart Poettering wrote:
> diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
> index d1fdd113450a..7783bcacd26c 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
> @@ -7,7 +7,6 @@
> #include <linux/err.h>
> #include <linux/efi.h>
> #include <linux/slab.h>
> -#include <linux/ima.h>
> #include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
> #include <keys/system_keyring.h>
> #include "../integrity.h"
> @@ -211,10 +210,6 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
> kfree(dbx);
> }
>
> - /* the MOK/MOKx can not be trusted when secure boot is disabled */
> - if (!arch_ima_get_secureboot())
> - return 0;
> -
> mokx = get_cert_list(L"MokListXRT", &mok_var, &mokxsize, &status);
> if (!mokx) {
> if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
The original commit message is foggy:
"
integrity: Do not load MOK and MOKx when secure boot be disabled
The security of Machine Owner Key (MOK) relies on secure boot. When
secure boot is disabled, EFI firmware will not verify binary code. Then
arbitrary efi binary code can modify MOK when rebooting.
This patch prevents MOK/MOKx be loaded when secure boot be disabled.
"
Given that I don't understand the problem it is trying to solve:
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
> --
> 2.48.1
>
>
> Lennart
>
> --
> Lennart Poettering, Berlin
>
Jarkko
